Defence Intelligence Staff
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The Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) is part of the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence. The DIS is responsible for gathering and assessing intelligence concerning military threats to the UK and its allies. It was created in 1964 when the three armed services merged their intelligence organisations. It has recently been renamed "Defence Intelligence" by the Ministry of Defence.
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Overview
The DIS is represented together with the Secret Intelligence Service (also known as MI6), The Security Service (MI5) and the Government Communications Headquarters as key intelligence players on the Joint Intelligence Committee which provides intelligence assessments to Ministers and senior officials. Each of the intelligence services has a different remit, and the role of the DIS is to provide the armed services and the government with information and assessments concerning military threats to national security. The DIS also provides a broader service to Whitehall as the centre of expertise on issues such as counter-proliferation.
The DIS is headed by the Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI), a serving three star officer in one of the armed forces; in practice the post rotates between the three services. The current CDI is Lieutenant-General Andrew Ridgway: if the rotational system of appointment continues the next CDI will come from the Royal Navy and take up office around April 2006. The Chief of Defence Intelligence replaced the former Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Intelligence) (DCDS(I), and Director-General Intelligence (DGI), both three star officers, in 1984 (until then it was normal for DCDS(I) to take up the position of DGI on retirement from the Services).
The Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence (currently Tony Pawson) is a civilian who heads the Defence Intelligence Assessment Staff (DIAS) which draws upon classified information (provided by MI6, MI5 and GCHQ) as well as open source intelligence. The former DCDI was Martin Howard. His predecessor was Tony Cragg, and his predecessor was John Morrison, the last intelligence professional to hold the post. The DIAS contains some 300 intelligence analysts plus management and support staff.
The other arm of the DIS is an independent Intelligence Collection Staff headed by a two star military officer. They use the eyes and ears of the armed forces for intelligence gathering and provide targeting and geographical intelligence to the services. They also provide intelligence and security training to key personnel.
The staff is made up of a mixture of serving military and civilian researchers, scientists and linguists.
The September Dossier and The Kelly Affair
The DIS was at the centre of controversy in the run up to the 2003 Iraq War. Senior weapons experts in the DIAS including Dr Brian Jones were unhappy about the wording of a dossier concerning the threat to the UK posed by Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction. The dossier was compiled by the JIC and published by the government in September 2002 to help make the case for an invasion of Iraq. Just after the dossier was published, Parliament ratified the governments decision to go to war.
Jones and others had complained in writing to the then DCDI (Tony Cragg) that the wording of the dossier was too strong. For instance, they felt claims that Iraq "could" launch Chemical or Biological Weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so should have been hedged about with caveats. Their complaints were overuled by the then CDI Air Marshal Sir Joe French.
It was claimed at the Hutton Inquiry that the 45 minutes claim was based on "compartmentalized" intelligence which they, the JIC, had seen but that the weapons experts had not. Writing in the Independent on February 4 2004, Dr Jones said that it was unlikely that anyone with WMD expertise had seen the "compartmentalized" report prior to its inclusion in the dossier, and if they had, they would have been sceptical.
The 45 minutes claim had also been derided as "risible" by another eminent weapons expert who worked closely with the DIS, Dr David Kelly. His off-the-record briefings to journalists lead to great controversy in Summer 2003. Kelly committed suicide following his exposure as the source of a report by Andrew Gilligan broadcast by the BBC. At the ensuing inquiry,chaired by Lord Hutton, memos from Jones and his deputy to the DCDI became public.
Chemical and Biological munitions were never deployed during the war, and no evidence of WMD has been found to date. It was succeeded by the Butler Review.
Chiefs of Defence Intelligence (1985-)
- Lieutenant-General Andrew Ridgway, CB CBE 2003 - 2006
- Air Marshal Sir Joe French, KBE 2000-2003
- Vice-Admiral Sir Alan West, KCB DSO 1997-2000
- Lieutenant-General Sir John Foley, KCB OBE MC 1994-1997
- Air Marshal Sir John Walker, KCB CBE AFC 1991-1994
- Vice-Admiral Sir John Kerr 1988-1991
- Lieutenant-General Sir Derek Boorman 1986-1988
- Air Marshal Sir Michael Armitage 1985-1986
Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Intelligence) (1964-1984)
- Air Marshal Sir Michael Armitage 1985-1986
- Lieutenant-General Sir James Glover 1981-1983
- Vice-Admiral Sir Roy Halliday 1978-1981
- Air Marshal Sir Richard Wakeford 1975-1978
- Lieutenant-General Sir David Willison 1972-1975
- Vice-Admiral Sir Louis Le Bailly 1971-1972
- Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Fyffe 1968-1971
- Air Marshal Sir Harold Maguire 1965-1968
- Vice-Admiral Sir Norman Denning 1964-1965
Director-General Intelligence (1964-1984)
- Vice-Admiral Sir Roy Halliday, rtd 1981-1984
- Air Chief Marshal Sir John Aiken, rtd 1978-1981
- Lieutenant-General Sir David Willison, rtd 1975-1978
- Vice-Admiral Sir Louis Le Bailly, rtd 1972-1975
- Air Marshal Sir Harold Maguire, rtd 1968-1972
- Air Chief Marshal Sir Alfred Earle, rtd 1966-1968
- Major-General Sir Kenneth Strong, KBE CB 1964-1966