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The Chindits (Officially in 1942 77th Indian Infantry Brigade and in 1943 Indian 3rd Infantry Division) were a British Indian Army "Special Force"Template:Ref that served in Burma and India from 1942 until 1945 during the Burma Campaign in World War II. They were formed into long range penetration groups trained to operate deep behind Japanese lines.
The Chindits were the brainchild of British Brigadier Orde Charles Wingate when he was serving under Archibald Wavell, the Supreme Commander of the Far Eastern Theatre in India. The name was suggested by Captain Aung Thin (DSO) of the Burma Army. Chindit is a corrupted form of the suggested name which was of a Burmese mythical beast Chinthé or Chinthay, statues of which guarded Buddhist temples. Officially their name was 77th Indian Infantry Brigade. Wingate took charge of the training of the troops in jungles of central India during the rainy season.
In the Ethiopian campaign of 1940 Wingate had begun to explore the ideas that he used with the Chindits, when he created and commanded a group of Ethiopian 'patriots', known as the Gideon Force, which disrupted Italian supply lines and provided intelligence to British forces. As Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East in 1940, Wavell had given permission for the Gideon Force for political reasons, because he had thought Wingate's idea to be too unorthodox. After the disbandment of Gideon Force, Wavell requested Wingate for service in Burma in 1942 where it was intended that he raise irregular forces to operate behind the Japanese lines similar to how Gideon Force had operated in Ethiopia. Wingate spent his time in Burma touring the country and developing his theory of long range penetration on paper. During the final stages of the British retreat from Burma, Wingate had himself flown back to India where Wavell was willing to listen to his proposals.
The 77th Indian Infantry Brigade, otherwise known as the Chindits, was gradually formed in the area around Jhansi during the summer months of 1942. Half of the Chindits were British infantry soldiers from the 13th Battalion King's Liverpool Regiment, and men from the Bush Warfare School in Burma who were formed into 142 Commando Company. The other portion of the force was made up of the 3/2nd Gurkha Rifles and 2nd Burma Rifles. Wingate trained them as Long-Range Penetration units that were to be supplied through air. Usual armament was rifles, Thompson submachine guns, pistols, mortars, grenades and knives. A mule transport company carried their supplies. RAF sections were attached to each column for the purpose of air coordination. The Chindits were organized into columns under the command of group headquarters which were ultimately under the command of a brigade headquarters.
In February 8 1943 in Operation Longcloth, 3000 Chindits, Wingate with them, begun their march into Burma. The original intent had been to use the Chindits as a part of a larger offensive but it was cancelled. Wingate convinced General Wavell to send the Chindits into Burma in spite of the cancellation of the larger offensive.
The Chindits crossed the Chindwin River on February 13 and faced the first Japanese troops two days later. They were divided into seven columns. Two columns marched to the south and received their air supply drops in broad daylight to create an impression that they were the main attack. They even had a man impersonating a British general along with them. RAF mounted air attacks on Japanese targets to support the deception. These columns were to swing east at the beginning of march and attack the main north-south in areas south of the main force. One column successfully carried out demolitions along the railway but the other column was ambushed. Half of the ambushed column returned to India.
Five other columns proceeded eastward. Two, those of Michael Calvert and Bernard Fergusson, proceeded towards the main north-south railway in Burma. On March 4 Calvert's column reached the valley and demolished the railway in 70 places. Fergusson arrived two days later to do the same. The railway was put out of action only for a very short period.
On many occasions, the Chindits could not take their wounded with them; some were left behind in villages. Wingate had in fact issued specific orders to leave behind all wounded, but these orders were not strictly followed. Since there were often no established paths in the jungle along their routes, many times they had to clear their own with machetes and kukris. A single RAF squadron of 6 planes supplied them by air.
Once in Burma, Wingate repeatedly changed his plans, sometimes without informing all the column commanders. The majority of two of the columns marched back to India after being ambushed by the Japanese in separate actions. After the railway attacks, he decided to cross his force over the Irrawaddy River. However, the area on the other side of the river turned out to be inhospitable to operations. Water was difficult to obtain and the combination of rivers with a good system of roads in the area allowed the Japanese to force the Chindits into a progressively smaller "box".
