Blitzkrieg

From Free net encyclopedia

Current revision

This article is about the military term. For the wrestlers of the same name, see Jay Ross and Jack Evans.

For the computer game of the same name, see Blitzkrieg (computer game).

Image:PanzerInfantryAdvance.jpg Template:Audio (German, literally lightning war or flash war) is a popular name for an offensive operational-level military doctrine which after an initial bombardment, they employed mobile forces attacking with speed and surprise to prevent an enemy from implementing a coherent defense. The doctrines resulting in the blitzkrieg effect were developed in the years after World War I as a method to help prevent trench warfare and linear warfare.

Blitzkrieg was first used on any serious scale by the German Wehrmacht in World War II. While operations in Poland were rather conventional (see detailed discussion below), later operations early in the war — particularly the invasions of France, The Netherlands and initial operations in the Soviet Union — were effective owing to surprise penetrations, general enemy unexpectence and an inability to react swiftly enough to the superior German military doctrines. The Germans faced numerically superior forces and technically superior vehicles in the invasion of France, proving the early effectiveness of their tactics and strategies. From this peak, the Wehrmacht's cohesion deteriorated. Heinz Guderian, an early implementer of blitzkrieg, was relieved of command on 25 December 1941, for ordering a withdrawal in contradiction of Hitler's "standfast" order. This showed a fundamental doctrinal difference between Hitler's view of military strategy and the Wehrmacht's proven system. This event undermined confidence and military effectiveness from that point onwards. After this point, German offensive operations were severely limited; the last major blitzkrieg style operation in the East was at Kursk in July 1943, and the last in the west was the Ardennes Offensive in December 1944. By this period, the Allies had developed effective defensive tactics to deal with these operations (see below).

Methods of blitzkrieg operations centered on using maneuver rather than attrition to defeat an opponent. The blitzkrieg thus first and foremost required a combined arms concentration of mobile assets at a focal point, armour closely supported by mobile infantry, artillery and close air support assets. These tactics required the development of specialized support vehicles, new methods of communication, new tactics, and an effective decentralized command structure. Broadly speaking, blitzkrieg operations required the development of mechanized infantry, self-propelled artillery and engineering assets that could maintain the rate of advance of the tanks. German forces avoided direct combat in favor of interrupting an enemy's communications, decision-making, logistics and of reducing morale. In combat, blitzkrieg left little choice for the slower defending forces but to clump into defensive pockets that were encircled and then destroyed by following German infantry.

Etymology and modern meaning

Though "blitzkrieg" is a German word (literally "lightning war", meaning "a war as fast as a lightning"), the word did not originate from within the German military. It was first used by a journalist in the American newsmagazine TIME describing the 1939 German invasion of Poland. Published on September 25 1939, well into the campaign, the journalist's account reads:

The battlefront disappeared, and with it the illusion that there had ever been a battlefront. For this was no war of occupation, but a war of quick penetration and obliteration—Blitzkrieg, lightning war. Swift columns of tanks and armored trucks had plunged through Poland while bombs raining from the sky heralded their coming. They had sawed off communications, destroyed stores, scattered civilians, spread terror. Working sometimes 30 miles (50 km) ahead of infantry and artillery, they had broken down the Polish defenses before they had time to organize. Then, while the infantry mopped up, they had moved on, to strike again far behind what had been called the front.<ref>"Blitzkrieger" in TIME Vol. XXXIV No. 13, 25 September 1939. http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,761969,00.html</ref>

Military historians have defined blitzkrieg as the employment of the concepts of maneuver and combined arms warfare developed in Germany during both the interwar period and the Second World War. Strategically, the ideal was to swiftly effect an adversary's collapse through a short campaign fought by a small, professional army. Operationally, its goal was to use indirect means, such as, mobility and shock, to render an adversary's plans irrelevant or impractical. To do this, self-propelled formations of tanks; motorized infantry, engineers, artillery; and ground-attack aircraft operated as a combined-arms team. Historians have termed it a period form of the longstanding German principle of Bewegungskrieg, or movement war.

