Iron triangle
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- This article is about a political concept. For other uses of the phrase, see Iron Triangle.
Iron triangle is a phrase typically used by American political scientists to describe what are deemed to be cosy relationships in U.S. politics between the legislature, government bureaucracies, and constituencies; which ultimately result in very tight policy-making circles. The term is frequently used in discussions having to do with "agency capture" - the co-option of government agencies by special interests. One of the most frequent usages of the term relates to the Military-Industrial Complex. In this context, the term is most often used to refer to the relationship between the weapons industry/military contractors, the military bureaucracy headquartered at The Pentagon, and political power exercised by the United States Congress.
Central to the issue of iron triangles is the assumption that bureaucratic agencies, as players in the political game, seek to create and consolidate their own power base. The idea is that an agency's power is determined by its constituency, not by its consumers. For these purposes, constituency may be defined as a group of politically active members sharing a common interest or goal; consumers are the expected recipients of goods or services provided by government bureaucracies (often identified in an agency's written goals or mission statement).
A considerable amount of what is seen as bureaucratic dysfunction may be attributable to the alliances formed between the agency and its respective constituency. The official goals of an agency may be thwarted or ignored altogether at the expense of the citizenry it is meant to serve.
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Cultivating a constituency
The need for a constituency sometimes leads to the cultivation of a particular "clientele". Agencies may attempt to seek out those groups (relevant to their policy jurisdiction) that will make the best allies and give them the most clout within the political arena.
It is often the case, especially in so-called "street-level bureaucracies", that the consumers - those who are the supposed beneficiaries of an agency's services - do not qualify as power brokers and thus make poor constituents. These large segments of the public have diffuse interests, seldom vote, are rarely or poorly organized, are difficult to mobilize, and are often lacking in resources or financial muscle. As one might expect, welfare recipients, participants in job placement services and residents of low-income housing, for example, typically make the worst constituents from the agency's perspective.
Private or special interest groups, on the other hand, possess considerable power, as they tend to be well-organized, have plenty of resources, are easily mobilized, and are extremely active in political affairs (e.g., voting, contributing to campaigns, lobbying, and marshaling statistics or information). This being the mkhs, one can say that it is often in the agency's best interest to switch its focus from officially designated consumers to a carefully selected clientele of constituents that will aid the agency in its quest for greater political influence.
Dynamics of iron triangles
In the United States, bureaucratic power is exercised in U.S. Congress, and in congressional committees and subcommittees in particular. By aligning themselves with constituencies, bureaucracies are able to affect policy outcomes directly. This is where iron triangles manifest themselves. The picture below displays the concept.
At one corner of the triangle are interest groups (constituencies). These are the powerful interests that buy Congressional votes in their favor and which guarantee re-election for supporting their programs. At another corner sit members of Congress who also seek to align themselves with a constituency for political and electoral support. These congressional members support legislation that advances the interest group's agenda. Occupying the third corner of the triangle are bureaucrats, who are often captured by those they are designed to regulate. The result is a three-way, stable alliance that is sometimes called a subgovernment because of its durability, impregnability, and power to determine policy.
Consumers are often left out in the cold by this arrangement. Iron triangles result in the passing of very narrow, "pork barrel" policies that benefit a small segment of the population. The interests of the bureaucracy's constituency are met, while the needs of consumers (which may be the general public) are passed over. This "privatization" of public administration may be viewed as problematic for the popular concept of democracy, insofar as the common welfare of all citizens is sacrificed for very specific interests; effectively subverting the purpose for which the agency was established in the first place. Others maintain that such arrangements are consonant with (and natural outgrowths of) the democratic process, since they frequently involve a majority bloc of voters implementing their will through their representatives in government.
Example of an iron triangle: TVA
One of the most prominent historical examples of an iron triangle involved the Tennessee Valley Authority. A key goal of the TVA when it was created in 1933 was the production of cheap electric power, which was to provide great economic benefit to one of the poorest sections of the United States. The New Deal officials who set the agency in motion hoped that the provision of cheap power would help relieve rural poverty and transform the social system of the American South.
The TVA faced strong opposition early on, most notably from private utility companies. By the mid to late 1940s the TVA had reason to be concerned about its political survival. In order to secure political support and strengthen its position, the agency established ties with agricultural elites who exerted significant influence over Southern representatives in Congress. The alliance worked to the benefit of the TVA's new constituency, while many poor farmers (particularly blacks) who might have benefited most from the goods and services of the TVA were ignored.
References
- Graham T. Allison, Philip Zelikow; Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis; Pearson Longman; ISBN 0321013492 (2nd edition, 1999)
- Jack H. Knott, Gary J. Miller; Reforming Bureaucracy; Prentice-Hall; ISBN 0137700903 (1st edition, 1987)
- Francis E. Rourke; Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy; Harpercollins; ISBN 0673394751 (3rd edition, 1984)