An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

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An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding is a book by the Scottish philosopher David Hume, published in 1748.

This is the book that woke Immanuel Kant from his self-described "dogmatic slumber". It was a simplification of an earlier effort, Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature, published anonymously in London in 1739–1740. Hume was disappointed with the reception of the Treatise (it "fell dead-born from the press", as he put it) and so tried again to get his ideas before the public in this Enquiry. Among the changes from the Treatise included a removal of Hume's theories of personal identity.

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Summary

The argument of the Enquiry proceeds following these steps:

Of the different species of philosophy. In the first section of the Enquiry, Hume provides a rough introduction to philosophy as a whole. For Hume, philosophy can be split into two general parts: natural and moral philosophy. By "moral philosophy" Hume means the philosophy of human nature, which investigates both actions and thoughts. He emphasizes in this section, by way of warning, that philosophers with nuanced thoughts will likely be cast aside in favor of those who weild flowery rhetoric. However, he insists, precision helps art and craft of all kinds.
Of the origin of ideas. In this section, Hume discusses the distinction between impressions and ideas. By "impressions", he means sensations, while by "ideas", he means memories and imaginings. According to Hume, the difference between the two is that ideas are less vivacious than impressions. Along with the empiricist's program, he argues that the source of all ideas are impressions, combined with the operations of the imagination. One noteworthy consequence which he gives some treatment of is the "missing blue shade" problem.
Of the association of ideas. In this chapter, Hume discusses how thoughts tend to come in sequences, as in trains of thought. He explains that there are at least three kinds of associations between ideas: resemblance, contiguity, and cause-and-effect. He argues that there must be some universal principle that must account for the various sorts of connections that exist between ideas, but does not immediately show what this principle might be.
Skeptical doubts concerning the operations of the understanding (in two parts). In the first part, Hume discusses how the objects of inquiry are either "relations of ideas" or "matters of fact", which is roughly the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. In part two, Hume inquires into how anyone can justifiably believe that experience yields any conclusions about the world. He shows how a satisfying argument for experience can be based neither on principles (since no principle exists) nor experience (since that would be a circular argument). Here he is describing what would become to be known as the problem of induction.
Skeptical solution of these doubts (in two parts). For Hume, we assume that experience tells us something about the world because of habit or custom, which human nature forces us to take seriously. This is also, presumably, the principle that organizes the connections between ideas. Indeed, one of the many famous passages of the Enquiry was on the topic of the incorrigibility of human custom. Hume wrote:"The great subverter of Pyrrhonism or the excessive principles of skepticism is action, and employment, and the occupations of common life. These principles may flourish and triumph in the schools; where it is, indeed, difficult, if not impossible, to refute them. But as soon as they leave the shade, and by the presence of the real objects, which actuate our passions and sentiments, are put in opposition to the more powerful principles of our nature, they vanish like smoke, and leave the most determined skeptic in the same condition as other mortals."
Of probability.
Of the idea of necessary connection (in two parts).
Of liberty and necessity (in two parts). Here Hume tackles the problem of free will, espousing a broadly compatibilist position.
Of the reason of animals (comparable to man).
Of miracles (in two parts).
Of a particular providence and of a future state.
Of the academical or sceptical philosophy (in three parts). The first section of the last chapter is organized as an outline of various skeptical arguments. The treatment includes the arguments of atheism, Cartesian skepticism, "light" skepticism, and rationalist critiques of empiricism. Hume shows that even light skepticism leads to crushing doubts about the world which - while ultimately are more philosophically justifiable - may only be combatted through the non-philosophical adherance to custom or habit. He ends the section with his own reservations towards Cartesian and Lockean epistemologies.