"Blitzkrieg" has since expanded into multiple meanings in more popular usage. From its original military definition, "blitzkrieg" may be applied to any military operation emphasizing the surprise, speed, or concentration stressed in accounts of the Polish September Campaign. During the war, the Luftwaffe terror bombings of London came to be known as The Blitz. Similarly, blitz has come to describe the "blitz" (rush) tactic of American football, and the blitz form of chess in which players are allotted very little time. Blitz or blitzkrieg is used in many other non-military contexts.

Interwar period

Reichswehr

Blitzkrieg's immediate development began with Germany's defeat in the First World War. Shortly after the war, the new Reichswehr created committees of veteran officers to evaluate 57 issues of the war.<ref>James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 37</ref> The reports of these committees formed doctrinal and training publications which were the standards in the Second World War. The Reichswehr was influenced by its analysis of pre-war German military thought, in particular its infiltration tactics of the war, and the maneuver warfare which dominated the Eastern Front.

German military history had been influenced heavilly by Carl von Clausewitz, Alfred von Schlieffen and von Moltke the Elder, who were proponents of maneuver, mass, and envelopment. Their concepts were employed in the successful Franco-Prussian War and attempted "knock-out blow" of the Schlieffen Plan. Following the war, these concepts were modified by the Reichswehr. Its Chief of Staff, Hans von Seeckt, moved doctrine away from what he argued was an excessive focus on encirclement towards one based on speed. Speed gives surprise, surprise allows exploitation if decisions can be reached quickly and mobility gives flexibility and speed. Von Seeckt advocated effecting breakthroughs against the enemy's centre when it was more profitable than encirclement or where encirclement was not practical. Under his command a modern update of the doctrinal system called "Bewegungskrieg" and its associated tactical system called "Auftragstaktik" was developed which resulted in the popularly known blitzkrieg effect. He additionally rejected the notion of mass which von Schlieffen and von Moltke had advocated. While reserves had comprised up to four-tenths of German forces in pre-war campaigns, von Seeckt sought the creation of a small, professional (volunteer) military backed by a defense-oriented militia. In modern warfare, he argued, such a force was more capable of offensive action, faster to ready, and less expensive to equip with more modern weapons. The Reichswehr was forced to adopt a small and professional army quite aside from any German plans, for the Treaty of Versailles limited it to 100,000 men.

Bewegungskrieg required a new command hierarchy that allowed military decisions to be made closer to the unit level. This allowed units to react and make effective decisions faster, which is a critical advantage and a major reason for the success of Blitzkrieg.

German leadership had also been criticized for failing to understand the technical advances of the First World War, having given tank production the lowest priority and having conducted no studies of the machine gun prior to that war.<ref>Corum, op. cit., 23.</ref> In response, German officers attended technical schools during this period of rebuilding after the war.

Infiltration tactics invented by the German Army during the First World War became the basis for later tactics. German infantry had advanced in small, decentralised groups which bypassed resistance in favour of advancing at weak points and attacking rear-area communications. This was aided by co-ordinated artillery and air bombardments, and followed by larger infantry forces with heavy guns, which destroyed centres of resistance. These concepts formed the basis of the Wehrmacht's tactics during the Second World War.

On the war's Eastern Front, combat did not bog down into trench warfare. German and Russian armies fought a war of maneuver over thousands of miles, giving the German leadership unique experience which the trench-bound Western Allies did not have.<ref>Corum, op. cit., 7.</ref> Studies of operations in the East led to the conclusion that small and coordinated forces possessed more combat worth than large, uncoordinated forces.

Foreign influence

During this period, all the war's major combatants developed mechanized force theories. Theories of the Western Allies differed substantially from the Reichswehr's. British, French, and American doctrines broadly favored a more set-piece battle, less combined arms focus, and less focus on concentration. Early Reichswehr periodicals contained many translated works, though they were often not adopted. Technical advances in foreign countries were, however, observed and used in-part by the Weapons Office. Foreign doctrines are widely considered to have had little serious influence.<ref>Argued by Corum, Edwards, and House. This is not to include theories which were not adopted as actual doctrine, on which there are varied views.</ref>

Col. Charles de Gaulle, in France, was a known advocate of concentration of armor and airplanes — views that little endeared him to the French high command, but are claimed by some to have influenced Heinz Guderian. [1]

