UN Security Council Resolution 242

From Free net encyclopedia

United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 (S/RES/242) was adopted unanimously by the UN Security Council on November 22, 1967 in the aftermath of the Six Day War. Adopted under Chapter VI [1] of the United Nations Charter, it calls for the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" (see semantic dispute) and the "[t]ermination of all claims or states of belligerency". It also calls for the recognition of all established states by belligerent parties (Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan) of each other and calls for the establishment of defensible boundaries for all parties. It is one of the most commonly referenced UN resolutions in Middle Eastern politics. It was reaffirmed and made binding by UN Security Council Resolution 338, adopted after the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

Contents

[edit]

Context

The resolution is the formula proposed by the Security Council for the successful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, in particular, ending the state of belligerency then existing between Israel and Egypt, Jordan and Syria. It insists upon the termination of all states of war in the area; guarantees the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of all Middle Eastern nations; and calls for a "just settlement" of the question of the refugees.

The resolution's most important feature is the "land for peace" formula, calling for Israeli withdrawal from territories it had occupied in 1967 in exchange for peace with its neighbors. This was an important advance at the time, considering the fact that there were no peace treaties between any Arab state and Israel until the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty signed in 1979.

For obvious reasons, the U.N. could not force the relevant parties to make a peace agreement, nor would the rather ambiguous resolution have precedence over bilateral negotiations; however the resolution was the focus of numerous semantic disputes.

"Land for peace" served as the basis of the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty, in which Israel retreated from the Sinai peninsula (Egypt withdrew its claims to the Gaza Strip). Jordan withdrew its claims for the West Bank shortly after the beginning of the First Intifada, and has signed the Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace in 1994, that demarcated the Jordan River as the border line. Throughout the 1990s, there were Israeli-Syrian negotiations regarding a normalization of relations and an Israeli retreat from the Golan Heights but a peace treaty failed to materialize.

The resolution advocates a "just settlement of the refugee problem" but doesn't specifically mention the Palestinians, who were not represented in the debate. The UN resolution, however, did serve as a basis for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations (Palestinians being represented by the PLO) that led to the Oslo Accords. The Accords' main premise, the eventual creation of Palestinian autonomy in some of the territories captured during the Six-Day War, in return for Palestinian recognition of Israel is obviously reminiscent of the "Land for Peace" principle.

Both Israel and her neighbors accept the legitimacy of 242, although the two sides interpret the resolution to mean quite different things. The two sides also disagree over the implementation of the resolution. Israel generally focuses on the latter part of the resolution first, which calls for the "termination of all states of belligerency" in the area. Thus, the refusal of the Arab states to end the state of war that exists represents a material and continuing breach of 242, making Israeli security control of the territories a continuing necessity. This continued disagreement continues to be reflected even in Israel's peaceful relations with more "moderate" neighbors such as Egypt and Jordan, and is still a major stumbling block in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians -- the former insisting upon an end to terrorism as a prerequisite to negotiations, the latter claiming Israel's continuing violations of 242 as one of the justifications for Palestinian militancy.

After territorial issues, perhaps the most widely disputed element of 242 is the call for "a just settlement of the refugee problem." Israel continues to refuse to consider any large-scale resettlement of Palestinian refugees on Israeli territory, claiming that such a move would undermine the Jewish character of the state of Israel and lead to its collapse. Moreover, Israel points to the continued refusal of the Arab nations to compensate Israeli Jews of Arab origin, many of whom were driven out of their home countries after facing the expropriation of virtually all of their property. Israel's official stand at present is that refugees will be resettled either where they currently live, or in a newly constituted Palestinian state at such a time when it is established. Recent evidence suggests that a moderate Palestinian leadership would accept a "symbolic right of return" to Israel in the framework of an overall peace agreement, along with an acknowledgement from Israel of its responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem. However, numerous Palestinian groups with substantial political power have stated their opposition to any agreement that does not allow for a full return of Palestinian refugees to their places of origin within the former Palestine Mandate, regardless of whether those places are currently in Israel proper. This argument reflects an even older conflict over the meaning of the non binding UN Resolution 194, the first UN resolution to deal with the Palestinian refugees. The refugee issue continues to be one of the most intractable facets of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and continues to hamstring efforts on both sides to implement Resolution 242.

[edit]

Semantic dispute

The interpretation of the resolution has been controversial, in particular the issue of the correct interpretation of Operative Clause 1(i), in which the Security Council calls for

Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.

The French version of this reads differently:

Retrait des forces armées israéliennes des territoires occupés lors du récent conflit.

In simple terms, the dispute is about whether the Resolution would require Israel to retreat from all the territories it has captured, or whether it would still comply with the resolution by retreating, on mutually agreed terms, only from some of the territories.