In late March, Wingate made the decision to withdraw the majority of the force, but sent orders to one of the columns to continue eastward. The operations had reached the range limit of air supply and prospects for new successful operations were low given Japanese pressure. The columns were generally left to make their own way back to India. On the journey back, the most difficult actions involved crossing back over the Irrawaddy River. The Japanese had observers and patrols all along the river bank and could quickly concentrate once an attempt at a crossing was detected. Gradually, all the columns broke up into small groups. Wingate's headquarters returned to India on its own ahead of most of the columns. Through the spring and even into the fall of 1943 individual groups of men from the Chindits made their way back to India. The army did what they could for the men. In one case, an airplane was landed in an open area and wounded men were evacuated by air. Part of one column made it to China. Another portion of the men escaped into the far north of Burma. Others were captured or died.
By the end of April, after the mission of three months, the majority of the surviving Chindits had crossed the Chindwin river. They had lost a total of 818 or more men. Of the other men, Wingate almost hand picked those few he would retain. Both battalions, with the hand-picked exceptions, were put back under the normal army command structure.
Although British army officers in India criticized the effectiveness of the Chindits (Japanese railway communications had been out of commission for less than a week), their effect on the morale of the allied troops in India was refreshing, and they were given plenty of publicity.
Wingate on returning to India wrote an operation report. The report was controversial for many reasons including attacks on officers under his command. The report had a tendency to excuse any mistakes made by its author (Wingate) while viciously attacking other officers often based on limited information. Eventually, through his political allies in London, a copy of the report was given to Winston Churchill who was impressed and took Wingate with him to the Quebec Conference. There they were promised support of a whole air task force. Much of the air transport available for the second operation was provided by C-47 aircraft from the USAAF 1st Air Commando Group which was created to support the Chindits. The US Army also began its own plans for the group that would later become Merrill's Marauders.
The forces for the second Chindit operation were called Special Force, officially 3rd Indian Infantry Division, or Long Range Penetration Groups, but the nickname, the Chindits, had already stuck.
As the members of the first expedition were making their way back to India, a second Long Range Penetration brigade, 111 Indian Infantry Brigade, was being formed by General Wavell without Wingate's knowledge or approval under Brigadier Joe Lentaigne. Wingate's plans for the second expedition demanded a greatly increased force, of six brigades. Wingate refused to use Indian Army formations in this force, because he maintained their training in long-range penetration techniques would take longer and their maintenance by air would be difficult due to the varied dietary requirements of different Indian castes and religions.Template:Ref
Whatever the reason, large numbers of trained British personnel were required quickly, and three brigades (14th, 16th, 23rd) were added to the Chindits by breaking up the experienced British 70th Infantry Division, much against the wishes of General Slim and other commanders, who wished to use the division in a conventional role. A sixth brigade was found by taking a brigade from the West African 81st Division.
The expanded Chindit force trained in Gwalior. In addition to men from previous regiments, new men came also from Black Watch, Queen's Royal, Leicesters, Lancashire Fusiliers and two regiments of Royal Artillery, with three Battalions of the Nigeria Regiment and more Gurkhas. Men were trained in crossing rivers, demolitions and bivouacking. Brigadiers Calvert and Fergusson took command of two of the brigades. Wingate himself was gone for much of the training period being first out of the country at the Quebec Conference and then struck ill with typhoid from drinking bad water in North Africa on his return trip.
The planning process for the operations went through many revisions. At one point it was intended to be part of a larger offensive by the Chinese and Indian Armies into northern Burma. But eventually it was decided to send in the force on its own, as in 1943.
The methods of the Chindits in 1944 differed from those of 1943. Wingate had decided on a method of creating fortified bases behind the Japanese lines which would then send out raiding columns over short distances. This change was in part forced upon him by improved Japanese patrols along the frontier making a repeat of the successful infiltration in 1943 unlikely. Template:Ref The lavish air support provided by the 1st Air Commando Group allowed also him this option.
Wingate also had plans for a general uprising of the Kachin population of Northern Burma. He fought over his plans with the leadership of Force 136, which was concerned that a premature uprising of the Kachins without a permanent British military presence would lead to their slaughter by the Japanese at the end of operations. Force 136 also had their own plans for a rising to be coordinated with the arrival of the regular army into Burma. Wingate was eventually convinced to scale back his original plans. Template:Ref Further complicating relations between the organisations were orders issued by Wingate to the commander of Dah Force not to coordinate operations with Force 136 for security reasons. Template:Ref
During the last months of 1943, planning was conducted to carry out the strategy for India as originally determined at the Quebec Conference. The overall plan eventually focused on the use of the Chindits in the reconquest of northern Burma. But the uncertainty of the strategic plans, meant that the plans for the use of the Chindits repeatedly changed up to the very start of operations.Template:Ref No firm plans can be said to have existed until January 1944. The Japanese offensive on the Central Front resulted in further proposals and refinements of the plans for the Chindits. Template:Ref label
On February 5, 1944, Fergusson's 16th Brigade left Ledo for Burma. They avoided Japanese forces by traversing exceptionally difficult terrain. The rest of the Brigades were brought in by air to create fortified bases with airstrips.