British theorists J.F.C. Fuller and Captain B. H. Liddell Hart have often been associated with blitzkrieg's development, though this is a matter of controversy. It is argued that Guderian, a critical figure in blitzkrieg's conception, drew some of his inspiration from Liddell Hart. This was based on a paragraph in the English edition of Guderian's autobiography in which he credits Liddell Hart. In opposition, it is argued that Liddell Hart, as editor of the autobiography's English edition, wrote that paragraph himself or, more broadly, that his influence on Guderian was not as significant as held. Fuller's influence is less clear. During the war, he developed plans for massive, independent tank operations and was subsequently studied by the German leadership. It is variously argued that Fuller's wartime plans and post-war writings were an inspiration, or that his readership was low and German experiences during the war received more attention.

What is clear is the practical implementation of this doctrine in a wide and successful range of scenarios by Guderian and other Germans during the war. From early combined-arms river crossings and penetration exploitations during the advance in France in 1940 to massive sweeping advances in Russia in 1942, Guderian showed a mastery and innovation that inspired many others. This leadership was supported and fostered by the Reichswehr General Staff system, which worked the Army to greater and greater levels of capability through massive and systematic Movement Warfare war games in the 1930s.

The Reichswehr and Red Army collaborated in wargames and tests in Kazan and Lipetsk beginning in 1926. Set within the Soviet Union, these two centers were used to field test aircraft and armored vehicles up to the battalion level, as well as housing aerial and armored warfare schools through which officers were rotated. This was done in the Soviet Union, in secret, to evade the Treaty of Versailles's occupational agent, the Inter-Allied Commission.<ref>Roger Edwards, Panzer: A Revolution in Warfare, 1939-1945 (London: Brockhampton Press, 1998), 23.</ref>

Guderian into the Wehrmacht

Following Germany's military reforms of the 1920s, Heinz Guderian emerged as a strong proponent of mechanized forces. Within the Inspectorate of Transport Troops, Guderian and colleagues performed theoretical and field exercise work. There was opposition from many officers who gave primacy to the infantry or simply doubted the usefulness of the tank. Among them was Chief of the General Staff Ludwig Beck (1935–38), who was skeptical that armored forces could be decisive. Nonetheless, the panzer divisions were established during his tenure.

Guderian argued that the tank was the decisive weapon of war. "If the tanks succeed, then victory follows", he wrote. In an article addressed to critics of tank warfare, he wrote "until our critics can produce some new and better method of making a successful land attack other than self-massacre, we shall continue to maintain our beliefs that tanks—properly employed, needless to say—are today the best means available for a land attack." Addressing the faster rate at which defenders could reinforce an area than attackers could penetrate it during the First World War, Guderian wrote that "since reserve forces will now be motorized, the building up of new defensive fronts is easier than it used to be; the chances of an offensive based on the timetable of artillery and infantry co-operation are, as a result, even slighter today than they were in the last war." He continued, "We believe that by attacking with tanks we can achieve a higher rate of movement than has been hitherto obtainable, and—what is perhaps even more important—that we can keep moving once a breakthrough has been made."<ref>Guderian's remarks are from an unnamed article published in the National Union of German Officers, 15 October 1937 as quoted in Panzer Leader, pp. 39-46. Italics removed — the quoted sections are all italics in the original.</ref> Guderian additionally required that tactical radios be widely used to facilitate co-ordination and command.

Panzertruppe and Luftwaffe

Image:EarlyPzDivTOE.png

Blitzkrieg would not have been possible without modifying Germany's standing interwar military, which under the Treaty of Versailles was limited to 100,000 men, its air force disbanded, and tank development forbidden. After becoming head of state in 1933, Adolf Hitler ignored these provisions. A command for armored troops was created within the German Heer—the Panzertruppe, as it came to be known later. The Luftwaffe, or air force, was re-established, and development begun on ground-attack aircraft and doctrines. Hitler was a strong supporter of this new strategy. He observed panzer field exercises and read Guderian's book Achtung! Panzer!<ref>Heinz Guderian, trans. Constantine Fitzgibbon, Panzer Leader (New York: De Capo Press, 2002), 46.</ref> Upon seeing exercises at Kummersdorf, he remarked "That is what I want—and that is what I will have."<ref>Edwards, op. cit., 24.</ref>

