Battle of the Trebia

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For the Napoleonic battle of Trebia, see Battle of Trebia (1799)

{{Infobox Military Conflict |conflict=Battle of the Trebia |partof=the Second Punic War |image=Image:Battleofthetrebiamap.JPG |caption= |date=18 December, 218 BC |place=Trebbia River, Italy |casus= |territory= |result=Carthaginian victory |combatant1=Carthage |combatant2=Roman Republic |commander1=Hannibal |commander2=Titus Sempronius Longus |strength1=26,000 |strength2=45,000 |casualties1=Unknown, but low |casualties2=20,000 }} Template:Campaignbox Second Punic War The Battle of the Trebia (or Trebbia) was the first major battle of the Second Punic War, fought between the Carthaginian forces of Hannibal and the Roman Republic in 218 BC.

1 Prelude
2 Battle
- 2.1 Preparation
- 2.2 Events
3 Aftermath
4 References
5 External links

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Prelude

Hannibal began the Second Punic War in 219 BC by attacking the Roman-allied city of Saguntum, in modern Spain. After capturing the city, he marched on Italy proper, leading a force of approximately 40,000 men and dozens of war elephants towards Italy via an inland route, crossing over the Alps. While he lost a large portion of his forces, he made it through the mountains successfully, winning a small battle at the river Ticinus. The Roman Senate, appalled by the early setback at Ticinus, ordered the consul Titus Sempronius Longus, who was stationed in Sicily, to reinforce the existing Roman general, Publius Cornelius Scipio, who had been wounded during the battle. Fortunately, Hannibal, by skillful maneuvers, was in position to head him off, for he lay on the direct road between Placentia and Ariminum, by which Sempronius would have to march in order to reinforce Scipio. But he then captured Clastidium, to resupply his forces; Sempronius took advantage of Hannibal's distraction, slipped around his flank, and joined his colleague in the Roman camp near the Trebia River, flowing from the Apennines into the nearby Po. Hannibal now had no choice but to fight both consuls, and set about luring Sempronius, whose rashness and impulsiveness he knew too well, into a pitched battle on equal terms, before the more cautious Scipio could recover from his wounds and assume command.

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Battle

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Preparation

The December of 218 B.C. was particularly cold and snowy. Scipio was still recovering from his wounds but Sempronius was spoiling for a fight. Eager to come to blows with Hannibal before Scipio could recover and assume command –and particularly as the time for the election of new consuls was drawing near—Sempronius took measures looking for a general engagement, disregarding Scipio’s caution to beware of Hannibal Template:Ref. Unfortunately for Sempronius, Hannibal was aware of this, and prepared a plan to take advantage of Sempronius' impetuosity. Hannibal's force was camped across the frozen Trebia River. He had noticed, says Polybius, a “place between the two camps, flat indeed and treeless, but well adapted for an ambuscade, as it was traverse by water-course with steep banks densely overgrown with brambles and other thorny plants, and here he proposed to lay a stratagem to surprise the enemy” Template:Ref. Hannibal, having ascertained by the use of several Gallic spies the whereabouts of his opponents, which he had deemed essential, sent a chosen detachment of 1,000 light infantry and 1,000 cavalry under the command of his younger brother Mago, to conceal themselves in the underbush among the streambeds along the Trebia under the cover of night, and prepare an ambush for the Romans. Then, the following morning, he sent his cavalry beyond the Trebia to harass the nearby Roman camp and retreat, so as to lure the Romans into a position from which Mago’s hidden detachment could strike at the opportune moment.

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Events

No sooner had the cavalrymen shown up in the vicinity of the Roman camp, than Sempronius sent out his cavalry to drive them off, and shortly afterwards, recklessly sent his entire army of 36,000 Roman infantry, 4,000 allied cavalry, and 3,000 Gallic auxiliaries, towards battle. He was impatient to gain what appeared to him to be victory, though unaware of the trap set for him. The day was raw, snow was falling, the Romans had not yet eaten their morning meal, and by the time the legions had crossed the Trebia fords the men were so tired and chilled that they could barely hold their weapons. The Carthaginians on the other hand, had fed themselves well, and anointed themselves in oil before their campfires. Hannibal now arranged his army on a field of his own choosing. He positioned 1,000 light infantry as skirmishing line, and behind them, he placed the main battle line of 20,000 infantry of African, Spanish, Gallic, and Celtic infantry, with 10,000 cavalry and three elephants split between the two flanks. Sempronius arranged his army in the standard Roman three-line formation, throwing out the velites (Roman skirmish infantry) to the front, and placing the cavalry on the flanks, while the Gallic warriors, who were allied to Rome, were placed on the left of the legions. Image:Battle trebia.gif The light infantry screen first clashed, but the velites performed poorly and they were withdrawn. After the velites retired though the gaps in the Roman line, the hastati and principes (heavy-armed infantry or legionaries) took their place and engaged in a struggle with their opponents. As the opposing heavy infantry remained locked in a severe hand-to-hand struggle, the Carthaginian cavalry and elephants attacked the Roman cavalry, whom they greatly outnumbered. Gradually, the Roman cavalry wings were pushed farther and farther back, leaving their infantry, whom they intended to protect, more and more exposed Template:Ref. Meanwhile, Hannibal had dispatched forward all his war elephants to attack the Gallic allies on the extreme Roman left, whom, having never seen such creatures before, were quickly demoralized and retreated. After the Roman cavalry had been driven off the field, the Carthaginian cavalry fell savagely on the Romans on their unprotected sides, hindering them from dealing with the enemy foot soldiers who faced them Template:Ref. While at the same time, Mago’s hidden force emerged from the ambush and fell upon the rear of the hard-pressed Roman infantry. With their morale already sapped by cold, hunger and fatigue, the Romans broke under this fresh onslaught and then finally collapsed under intense pressure Template:Ref.

What had once been a line of determined fighting soldiers, became a mob of helpless men, whose only remaining strength was in their legs. Thousands were cut down on the spot and trampled by elephants, and many more drowned attempting to cross the river to safety. Trapped in between Hannibal’s forces, the Romans were quickly routed, losing more than a third of their forces. The vanguard of Sempronious’s center had a more fortunate fate. Having been forced to advance by pressure from the rear, the Romans in the center actually defeated the troops opposed them, and managed to break through the Carthaginian line, advancing so far that they became separated from their wings. But seeing that both their flanks had been driven from the field, these men retired in good order to the nearby town of Placentia. This resulted in Hannibal’s first great victory over the Romans.

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Aftermath

The Romans, stunned and dismayed by Sempronius’s defeat at Trebia, immediately made plans to counter the new threat from the north. Sempronius returned to Rome and the Roman senate resolved to elect new consuls the following year in 217 B.C. The two new consuls elected were Gnaeus Servilius and Gaius Flaminius, the latter of which would lead the Roman army to the debacle at Lake Trasimene.

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