Three landing zones, codenamed Piccadilly, Broadway and Chowringhee were selected. Calvert's 77th Brigade prepared to fly by glider into Piccadilly on the night of March 5. A last-minute reconnaissance revealed Piccadilly to be covered with logs, making landing impossible. In some accounts of the incident, Wingate insisted that the operation had been betrayed and that the other landing zones would be ambushed. To proceed would be "murder". Slim accepted the responsibility of ordering a willing Calvert to proceed with the operation, using Broadway instead. Broadway was a worse landing ground and there were many casualties in crash landings, but Calvert's men were just able to make the strip fit to take transport aircraft. Chindit gliders landed on Chowringhee the next day. It was later revealed that the logs on Piccadilly had been placed there to dry by Burmese teak loggers. The real problem was the failure to maintain observation of the landing zones (e.g. with high-flying Spitfire photo-recconnaissance aircraft) before the forces were deployed.
Over the next week, 600 sorties transferred 9000 men to the landing zones. Chowringhee was abandoned once the fly-in was completed, but Broadway was held with a garrison which included field artillery, anti-aircraft guns and even Spitfire fighters for a brief period. Fergusson's brigade set up another base named Aberdeen north of Indaw, into which 14th Brigade was flown. Calvert's brigade established yet another, named White City at Mawlu, astride the main railway and road leading to the Japanese northern front. 111 Brigade set up ambushes and roadblocks south of Indaw (although part of the brigade which landed at Chowringhee was delayed in crossing the Irrawaddy River), before moving west to Pinlebu.
Ferocious jungle fighting ensued around Broadway and White City. At times, British and Japanese troops were in close combat, bayonets and kukris against katanas. On March 27, after days of aircraft attack, Japanese attacked Broadway for several nights before the attack was repulsed with flown-in artillery and the aid of Kachin irregulars locally recruited.
However, a setback occurred when Fergusson's brigade tried to capture Indaw on March 24. The original intention had been to seize the town and its airfields on March 15 but Fergusson had to report that this was impossible. Wingate appeared ready to change the brigade's mission but on March 20, he reinstated Indaw as the target.Template:Ref. The brigade was already exhausted from its long march, and there was no time to properly reconnoitre the objective. The units were dismayed to find that the Japanese controlled the only water sources. Fergusson expected that 14th Brigade would cooperate in the attack, but they moved west instead. Also, Japanese reinforcements had moved into Indaw, which was a major road and rail centre. Fergusson's battalions, attacking separately, were each repulsed. After this, most of the tired 16th Brigade were flown out.
Change of command
On March 24th, Wingate flew to Imphal to confer with air force commanders. Returning, his aircraft is believed to have flown into a thunderstorm, and crashed in the jungle-covered mountains. All aboard were killed.
The responsibility for selecting a replacement for Wingate fell to Slim, commander of Fourteenth Army. The fact that Slim had to make the choice represents the somewhat haphazard relationship of Special Force to the command structure within South East Asia Command. Wingate did not report formally to 11th Army Group, nor Stilwell, nor to any other single commander. While Slim claims Wingate was under his command Template:Ref, Wingate himself claimed that he was under the command of 11th Army Group for planning purposes. Template:Ref He made direct requests to South East Asia Command Template:Ref and on at least one occasion sent a request directly to Winston Churchill Template:Ref. On many occasions, the accounts of joint meetings between Silm and Wingate written by the two men vary greatly. Template:RefThere was no formal order of succession (several officers believed Wingate had nominated them as his successor). Template:Ref
Slim selected Lentaigne after conferring with Tulloch, Wingate's Chief of Staff. The choice was made on the grounds that Lentaigne was the most balanced and experienced commander in the force; he had been an instructor at the Staff College at Quetta, had commanded a Gurkha battalion with distinction during the gruelling retreat from Burma in 1942, and had commanded a Chindit Brigade in the field (albeit for only a few weeks but none of the other Brigade commanders had more experience). As an officer of Gurkha troops, he had a similar outlook and background to Slim. The other Brigade commanders were unknown quantities, mostly without staff qualifications with some having never even commanded a battalion sized unit in combat before 1944, and Wingate's staff officers lacked the necessary combat experienceTemplate:Ref.