Spanish Civil War

Image:Pzkpfwiausfa.jpg German volunteers tested aspects of blitzkrieg tactics during the Spanish Civil War of 1936. Panzer commitments consisted of Panzer Battalion 88, a force built around three companies of PzKpfw I's that functioned as a training cadre for Nationalists. The Luftwaffe deployed squadrons of fighters, dive-bombers, and transports as the Condor Legion.<ref>Edwards, op. cit., 145.</ref> Guderian called the panzer employment "on too small a scale to allow accurate assessments to be made."<ref>Edwards, op. cit., 25.</ref> More was gained by the Luftwaffe, which developed both tactics and aircraft in combat; it was here that the Stuka first saw combat. Eighteen thousand Luftwaffe troops also gained combat experience.

Methods of operations

Schwerpunkt

Blitzkrieg sought decisive actions at all times. To this end, the theory of a schwerpunkt (focal point) developed; it was the point of maximum effort. Panzer and Luftwaffe forces were used only at this point of maximum effort whenever possible. By local success at the schwerpunkt, a small force achieved a breakthrough and gained advantages by fighting in the enemy's rear. It is summarized by Guderian as "Nicht kleckern, klotzen!" ("Don't tickle, smash!")

To achieve a breakout, infantry or, less commonly, panzer forces themselves (otherwise preserved for maneuver beyond) would attack the enemy's defensive line, supported by artillery fire and Luftwaffe bombing. These forces created a breach in the depth of the enemy's line. Through this breach passed the panzer forces in their entirety, as the breaching force attacked to the flanks to increase security through distance. This point of breakout has been labeled a "hinge", for from it panzer forces manoeuvred forward and developed "leverage" against the defensive line's forces.

In this, the opening phase of an operation, the Luftwaffe sought a coup against enemy air forces. It attempted to strafe and bomb landed aircraft and runways, disabling them, or deploy in fighter sweeps to clear the skies in large battles. From the beginning, air superiority was a goal; to operate as designed, the panzer force required that reconnaissance aircraft, ground-attack aircraft, and in some cases transport aircraft all be able to fly. With the Luftwaffe itself driven from the sky in the war's later years, operating under Allied air superiority would be a hindrance (See below).

A final element was the use of airborne forces beyond the enemy lines. These were not only to disrupt enemy activities or take important positions, in Blitzkrieg they were also to serve as a psychological inducement for the troops trying to forge ahead into enemy territory - since any rapid advance is in danger of eventually slowing down when urgency is lost and supply lines lengthen, while troop strengths fall due to inevitable causalities. It was the stated purpose of commanding officers that the airborne troops deployed far beyond enemy lines serve as a sort of 'beacon' which the advancing troops were to relieve. In this urgent rush to save their comrades from eventually being overwhelmed by heavier enemy forces was thus seen an important element of preventing an advance from slowing down too much.

Paralysis

Image:PanzerV Panther D.jpg Having achieved a breakthrough into the enemy's rear areas, German forces attempted to paralyze the enemy's decision making and implementation process. Moving faster than enemy forces, panzer forces exploited weaknesses and acted before opposing forces could formulate a response. Guderian wrote that "Success must be exploited without respite and with every ounce of strength, even by night. The defeated enemy must be given no peace."

Central to this is the decision cycle. Every decision made by German or opposing forces required time to gather information, make a decision, disseminate orders to subordinates, and then implement this decision through action. Through superior mobility and faster decision-making cycles, panzer forces could take action on a situation sooner than the forces opposing them.

Directive control was a fast and flexible method of command. Rather than receiving an explicit order, a commander would be told of his superior's intent and the role which his unit was to fill in this concept. The exact method of execution was then a matter for the low-level commander to determine as best fit the situation. Staff burden was reduced at the top and spread among commands more knowledgeable about their own situation. In addition, the encouragement of initiative at all levels aided implementation. As a result, significant decisions could be effected quickly and either verbally or with written orders a few pages in length.

Kesselschlacht

An operation's final phase, the Kesselschlacht (cauldron battle), was a concentric attack on an encircled force. It was here that most losses were inflicted upon the enemy, primarily through the capture of prisoners and weapons.