The difference between the two version lies in the absence of a definite article ("the") in the English version (so that it means "from some territories"), while a definite article ("de + les" = "des") is present in the French version, so that it means "from the territories." The absence of the word "the" in the English version was the result of a deliberate amendment made by the U.S. government. The drafting process being made on the English version, the French being a translation of the English final draft.

The Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America argues the practice at the UN is that the binding version of any resolution is the one voted upon. In the case of 242 that version was in English, thus they assert the English version the only binding one. [2] In contrast, the French representative to the Security Council, in the debate which preceded the vote, asserted:

the French text which is equally authentic with the English, leaves no room for any ambiguity, since it speaks of withdrawal "des territoires occupés", which indisputably corresponds to the expression "the occupied territories".

The Russian and the Spanish readings support the English one, but only English and French were the Security Council's working languages (Russian, Spanish and Chinese were official but not the working languages).

[edit]

Arguments in favor of "all territories" reading

Supporters of the "all territories" reading claim that the principle usually applied in international law is to adopt the interpretation which best harmonizes the meaning of the differing language texts. Applying this principle to this resolution, one would come to the interpretation that the resolution requires a full withdrawal is compatible with the English text, and is implied by the French text. By contrast, even if an interpretation requiring only a partial withdrawal is compatible with the English text, it contradicts the French text.

Other supporters of a full withdrawal argue that the absence of the words "all" or "the" before territories does not mean that Israel can retain some of the territories it captured in 1967. For instance, British solicitor John McHugo argues that the absence of a definite article in the notice "dogs must be kept on a leash" does not imply that "some dogs must be kept on a leash" but clearly means that "all dogs must be kept on a lead." [3] Advocates of this view point to a presumption in International Law that a document should be interpreted in order to make its meaning clear, and interpretations that lead to uncertainty should be avoided. The Israeli claim that resolution 242 requires only a partial withdrawal from territories creates uncertainty as to which territories it could retain and which it could withdraw from, and so cannot have been the intention of the Security Council, according to advocates of a full withdrawal.Template:Fact

Some claim that Preambulatory Clause 2, "Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" would imply a total withdrawal; this is based on a principle under international law on how to interpret treaties (see art. 31 in the Vienna Convention, entered into force on January 27, 1980), but although preambulatory clauses never include specific directives, they can be used to interpret the operative paragraphs. Under such a view, a withdrawal would include "all territories". The representative for India stated to the Security Council:

"It is our understanding that the draft resolution, if approved by the Council, will commit it to the application of the principle of total withdrawal of Israel forces from all the territories—I repeat, all the territories occupied by Israel as a result of the conflict which began on 5 June 1967."

The representatives from Nigeria, France, USSR, Bulgaria, United Arab Republic, Jordan, Argentina and Mali supported this view, and as worded by the representative from Mali: "wishes its vote today to be interpreted in the light of the clear and unequivocal interpretation which the representative of India gave of the provisions of the United Kingdom text".

[edit]

Arguments against "all territories" reading

Opponents of the "all territories" reading remind that the UN Security Council declined to adopt a draft resolution worded in this way prior to the adoption of Resolution 242.

They claim that in interpreting a resolution of an international organization, one must look to the process of the negotiation and adoption of the text. This would make the text in English, the language of the discussion, take precedence.

Moreover, according to them the nature of the French language requires the use of an article in places where English does not, so the inclusion of a definite article in the French text does not imply what the inclusion of the definite article in the English text would. Finally, as they claim that the only reason for the re-appearance of this reading was translator error, which obviously does not justify the change in the document's meaning. According to the legal principle "expressio unis et exclusio alterus" (which states that the terms excluded from a law are excluded intentionally, and the interpretation of that law should be accordingly altered) it could be argued against the "all territoires" reading.

Opponents of the "all territories" reading also point to statements made by American and British officials involved in the drafting of UN Resolution 242. These officials rejected Arab states' request that the word "all" be placed before "territories" and have since stated the following about UN Res 242:

  • Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (1965-1967):
    "It calls for respect and acknowledgment of the sovereignty of every state in the area. Since Israel never denied the sovereignty of its neighbouring countries, this language obviously requires those countries to acknowledge Israel's sovereignty."
    "The notable omissions in regard to withdrawal are the word 'the' or 'all' and 'the June 5, 1967 lines' the resolution speaks of withdrawal from occupied territories, without defining the extent of withdrawal." ("The Meaning of 242", June 10, 1977)
  • Lord Caradon, author of the draft resolution that was adopted as U.N. Resolution 242, U.K. Ambassador to the United Nations (1964-1970):
    "We didn't say there should be a withdrawal to the '67 line; we did not put the 'the' in, we did not say all the territories, deliberately.. We all knew - that the boundaries of '67 were not drawn as permanent frontiers, they were a cease-fire line of a couple of decades earlier... We did not say that the '67 boundaries must be forever." (MacNeil/Lehrer Report - March 30, 1978)
  • Eugene V. Rostow, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (1966-1969):
    " ... paragraph 1 (i) of the Resolution calls for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces 'from territories occupied in the recent conflict', and not 'from the territories occupied in the recent conflict'. Repeated attempts to amend this sentence by inserting the word 'the' failed in the Security Council. It is, therefore, not legally possible to assert that the provision requires Israeli withdrawal from all the territories now occupied under the cease-fire resolutions to the Armistice Demarcation lines." (American Journal of International Law, Volume 64, September 1970, p. 69)
    "UN SC 242 calls on Israel to withdraw only from territories occupied in the course of the Six Day War - that is, not from 'all' the territories or even from 'the' territories... Ingeniously drafted resolutions calling for withdrawal from 'all' the territory were defeated in the Security Council and the General Assembly one after another. Speaker after speaker made it explicit that Israel was not to be forced back to the 'fragile and vulnerable' 1949/1967 Armistice Demarcation Lines..." (UNSC Resolution 242, 1993, p. 17). The USSR and the Arabs supported a draft demanding a withdrawal to the 1967 Lines. The US, Canada and most of West Europe and Latin America supported the draft which was eventually approved by the UN Security Council." (American Society of International Law - 1970)
    "Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338... rest on two principles, Israel may administer the territory until its Arab neighbors make peace; and when peace is made, Israel should withdraw to 'secure and recognized borders', which need not be the same as the Armistice Demarcation Lines of 1949." ("The Truth About 242" - November 5, 1990)
  • The Russian delegate Vasily Kuznetsov acknowledged before the adoption of Resolution 242:
    " ... phrases such as 'secure and recognized boundaries'. ... there is certainly much leeway for different interpretations which retain for Israel the right to establish new boundaries and to withdraw its troops only as far as the lines which it judges convenient."
  • The Brazilian delegate Geraldo de Carvalho Silos, told the Security Council after 242's adoption:
    "We keep constantly in mind that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East has necessarily to be based on secure, permanent boundaries freely agreed upon and negotiated by the neighbouring States."
  • George Brown, British Foreign Secretary in 1967 commented:
    "I have been asked over and over again to clarify, modify or improve the wording, but I do not intend to do that. The phrasing of the Resolution was very carefully worked out, and it was a difficult and complicated exercise to get it accepted by the UN Security Council. I formulated the Security Council Resolution. Before we submitted it to the Council, we showed it to Arab leaders. The proposal said 'Israel will withdraw from territories that were occupied', and not from 'the' territories, which means that Israel will not withdraw from all the territories." (The Jerusalem Post, 23.1.70)
  • Lyndon B. Johnson, U.S. President (1963-1968):
    "We are not the ones to say where other nations should draw lines between them that will assure each the greatest security. It is clear, however, that a return to the situation of June 4, 1967 will not bring peace." (September 10, 1968)
[edit]

Implementation

On November 23, 1967, The Secretary General appointed Gunnar Jarring as Special Envoy to negotiate the implementation of the resolution with the parties, the so-called Jarring Mission. The governments of Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon recognized Jarring's appointment and agreed to participate in his shuttle diplomacy, although they differed on key points of interpretation of the resolution. The government of Syria rejected Jarring's mission on grounds that total Israeli withdrawal was a prerequisite for further negotiations. The talks under Jarring's auspices lasted until 1973, but bore no results. In the meantime, the United States proposed the so-called Rogers plan, which was also rejected by all parties. After 1973, the Jarring mission was replaced by bilateral and multilateral peace conferences.

Template:Wikisource

[edit]

See also

[edit]

Arab-Israeli peace diplomacy and treaties

[edit]

External links

The United Nations Image:Flag of the United Nations.svg

UN System
General Assembly | Security Council | Economic and Social Council
Trusteeship Council | Secretariat | International Court of Justice

United Nations resolution
General Assembly Resolutions | Security Council Resolutions

ar:قرار مجلس الأمن الدولي رقم 242

bg:Резолюция 242 de:Resolution 242 des UN-Sicherheitsrates fr:Résolution 242 he:החלטה 242 של מועצת הבטחון של האו"ם nl:Resolutie 242 Veiligheidsraad Verenigde Naties

Retrieved from "http://www.netipedia.com/index.php/UN_Security_Council_Resolution_242"