What Slim ignored was complaints inside the Chindits that Lentaigne was an outsider in Wingate's force and had been critical of Wingate's methods and techniques. In this respect, would be opposed to several of the Brigade commanders and staff of the Chindits. Wingate had disliked him because he was selected by Wavell without Wingate's approval. (Wingate also tended to hold Indian Army officers, and Gurkha Officers in particular, in total contempt.)
It is probably fair to say that nobody could have filled Wingate's shoes. Wingate had sustained his force outside normal army command through political connections that no successor would have available. The other dilemma of any successor was that they would constantly be second-guessed by those who thought they knew exactly what Wingate would have done in a particular situation. The same officers who would go to extraordinary lengths to justify even the most flawed decisions by Wingate would attack any successor whenever the opportunity presented itself.
The move north
Several major changes were made at the highest level. Much of the air support was diverted to the critical battles of Imphal and Kohima, where troops were cut off and could only be resupplied by air. 23rd Brigade, yet to fly in, was also despatched to Kohima. Those Chindits already operating in Burma were ordered to assist US General Joseph Stilwell on the northern front.
In April, Lentaigne ordered the part of 111 Brigade that was west of the Irrawaddy, now commanded by John Masters, to leave their earlier outposts, move north near Hopin and to build a new stronghold, codenamed Blackpool, and block Japanese supply routes. Calvert was ordered to abandon White City and Broadway and support Masters.
Masters's force established Blackpool on May 8 and were almost immediately engaged in fierce fighting. Whereas White City had been deep in the Japanese rear, its defenders had had plenty of time to prepare their defences and its attackers had been a mixed bag of detachments from several formations, Blackpool was close to the Japanese northern front, and was attacked by two regiments from the Japanese 53rd Division, with heavy artillery support. Because the monsoon had broken and heavy rain made movement in the jungle very difficult, neither Calvert nor Brodie's British 14th Infantry Brigade could help Masters. Finally, Masters had to abandon Blackpool on May 24, because the men were too exhausted after 17 days of continual combat. 19 Allied soldiers, who were so badly injured as to be beyond hope of recovery and could not be moved, were shot by the medical orderlies Template:Ref.
On May 17, Slim had formally handed control of the Chindits to Stilwell. Stilwell insisted that the Chindits capture several well-defended Japanese positions. The Chindits had no support from tanks or artillery and this led to heavier casualties than before. Some have considered these operations to be abuse, but others have pointed out that if the Chindits cannot carry out such operations, their usefulness in practice is open to question. And given Wingate's lack of concern over casualties in the first Chindit operation, its difficult to suggest that the losses in these battles were inconsistent with his methods.
Over the period June 6-June 27, Calvert's 77th Brigade took Mogaung and suffered 800 casualties (50%) among those of the brigade involved in the operation. Fearing that they would then be ordered to join the siege of Myitkyina, Calvert shut down his radios and retreated to Kamaing. A court-martial was likely until Stilwell and Calvert met in person, and Stilwell finally appreciated the conditions under which the Chindits had been operating.
111 Brigade, after resting, were ordered to capture a hill known as Point 2171. They did so, but were now utterly exhausted. Most of them were suffering from malaria, dysentery and malnutrition. On July 8, at the insistence of the Supreme Commander, Mountbatten, doctors examined the brigade. Of the 2200 men present from four and a half battalions, only 119 were declared fit. The Brigade was evacuated, although Masters sarcastically kept the fit men, "111 Company" in the field until August 1.
The portion of 111 Brigade east of the Irrawaddy were known as Morris Force, after its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel "Jumbo" Morris. They had spent several months harassing Japanese traffic from Bhamo to Myitkyina. They had then attempted to complete the encirclement of Myitkyina. Stilwell was angered that they were unable to do so, but Slim pointed out that Stilwell's 30,000 Chinese troops had also failed in that task. Morris Force was evacuated about the same time as 77th Brigade.
14th Brigade and 3rd West African Brigade remained in action, assisting the newly-arrived British 36th Division in its advance down the "Railway Valley" south of Mogaung. Finally, they were relieved and withdrawn, starting on August 17.
The last Chindit left Burma August 27 1944.