Operations in the Second World War

Poland 1939

Image:Poland2.jpg

Despite the term blitzkrieg being coined during the Polish September Campaign of 1939, historians generally hold that German operations during it were more consistent with more traditional methods. The Wehrmacht's strategy was more inline with Vernichtungsgedanken, or a focus on envelopment to create pockets in broad-front annihilation. Panzer forces were deployed among the three German concentrations without strong emphasis on independent use, being used to create or destroy close pockets of Polish forces and seize operational-depth terrain in support of the largely un-motorized infantry which followed. The Luftwaffe gained air superiority by a combination of superior technology and numbers. Common claims that the Polish Air Force was destroyed early in the campaign while it was on the ground are not true. Polish aircraft were moved to hidden airstrips approximately 48 hours before the outbreak of the hostilities.

The understanding of operations in Poland has shifted considerably since the Second World War. Many early postwar histories, such as Barrie Pitt's in The Second World War (BPC Publishing 1966), incorrectly attribute German victory to "enormous development in military technique which occurred between 1918 and 1940", incorrectly citing that "Germany, who translated (British inter-war) theories into action...called the result Blitzkrieg." More recent histories identify German operations in Poland as relatively cautious and traditional. Matthew Cooper wrote (in The German Army 1939-1945: Its Political and Military Failure) that "(t)throughout (the Polish Campaign), the employment of the mechanized units revealed the idea that they were intended solely to ease the advance and to support the activities of the infantry....Thus, any strategic exploitation of the armored idea was still-born. The paralysis of command and the breakdown of morale were not made the ultimate aim of the ... German ground and air forces, and were only incidental by-products of the traditional maneuvers of rapid encirclement and of the supporting activities of the flying artillery of the Luftwaffe, both of which had has their purpose the physical destruction of the enemy troops. Such was the Vernichtungsgedanke of the Polish campaign." He went on to say that the use of tanks "left much to be desired...Fear of enemy action against the flanks of the advance, fear which was to prove so disastrous to German prospects in the west in 1940 and in the Soviet Union in 1941, was present from the beginning of the war." John Ellis, writing in Brute Force (Viking Penguin, 1990) asserted that "...there is considerable justice in Matthew Cooper's assertion that the panzer divisions were not given the kind of strategic mission that was to characterize authentic armored blitzkrieg, and were almost always closely subordinated to the various mass infantry armies." In fact, according to Zaloga and Madej, in The Polish Campaign 1939 (Hippocrene Books, 1985), "Whilst Western accounts of the September campaign have stressed the shock value of the panzers and Stuka attacks, they have tended to underestimate the punishing effect of German artillery on Polish units. Mobile and available in significant quantity, artillery shattered as many units as any other branch of the Wehrmacht."

France 1940

The invasion of France consisted of two phases, Operation Yellow (Fall Gelb) and Operation Red. Yellow opened with a feint conducted against Holland and Belgium by two Panzer corps and paratroopers. Three days later, the main panzer effort of Panzer Group von Kleist attacked through the Ardennes and achieved a breakthrough with Luftwaffe air support. The group raced to the coast of the English Channel, dislodging the British Expeditionary Force, Belgian Army, and some divisions of the French Army. The Panzer units initially advanced far beyond the following divisions. The Panzers were met with a counterattack at the Battle of Arras the tough British tanks inducing a brief panic in the High Command. The Panzer forces were halted outside the port city of Dunkirk which was being used to evacuate the Allied forces. The Luftwaffe (in the form of Goering) had promised to complete the job but its bombing did not prevent the evacuation of the majority of the troops (Operation Dynamo); some 330,000 French and British. Operation Red then began with XV Panzer Corps attacking towards Brest and XIV Panzer Corps attacking south, east of Paris, towards Lyon, and XIX Panzer Corps completing the encirclement of the Maginot Line. The defending forces were hard pressed to organize any sort of counter-attack. The French forces were continually ordered to form new lines along rivers, often arriving to find the German forces had already passed them.

Soviet Union: the Eastern Front: 1941–45

Image:DefensivePincersVolkhov.png Use of armored forces was crucial for both sides on the Eastern Front. Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, involved a number of breakthroughs and encirclements by panzer forces. Its stated goal was "to destroy the Russian forces deployed in the West and to prevent their escape into the wide-open spaces of Russia."<ref>Alan Clark, Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict, 1941-45 (New York: Quill, 1965), 78.</ref> This was generally achieved by four panzer armies which encircled surprised and disorganized Soviet forces, followed by marching infantry which completed the encirclement and defeated the trapped forces. The first year of the Eastern Front offensive can generally be considered to have had the last successful major blitzkrieg operations.

