Deterrence theory
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Deterrence theory is a defensive strategy developed after World War II and used throughout the Cold War. It also figures somewhat in the current War on Terrorism. Under the strategy, a government builds up or maintains military forces and weapons so that other powers will not attack it in fear of a larger retaliation. John Foster Dulles elaborated that “The heart of the problem is how to deter attack. This... requires that a potential aggressor be left in no doubt that he [or she] would... suffer damage outweighing any possible gains from aggression.”[1] Deterrence is viewed by some as the opposite of appeasement, where an expansionist government is allowed to absorb some territory to reach a negotiated settlement. (See Munich Agreement) Deterrence can be based on either WMD's, conventional weapons strength, or both.
Because the theory suggested that expansion could be prevented by a show of military might, some leaders thought that the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union would prevent both sides from entering into another world war. Deterrence in the Cold War was related to George F. Kennan's ideology of Containment and President Ronald Reagan's arms build-up in the 1980's. They claimed that the Soviet system of political repression and a communist economy would be unable to compete with the American system; the USSR would eventually weaken and collapse.
Criticism
Some argue that Deterrence Theory is flawed since a government can misunderstand the rationale of their opponent. A peaceful country with unpopular politics can be unfairly seen as a threat. Also, an isolationist nation that imposes draconian rule over its people can be ignored since it does not directly threaten its neighbors.
The arms race during deterrence might escalate the risk of accidental deployment possibly leading to war. See WarGames the movie. The arms race is inefficient in terms of optimal output; all countries involved have to expend resources on armaments which would not be necessary if the others had not expended resources. This could be considered a form of feedback runaway.
Finally, a country's military build-up risks massive budget deficits, restrictions on civil liberties, the creation of a military-industrial complex, and other repressive measures that sometimes result from a protracted or endless war. See Garrison State.
Proponents insist that the theory is flexible to different situations and allows for changes of strategy.
External links
- Revisiting Nuclear Deterrence Theory by Donald C. Whitmore - March 1, 1998
- Nuclear Deterrence, Missile Defenses, and Global Instability by David Krieger, April 2001
- Bibliography
- Maintaining Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century by the Senate Republican Policy Committee
- Nuclear Files.org Description and analysis of the nuclear deterrence theory
- Nuclear Files.org Speech by US General Lee Butler in 1998 on the Risks of Nuclear Deterrence
- Nuclear Files.org Speech by Sir Joseph Rotblat, Nobel Peace Laureate, on the Ethical Dimensions of Deterrence