Continental rationalism

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A separate article deals with a different philosophical position called rationalism.

In philosophy, Continental rationalism is an approach to philosophy based on the thesis that human reason can in principle be the source of all knowledge. It originated with René Descartes and spread during the 17th and 18th centuries, primarily in continental Europe. In contrast, the approach known as British Empiricism held that all ideas come to us through experience, either through the five external senses or through such inner sensations as pain and pleasure, and thus that knowledge (with the possible exception of mathematics) is essentially empirical. At issue is the fundamental source of human knowledge, and the proper techniques for verifying what we think we know (see Epistemology).

Rationalists argued that, starting with foundational basic principles, like the axioms of geometry, one could deductively derive the rest of all possible knowledge. The philosophers who held this view most clearly were Baruch Spinoza and Gottfried Leibniz, whose attempts to grapple with the epistemological and metaphysical problems raised by Descartes led to a development of the fundamental approach of rationalism. Both Spinoza and Leibniz asserted that, in principle, all knowledge, including scientific knowledge, could be gained through the use of reason alone, though they both observed that this was not possible in practice for human beings except in specific areas such as mathematics.

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Philosophical usage

The distinction between rationalists and empiricists was drawn at a later period, and would not have been recognised by the philosophers involved. Also, the distinction wasn't as clear-cut as is sometimes suggested; for example, the three main rationalists were all committed to the importance of empirical science, and in many respects the empiricists were closer to Descartes in their methods and metaphysical theories than were Spinoza and Leibniz. Thus, although it can be useful when organising courses or writing books, the distinction is less useful philosophically.

History of rationalism

Rene Descartes (1596–1650)

Descartes thought that only knowledge of eternal truths – including the truths of mathematics, and the epistemological and metaphysical foundations of the sciences – could be attained by reason alone; other knowledge required experience of the world, aided by the scientific method. He also argued that although dreams appear as real as sense experience, these dreams cannot provide persons with knowledge. Also, since conscious sense experience can be the cause of illusions, then sense experience itself can be doubtable. As a result, Descartes deduced that a rational pursuit of truth should doubt every belief about reality. He elaborated these beliefs in such works as Discourse on Method, Meditations on First Philosophy, and Principles of Philosophy. Descartes developed a method to attain truths according to which nothing which cannot be recognised by the intellect (or reason) can be classified as knowledge. These truths are gained "without any sensory experience", according to Descartes. Truths that are attained by reason are to be broken down into elements which intuition can grasp, which, through a purely deductive process, will result in clear truths about reality.

Descartes therefore argued, as a result of his method, that reason alone determined knowledge, and that this could be done independently of the senses. For instance, his famous dictum, cogito ergo sum, is a conclusion reached a priori and not through an inference from experience. This was for Descartes, an irrefutable principle upon which to ground all forms of other knowledge. Descartes posited a metaphysical dualism, distinguishing between the substances of the human body ("res extensa") and the mind or soul ("res cogitans") . This crucial distinction which would be left unresolved and lead to what is known as the mind-body problem, since the two substances in the Cartesian system are independent of each other and irreducible.

Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677)

Baruch Spinoza, a key precursor to the Enlightenment, offered both a solution to the mind-body problem and determined the relationship between God as an infinite substance with the finite substance of the world. As a corollary of this, God is the only being that exists, of necessity, and the empirical world is just modifications of the infinite attributes of God, of which we are aware of by thought and reason. God, as infinite substance and as made up of infinite attributes, necessarily exists, and is the whole of nature, or deus sive natura (God or nature).

In opposition to Descartes, Spinoza argued that there is only one substance, and that this is God when conceived under the attribute of thought, natura naturans, and Nature when conceived under the attribute of extension, natura naturata. Natura naturans is the eternal, aspect of Spinoza's system, and natura naturata is the infinite modifications of God's attributes. This God is non-personal, and has no will; Spinoza's universe is deterministic. Therefore, every human mind is part of God under the attribute of thought.

Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716)

Leibniz was the last of the great Rationalists, who contributed heavily to other fields such as mathematics. His system however was not developed independently of these advances. Leibniz rejected Cartesian dualism, and denied the existence of a material world. In Leibniz's view there are infinitely many simple substances, which he called "monads" (possibly taking the term from the work of Anne Conway).

Leibniz developed his theory of monads in response to both Descartes and Spinoza. In rejecting this response he was forced to arrive at his own solution. Monads are the fundamental unit of reality, according to Leibniz, constituting both inanimate and animate things. These units of reality represent the universe, though they are not subject to the laws of causality or space (which he called "well-founded phenomena"). Leibniz therefore introduced his principle of pre-established harmony, in order to account for apparent causality in the world.

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)

Immanuel Kant started as a traditional rationalist, having studied the rationalists Leibniz and Wolff, but after studying David Hume's works which "awoke [him] from [his] dogmatic slumbers", he developed a distinctive and very influential rationalism of his own which attempted to synthesise the traditional rationalist and empiricist traditions.

The more modern usage of the term "rationalist" refers to the belief that human behaviour and beliefs should be based on reason — a belief shared by continental rationalists and empiricists alike (see Rationalism).

References

  • Descartes, R., Discourse on Method: (1637).
  • Leibniz, G., The Monadology: (1714).
  • Spinoza, B., Ethics: (1677).

External links

fr:Rationalisme ja:合理主義哲学 nl:Rationalisme pl:Racjonalizm zh:欧洲理性主义