After Germany's failure to destroy the Soviets before the winter of 1941, the limits of blitzkrieg became visible. Although the German attack took huge areas of Soviet territory, the overall strategic effects were more limited. The Red Army was able to regroup far to the rear of the main battle line, and eventually defeat the German forces for the first time in the Battle of Moscow.

In the summer of 1942, when Germany launched another offensive in the southern USSR against Stalingrad and the Caucasus, the Soviets again lost tremendous amounts of territory, only to counter-attack once more during winter. German gains were ultimately limited by Hitler diverting forces from the attack on Stalingrad itself and seeking to pursue a drive to the Caucasus oilfields simultaneously as opposed to subsequently as the original plan had envisaged.Image:Jagdtiger 1.jpg

Western Front, 1944–45

As the war progressed, Allied armies began using tactics somewhat resembling the blitzkrieg tactics of Germany. Many operations in the Western Desert and on the Eastern Front relied on massive concentrations of firepower to establish breakthroughs by fast-moving armoured units. These artillery-based tactics were also decisive in Western Front operations after Operation Overlord and both the British Commonwealth and American armies developed flexible and powerful systems for utilizing artillery support. What the Russians lacked in flexibility, they made up for in number of rocket, cannon, and mortar tubes. The Germans never achieved the kind of response times or fire concentrations their enemies were capable of by 1944.

After the Allied landings at Normandy, Germany made attempts to overwhelm the landing force with armored attacks but this failed for lack of co-ordination and Allied air superiority. The most notable attempt to use Blitzkrieg in Normandy was at Mortain, which resulted in the creation of the Falaise Gap and the ultimate destruction of German forces in Normandy. The Mortain counter-attack was launched against Allied forces employed in Operation Cobra, U.S. 12th Army Group's breakout from the Normandy area at St.-Lô. The German Seventh Army attacked towards the coast at St.-Lô, attempting to cut off the U.S. Third Army, commanded by George S. Patton, in Operation Lüttich. It was unable to achieve a breakthrough against defending infantry and, stalled, was encircled and effectively destroyed by U.S. 12th Army Group.

The Allied offensive in central France, spearheaded by armored units from George S. Patton's Third Army, used breakthrough and penetration techniques that were essentially identical to blitzkrieg. Patton acknowledged that he had read both Guderian and Rommel before the war, and his tactics shared their emphasis on speed and attack. A phrase commonly used in his units was "haul ass and bypass."

Germany's last offensive on its Western front, Operation Wacht am Rhein, was a blitzkrieg offensive towards the vital port of Antwerp during the winter of 1944 to 1945. Launched in poor weather against a weakened Allied sector, it achieved surprise and initial success. Allied air power was stymied by cloud cover. However, defence along the Ardennes and few serviceable roads caused delays. Allied forces deployed to the flanks of the German penetration, and Allied aircraft were again able to attack panzer columns, finally routing them. While the strategy itself had been sound, the German troops had already been reduced beyond their ability to effectively exploit the initial gains.

Countermeasures and limitations

Terrain

Blitzkrieg was largely dependent upon terrain and weather conditions. Where the ability for rapid movement across "tank country" was not possible, blitzkrieg was often avoided or resulted in failure. Terrain would ideally be flat, firm, unobstructed by natural barriers or fortifications, and interspersed with roads and railways. If it was instead hilly, wooded, marshy, or urban, panzers would be vulnerable to infantry in close-quarters combat and unable to breakout at full speed. Additionally, units could be halted by mud (thawing along the Eastern Front regularly slowed both sides) or extreme snow.

Air superiority

Image:Il2 sturmovik.jpg Allied air superiority became a critical hindrance to German operations during the later years of the war. Early German successes enjoyed air superiority with unencumbered movement of ground forces, close air support, and aerial reconnaissance. However, the Western Allies' air-to-ground attacks were so great following the lead up to Operation Overlord that panzer crews deployed from the Western to Eastern Front showed reluctance to moving en masse during daylight. Indeed, the final German blitzkrieg operation in the west, Operation Wacht am Rhein, was planned to take place during poor weather which grounded Allied aircraft. Under these conditions, it was difficult for German commanders to employ the panzer arm to its envisioned potential.

