Furman v. Georgia

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Furman v. Georgia
Image:Seal of the United States Supreme Court.png

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued January 17, 1972

Decided June 29, 1972

Full case name: Furman v. Georgia
Citations: 408 U.S. 238; 92 S. Ct. 2726; 33 L. Ed. 2d 346; 1972 U.S. LEXIS 169
Prior history: Certiorari granted (403 U.S. 952)
Subsequent history: Rehearing denied (409 U.S. 902)
Holding
The arbitrary and inconsistent imposition of the death penalty violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
Court membership
Chief Justice: Warren Burger
Associate Justices: William O. Douglas, William Brennan, Potter Stewart, Byron White, Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, Jr., William Rehnquist
Case opinions
Majority by: per curiam
Concurrence by: Douglas
Concurrence by: Brennan
Concurrence by: Stewart
Concurrence by: White
Concurrence by: Marshall
Dissent by: Burger
Joined by: Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist
Dissent by: Blackmun
Dissent by: Powell
Joined by: Burger, Blackmun, Rehnquist
Dissent by: Rehnquist
Joined by: Burger, Blackmun, Powell
Laws applied
U.S. Const. Amd. VIII, XIV
Overruled by
Gregg v. Georgia, Template:Ussc

Furman v. Georgia, Template:Ussc was a United States Supreme Court decision that ruled on the requirement for a degree of consistency in the application of the death penalty. Jackson v. Georgia and Branch v. Texas, pulling of brief sentences for rape, had the same result applied to them as part of a combined decision and ruling.

A resident of a house came home while William Henry Furman was robbing it. While trying to escape Furman tripped and the weapon he was carrying fired accidentally. One of the residents was shot and killed. Furman was tried for murder and was found guilty. He was sentenced to death.

Justice Potter Stewart, as one of the majority, wrote that "These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed. My concurring Brothers have demonstrated that, if any basis can be discerned for the selection of these few to be sentenced to death, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) But racial discrimination has not been proved, and I put it to one side. I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed". Two other Justices came to comparable conclusions based on factors including the quality of legal representation provided. Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred on the grounds that the death penalty was incompatible with the evolving standards of decency of a contemporary society. The dissenting justices pointed out that capital punishment had always been regarded as appropriate under the Anglo-American legal tradition for serious crimes and that the text of the Constitution did not support the invalidation of all United States death penalty laws.

In the following four years, 37 states enacted new death penalty laws aimed at overcoming Stewart's objections to the lack of standards to guide the discretion of juries and judges in imposing capital sentences. The new laws were in large part upheld in a series of decisions in 1976 such as Gregg v. Georgia.

External links

pl:Furman v. Georgia