No first use

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No first use refers to a pledge not to use nuclear weapons unless first attacked by an adversary using nuclear weapons.

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Signatories

The former-Soviet Union, Russia, India, and the People's Republic of China have pledged not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict, while the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, France, Pakistan, and North Korea have not. Historically, the reluctance of the NATO allies to pledge to not initate nuclear attacks during the Cold War resulted from the numerical superiority of Warsaw Pact conventional forces and the belief that the use of tactical nuclear weapons would have been required in defeating a Soviet invasion.Template:Citeneeded

Soviet Union

In the case of the Soviet Union, a no-first-use pledge was seen as a means of undermining support for the United States, particularly among Europeans, on whose territory a nuclear war might have been fought.Template:Citeneeded

People's Republic of China

In the case of People's Republic of China, the limited number and accuracy of its nuclear arsenal rendered it suicidal for any doctrine other than assured destruction and hence it has pledged no first use against other countries.Template:Citeneeded Since China's original no-first-use pledge in the 1960s, it has been somewhat unclear if the pledge would apply to a conflict involving Taiwan, especially in the event of military involvement by the United States. However, China officially reaffirmed its no-first-use policy in July 2005 at the request of the United States Department of State[1]. That request was prompted by remarks of a Chinese military official, who suggested Beijing might indeed respond to a US attack on the mainland in a conflict over Taiwan with a nuclear strike upon US forces.Template:Citeneeded

Post cold war

After the end of the Cold War, Russia has continued to pledge no first use in large part because the Russian economy does not allow for the expansion of its nuclear arsenal to serve as anything other than a deterrent force.Template:Citeneeded Despite the fact that a Soviet invasion of Western Europe is no longer possible, the United States has stated that it reserves the right to respond to an attack by weapons of mass destruction with nuclear weapons, and a leaked Pentagon report in March 2002 purports to show that the use of nuclear weapons - "mini-nukes" - for new purposes (such as bunker busters) is being considered.Template:Citeneeded

At NATO's summit in April 1999, Germany proposed that NATO adopt a no-first-use policy, but the proposal was rejected.Template:Citeneeded The US Department of Defense revised the doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons titled "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations" and written under the direction of Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Template:Citeneeded The new doctrine envisions commanders requesting presidential approval to use nuclear weapons to preempt an attack by a nation or a terrorist group using weapons of mass destruction. Template:Citeneeded The draft also includes the option of using nuclear weapons to destroy known enemy stockpiles of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. Template:Citeneeded The draft is not yet approved by Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. This new policy would update rules and procedures governing use of nuclear weapons to reflect a preemption strategy first announced by the Bush White House in December 2002. Template:Citeneeded

President G W Bush

In March 2006, President Bush held a town hall meeting at a retirement community in the Washington D.C. area, where a man identifying himself only as one of the few surviving members of the U.S. negotiation team for the non-proliferation treaty asked Bush to re-examine the administrations "first use" policy [2]:

"...the basic bargain there was that other countries would give up their nuclear weapons if we, the nuclear powers, would engage in a program of nuclear disarmament. Now, I'm aware of all of the agreements that have taken place. I'm aware of the negotiations that you had with Mr. Putin. The point is that we cannot expect that agreement, that basic agreement to hold if the United States, particularly, goes on acting as -- and has the position that we might initiate a nuclear war if it is necessary. And I would ask you just to think about the time -- while you're still President, taking the one position that only one American President has taken, and that is President Johnson, to consider a "no first-use" policy to help the prospect of nuclear proliferation in the long run."

The response from the president:

"Well, thank you. Thank you very much. Thanks for your contribution, by the way. I appreciate it. (Applause) ... I did do an agreement with President Putin -- thanks for noticing -- where we are -- both of us are reducing nuclear stockpiles. But I will take your words to heart, and think about it. Thank you. No commitment standing right here, of course. (Laughter) ...."

External links

  • [3] Andrew Yeh, "China Acts to Ease Fears over N-arms Policy," Financial Times, July 25, 2005
  • [4] Globalsecurity.org

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