23rd Brigade, which had been diverted from the main Chindit campaign, nevertheless acted as a long range penetration unit behind the Japanese fighting at Kohima. From April to June 1944, they marched long distances through the Naga hills, mostly in monsoon weather which made movement very difficult. They contributed in a large measure to the starvation of the Japanese at Kohima, the decisive factor in that battle. Although not engaged in major battles, they accounted for large numbers of Japanese stragglers and foragers, suffering 158 battle casualties themselves.
The Chindits had suffered heavy casualties: 1396 killed and 2434 wounded. Over half had to be hospitalised with a special diet afterwards. As bad as the numbers may seem, those suffered by the force in 1943 were proportionally much higher.
The healthy were sent on to training camps to await new operations. However, when the army command evaluated the men and equipment required to return the Chindits to operational status, it was gradually decided to transform it into an Airborne Division in India which would be more useful for the coming operations to reconquer Burma by conventional forces. Beyond direct replacements, it was known that the British element of the Chindits would be decimated in 1945 by the need to repatriate personnel who had served more than four years overseas. The Chindits were disbanded in February 1945. Around the same time, Fourteenth Army was positioned for a final assault on Burma and Force 136 was prepared to launch a coordinated national uprising within the country. The jungle training programs of the Indian Army, innovations in air supply and the defeat of the Japanese offensive in 1944 had created an army that was often able to do what was previously unthinkable.
There is a memorial to Orde Wingate and also to the Chindits on the north side of the Victoria Embankment next to the Ministry of Defence headquarters in London. The memorial was unveiled on 16th October 1990 by HRH The Prince Phillip, Duke of Edinburgh. The front of the monument is in memory of the Chindits and also mentions the four men of the Chindits awarded the Victoria Cross Major Frank Gerald Blaker, Captain Michael Allmand and Lieutenant George Albert Cairns and Rifleman Tulbahadur Pun. The battalions who took part are listed on the sides of the monument. Non-infantry units are mentioned by their parent formations only. No distinction is made between those units who took part in 1943 versus those of 1944. The rear of the monument is exclusively dedicated to Orde Wingate and also mentions his contributions to the state of Israel.Template:Ref
Military historians disagree on the Chindits' military significance. The debate is part of the ongoing one of whether the deployment of special forces are a net asset to a campaign or whether the investment in time, material and men that such operations demand outweigh the advantages gained. For example, did the interdiction of Japanese supply lines during Operation Thursday by the Chindits contribute more to Stilwel's advance than if the resources committed to the operation had been used to provide Stilwell with another regular division to fight along side his X Force.
The views of the majority of the post-war British military establishment were made succinctly by the Slim (commander of the Fourteenth Army), when he wrote "... the Chindits, gave a splendid examples of courage and hardihood. Yet I came firmly to the conclusion that such formations, trained equipped and mentally adjusted for one kind of operation were wasteful. They did not give, militarily, a worth-while return for the resources in men, material and time that they absorbed. ... [Special forces] were usually formed by attracting the best men ... The result of these methods was undoubtedly to lower the quality of the rest of the Army." He makes several other arguments against special forces, about the danger of ordinary battalions thinking that some tasks could only be performed by special forces, and that special forces can only stay in the field for relatively short periods compared to regular battalions. He sums up that "Anything, whatever the short cuts to victory it may promise, which thus weakens the Army spirit is dangerous." To underline his point he suggests that "This cult of special forces is as sensible as to form a Royal Corps of Tree Climbers and say that no soldier, who does not wear its green hat with a bunch of oak leaves stuck in it should be expected to climb a tree". He does acknowledge the need for small units to stir up trouble in the enemy's rear area but does not make it clear if he is talking about V Force or the actions of Force 136.Template:Ref
Others, like Sir Robert Thompson, himself a Chindit, have asserted that the idea behind the Chindits was a sound one, but that they were just badly handled and used in operations for which they were not properly equipped or trained, for example in static defence. A third view is that despite the relatively insignificant losses that the Chindits were able to inflict, their propaganda value in 1943, at a time when the Army was on the defensive, was a moral boost to the people of India and Britain. It has been hard to reach a consensus on this issue due to the partisan nature of the discussions surrounding Wingate himself.