Counter-tactics

Image:Stanislaw Maczek.jpg

Blitzkrieg was very effective against static defense doctrines that most countries developed in the aftermath of the First World War. Early attempts to defeat the blitzkrieg can be dated to the Polish September Campaign in 1939, where Polish general Stanisław Maczek, commander of 10th Motorized Cavalry Brigade, prepared a detailed report of blitzkrieg tactics, its usage, effectiveness and possible precautions for the French military from his experiences. However, the French staff disregarded this report (it was captured, unopened, by the German army). Later, Maczek would become one of the most successful Allied armoured forces commanders in the war.

During the Battle of France in 1940, De Gaulle's 4th Armour Division and elements of the British Armour Brigade in the British Expeditionary Force both made probing attacks on the German flank, actually pushing into the rear of the blitzkrieging armored columns at times (See Battle of Arras (1940) ). This may have been a reason for Hitler to call a halt to the panzers' advance. Those attacks combined with Maxime Weygand's Hedgehog tactic would become the major basis for responding to blitzkrieg attacks in the future: deployment in depth, permitting enemy forces to bypass defensive concentrations, reliance on anti-tank guns, strong force employment on the flanks of the enemy attack, followed by counter-attacks at the base to destroy the enemy advance in detail. While Allied forces in 1940 lacked the experience to successfully develop these strategies, resulting in France's capitulation with heavy losses, they characterized later Allied operations such as Kursk (where Russian armies deployed in great depth), Mortain (where counterattacks by the US and Canadian armies closed the Falaise Gap) or the Ardennes (the hedgehog defence of Bastogne and a counterattack by the US 3rd Army).

By 1944 the Allied armies' 17 pdr anti-tank guns and 90 mm gun-equipped tank destroyers and the Germans' famous 88s were very successful in blunting tank attacks, especially those with little infantry support. By that time the Allies had also developed their own version of both offensive and defensive strategies using armored forces.

Logistics

Although effective in quick campaigns against Poland and France, blitzkrieg could not be sustained by Germany in later years. Blitzkrieg strategy has the inherent danger of the attacking force overextending its supply lines, and the strategy as a whole can be defeated by a determined foe who is willing to sacrifice territory for time in which to regroup and rearm, as the Soviets did on the Eastern Front. Tank and vehicle production was a constant problem for Germany; indeed, late in the war many panzer "divisions" had no more than a few dozen tanks.<ref>Richard Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare (London: Brassey's, 2000), 34</ref> As the end of the war approached, Germany also experienced critical shortages in fuel and ammunition stocks as a result of Anglo-American strategic bombing. Although production of Luftwaffe fighter aircraft continued, they would be unable to fly for lack of fuel. What fuel there was went to panzer divisions, and even then they were not able to operate normally. Of those Tiger tanks lost against the United States Army, nearly half of them were abandoned for lack of fuel.<ref>Charles Winchester, "The Demodernization of the German Army in World War 2", Osprey Publishing. http://www.ospreypublishing.com/content2.php/cid=68</ref>

Influence

Blitzkrieg's widest influence was within the Western Allied leadership of the war, some of whom drew inspiration from the Wehrmacht's approach. United States General George S. Patton emphasized fast pursuit, the use of an armored spearhead to effect a breakthrough, then cut off and disrupt enemy forces prior to their flight. In his comments of the time, he credited Guderian and Rommel's work, notably Infantry Attacks, for this insight. He also put into practice the idea attributed to cavalry leader Nathan Bedford Forrest, "Get there fastest with the mostest." (Get there fastest, with the most forces).

Blitzkrieg also has had some influence on subsequent militaries and doctrines. The Israeli Defense Forces may have been influenced by blitzkrieg in creating a military of flexible armored spearheads and close air support.<ref>Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization. (U.S. Army Command General Staff College, 1984; reprint University Press of the Pacific, 2002). http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/House/House.asp</ref> The 1990's United States theorists of "Shock and awe" claim blitzkrieg as a subset of strategies which they term "rapid dominance".