Three of the Brigade commanders on Operation Thursday subsequently wrote autobiographies, which contained their comments on the Chindits' concept and practice of operations. Bernard Fergusson, originally an enthusiastic supporter of Wingate, later came to feel that Wingate lacked both consistency and flexibility in his plans, which contributed to Fergusson's long, pointless march and his defeat at Indaw. John Masters, who was a close friend and supporter of Lentaigne, felt that the Chindits' mobility was sacrificed in holding fixed defensive positions or attacking strong Japanese positions, without the necessary support. In criticism of the whole Chindit concept, he points out that the Chindit force had the infantry strength of two and a half line divisions, but, without supporting arms, it had the fighting strength of less than one. Michael Calvert, who was closest to Wingate and perhaps the most successful commander in the field, remained a defender of Wingate and his methods.
Order of battle
- Order of Battle of the Chindits#First Chindit Expedition 1943. Codenamed Operation Longcloth
- Order of Battle of the Chindits#Second Chindit Expedition 1944. Codenamed Operation Thursday
- Louis Allen, Burma: The longest War 1941-45, J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1984, ISBN 0460024744
- R. Callahan, Davis-Poynter Wingate in Burma 1942-1945, (1978)
- John Masters, The Road Past Mandalay
- Prasad, S. N. et al. Official History of Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War: Reconquest of Burma, volume 1: June 1942-June 1944. Delhi (?): Combined Inter-Services Hist, 1958
- Richard Rhodes James Chindit,
- Sir William Slim Defeat into Victory (1956)
- Sir Robert Thompson, Make for the Hills, an autobiography, Pen & Sword Books/Leo Cooper, 1989, ISBN 0850527619
- D. Tulloch (Wingate's Chief of Staff) Wingate in Peace and War
- Template:Note although they were known as Special Force after 1943, they were in fact ordinary infantry units arbitrarily selected for the mission based on their availability. There was no selection procedure. The term Special Forces did not originate with the Chindits.
- Template:Note R. Callahan Bibliograhy page 101
- Template:Note Slim Bibliograhy Page 219
- Template:Note See British National Archives HS1/2 - Most Secret & personal from head of SOE India to 'P' Division SEAC & GHQ India March 10, 1944 - Military Operations in the Dilwyn Area B/B.100 to head of SOE India March 11, 1944. For the Chindit side see the Operational Report of Dah Force (Imperial War Museum)
- Template:Note See Page 1, Operational Report of Dah Force by Captain Herring (Imperial War Museum)
- Template:Note Template:Note label Planning of Operation Thursday
- Template:Note Shelford Bidwell, The Chindit War, page 138. Bidwell speculates that Wingate had revived at short notice a plan codenamed Operation Tarzan, by which Indian 26th Infantry Division would fly in to the captured airfields, even though this division was already heavily engaged in the Arakan.
- Template:Note Slim Bibliograhy page 219
- Template:Note See British National Archives CAB 106/170 Document 14 - Statement made by Commander Special Force at HQ 14th Army on 25th January 1944
- Template:Note See British National Archives CAB 106/170 Dcoument 15 - Wingate sends request to the SEAC commander that Special Force be disbanded. See further British National Archives CAB 106/170 Document 6 January 5, 1944 where Wingate in a message to the SEAC commander accuses the commander of 11th Army Group of disobeying the orders of the SEAC commander with regard to Special Force. (Quote) "Commander-in-Chief, 11th Army Group is opposed to taking action on the lines of the Supreme Commander’s Personal Minute No. P.27 of 28 Dec 1943. The arguments which he advances in opposition to the course proposed by the Supreme Commander "
- Template:Note See British National Archives CAB 106/170 Document 27. Wingate directly requested Churchill provide four transport squadrons and promised him that with the aircraft he could conquer all Burma north of the 24th parallel along with destroying four Japanese Divisions.
- Template:Note See Slim's account of a meeting (Slim Bibliograhy Page 220) versus Wingate's account of the same meeting (British National Archives CAB 106/170 Document 18). Slim says Wingate was refusing his order. Wingate says the meeting was a conference to settle disputes run by the commander of 11th Army Group and that the orders issued were not from Slim. Slim's account of the issues related to the subject of potential use of 26th Indian Division is also totally at odds with that of Wingate.
- Template:Note Slim Bibliograhy Pages 269-270
- Template:Note Louis Allen Bibliograhy pages 348-351 summary from D. Tulloch in Wingate in Peace and War
- Template:Note Masters Bibliograhy Pages 277-278, Text online (MS.DOC): See section: "The Dark Side of Command"
- Template:Note Chindit Memorial, London
- Template:Note Slim Bibliography Chapter XXII, Afterthoughts, Special Forces: Pages 546-549