Changing Interpretations of Blitzkrieg

Beginning in the 1970s, the interpretation of Blitzkrieg, particularly with respect to the Second World War, has undergone a shift in the historical community. John Ellis described the shift in his book Brute Force in 1990.

Our perception of land operations in the Second World War has...been distorted by an excessive emphasis upon the hardware employed. The main focus of attention has been the tank and the formations that employed it, most notably the (German) panzer divisions. Despite the fact that only 40 of the 520 German divisions that saw combat were panzer divisions (there were also an extra 24 motorised/panzergrenadier divisions), the history of German operations has consistently almost exclusively been written largely in terms of blitzkrieg and has concentrated almost exclusively upon the exploits of the mechanized formations. Even more misleadingly, this presentation of ground combat as a largely armored confrontation has been extended to cover Allied operations, so that in the popular imagination the exploits of the British and Commonwealth Armies, with only 11 armored divisions out of 73 (that saw combat), and of the Americans in Europe, with only 16 out of 59, are typified by tanks sweeping around the Western Desert or trying to keep up with Patton in the race through Sicily and across northern France. Of course, these armored forces did play a somewhat more important role in operations than the simple proportions might indicate, but it still has to be stressed that they in no way dominated the battlefield or precipitated the evolution of completely new modes of warfare.

Ellis, as well as Zaloga in his study of the Polish Campaign in 1939, points to the effective use of other arms such as artillery and aerial firepower as equally important to the success of German (and later, Allied) operations. Panzer operations in Russia failed to provide decisive results; Leningrad never fell despite an entire Panzer Group being assigned to take it, nor did Moscow. In 1942 panzer formations overstretched at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus, and what successes did take place - such as Manstein at Kharkov or Krivoi Rog - were of local significance only.

See also

• AirLand Battle, blitzkrieg-like doctrine of US Army in 1980s
• Armoured warfare
• Attrition warfare
• The Blitz, the Luftwaffe terror bombings of London
• Combined arms
• Deep Battle, the period Soviet concept of warfare
• Maneuver warfare, battle doctrine of speed and strategic movement
• Methodical Battle, the period French concept of warfare
• Shock and Awe, the 21st century American military doctrine
• Vernichtungsgedanken, or 'annihilation thoughts', one of blitzkrieg predecessors
• Mission-type tactics, tactical battle doctrine of delegation and initiative stimulation

References

Further reading

• Chrisp, Peter. Blitzkrieg! 1990
• Deighton, Len. Blitzkrieg: From the rise of Hitler to the fall of Dunkirk. 1981.
• Corum, James S. The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform. University Press of Kansas, 1994.
• Edwards, Roger. Panzer: A Revolution in Warfare, 1939-1945. London: Brockhampton Press, 1998.
• Template:Cite book
• House, Jonathan M. Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization. U.S. Army Command General Staff College, 1984. Reprinted by University Press of the Pacific, 2002.
• Manstein, Erich von. Lost Victories. Trans. Anthony G. Powell. Presidio, 1994.
• Mosier, John. The Blitzkrieg Myth: How Hitler and the Allies Misread the Strategic Realities of World War II. HarperCollins, 2003.
• Sinesi, Michael P. Modern Bewegungskrieg. German Battle Doctrine, 1920-1940. Thesis submitted to Columbian School of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University, May 2001.
• Bruce Condell (Ed.),David T. Zabecki (Ed.). On the German Art of War: Truppenführung (Literal Trans: 'Troop Leading'). Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2001

Template:Featured articleTemplate:Link FA Template:Link FA

cs:Blitzkrieg de:Blitzkrieg es:Blitzkrieg fr:Blitzkrieg ko:전격전 id:Blitzkrieg it:Blitzkrieg he:מלחמת בזק ka:ელვისებური ომი lt:Blickrigas ms:Blitzkrieg nl:Blitzkrieg ja:電撃戦 no:Blitzkrieg pl:Blitzkrieg pt:Blitzkrieg ru:Блицкриг simple:Blitzkrieg sl:Bliskovita vojna sr:Блицкриг fi:Salamasota sv:Blixtkrig vi:Chiến tranh chớp nhoáng tr:Blitzkrieg zh:闪电战