Electronic voting
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Image:Urna eletrônica.jpeg Electronic voting (also known as e-voting) is a term encompassing several different types of voting. Electronic voting can include kiosks, the Internet, telephones, punch cards, and marksense or optical scan ballots.
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Overview
Electronic voting systems for electorates have been in use since the 1960s<ref>Bellis, Mary. The History of Voting Machines. About.com.</ref> when punch card systems debuted. The newer marksense ballots allow a computer to count a voter's mark with an optical sensor. Internet voting systems have gained popularity and have been used for government elections and referendums primarily in European countries. Electronic Voting Machines are used on a large scale in India (See Indian voting machines), Brazil, and the United States. In 2002, in the United States, the Help America Vote Act mandated that one accessible voting system be provided per polling place, which many jurisdictions have chosen to satisfy with the use of accessible electronic voting machines.
Types of voting systems
Paper-Based Voting System
A paper-based voting system records votes, counts votes, and produces a tabulation of the vote count from votes cast on paper cards or sheets. A marksense (also known as optical scan) voting system allows a voter to record votes by making marks directly on the ballot, usually in voting response locations. Additionally, a paper-based system may allow for the voter’s selections to be indicated by marks made on a paper ballot by an electronic input device, as long as such an input device does not independently record, store, or tabulate the voter selections.
This can also include punch card ballots, though this method is being phased out in the United States. With punch card ballots voters create holes in prepared ballot cards to indicate their choices. There are two main vendor systems, Datavote and Votomatic. Datavote systems use a cutting tool and vacuum to clean away material from unperforated cards indicating the voters' choices. Votomatic machines require the voter to punch out a perforated rectangle (i.e., a chad) from the card using a stylus.
Direct-Recording Electronic Voting System
A direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting system records votes by means of a ballot display provided with mechanical or electro-optical components that can be activated by the voter; that processes data by means of a computer program; and that records voting data and ballot images in memory components. It produces a tabulation of the voting data stored in a removable memory component and as printed copy. The system may also provide a means for transmitting individual ballots or vote totals to a central location for consolidating and reporting results from precincts at the central location.
Public Network Direct-Recording Electronic Voting System
A public network DRE voting system is an election system that uses electronic ballots and transmits vote data from the polling place to another location over a public network. Vote data may be transmitted as individual ballots as they are cast, periodically as batches of ballots throughout the election day, or as one batch at the close of voting. This includes Internet voting as well as telephone voting.
Internet voting can use remote locations (voting from any internet capable computer) or can use traditional polling locations with voting booths consisting of interent connected computers.
Corporations and organizations routinely use Internet voting to elect officers and Board members and for other proxy elections. Internet voting systems have been used privately in many modern nations and publically in the United States, the UK, Ireland, Switzerland and Estonia. In Switzerland, where it is already an established part of local referendums, voters get their passwords to access the ballot through the postal service. Most voters in Estonia can cast their vote in local and parliamentary elections, if they want to, via the Internet, as most of those on the electoral roll have access to an e-voting system, the largest run by any European Union country. It has been made possible because most Estonians carry a national identity card equipped with a computer-readable microchip and it is these cards which they use to get access to the online ballot. All a voter needs is a computer, an electronic card reader, their ID card and its PIN number, and they can vote from anywhere in the world. Estonian e-votes can only be cast during the days of advance voting. On election day itself people have to go to polling stations and fill in a paper ballot.
Precinct Count Voting System
A precinct count voting system is a voting system that tabulates ballots at the polling place. These systems typically tabulate ballots as they are cast and print the results after the close of polling. For DREs and some paper-based systems these systems provide electronic storage of the vote count and may transmit results to a central location over public telecommunication networks.
Central Count Voting System
A central count voting system is a voting system that tabulates ballots from multiple precincts at a central location. Voted ballots are typically placed into secure storage at the polling place. Stored ballots are transported or transmitted to a central counting location. The system produces a printed report of the vote count, and may produce a report stored on electronic media.
Advantages of electronic voting
People for the American Way cites as the principal advantages of electronic voting<ref>"Protecting the Integrity and Accessibility of Voting in 2004 and Beyond". People for the American Way</ref>:
- Each machine can easily be programmed to display ballots in different languages.
- Machines can be made fully accessible for persons with disabilities.
The advantage with respect to ballots in different languages appears to be unique to electronic voting. For example, King County, Washington's demographics require them under U.S. federal election law to provide ballot access in Chinese. With any type of paper ballot, the county has to decide how many Chinese-language ballots to print, how many to make available at each polling place, etc. Any strategy that can assure that Chinese-language ballots will be available at all polling places is certain, at the very least, to result in a lot of wasted ballots. (The situation with lever machines would be even worse than with paper: the only apparent way to reliably meet the need would be to set up a Chinese-language lever machine at each polling place, few of which would be used at all.)
Punchcard and optical scan machines are not fully accessible for the blind or visually impaired, and lever machines can be difficult for voters with limited mobility and strength.<ref>"Protecting the Integrity and Accessibility of Voting in 2004 and Beyond". People for the American Way</ref> Electronic machines can use headphones and other adaptive technology to provide the necessary accessibility.
Other benefits include:
- Faster counts and so quicker delivery of final election results
- Cost savings through the reduced amounts of specialist printing required
- Increased participation (voter turnout), particularly through the use of Internet voting.
Opposition to Electronic Voting
Some people challenge the use of electronic voting because of errors and malfunctions that have occurred. In the United States on Election Day 2004, 2269 machine problems were reported <ref>Election Incident Reporting System</ref>.
Others claim a greater possibility of electoral fraud. Some challenge the use of electronic voting from a theoretical point of view, arguing that humans are not equipped for verifying operations occurring within a machine. Thus, people can not trust computer operations can truly be verified<ref>Thompson,Ken (August 1984). "Reflections on Trusting Trust". Communication of the ACM 27 (8), 761–763.</ref>. Under a secret ballot system, there is no known input, nor is there any expected output with which to compare electoral results. Hence, electronic electoral result cannot be verified by humans and the people need to have an absolute faith in the accuracy, honesty and security of the whole electoral apparatus (people, software and hardware) <ref>electronic vote and Democracy</ref>. Requiring reliance on such faith may not be considered compatible with democracy.
Those in opposition suggest other forms of vote counting systems. The case of Switzerland, which uses paper ballots exclusively, suggests that electronic voting is not the only means to get a rapid count of votes. A country of a little over 7 million people, Switzerland publishes a definitive ballot count in about six hours. In villages, the ballots are even counted manually.
Possible malfunctions using electronic voting
- Diebold Election Systems, Inc. TSx voting system disenfranchised many voters in Alameda and San Diego Counties during the March 2, 2004 California presidential primary due non-functional voter card encoders.<ref>Greg Lucas, "State bans electronic balloting in 4 counties; Touch-screen firm accused of 'reprehensible,' illegal conduct", San Francisco Chronicle (May 1, 2004) http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2004/05/01/MNG036EAF91.DTL</ref> On April 30 California's secretary of state decertified all touch-screen machines and recommended criminal prosecution of Diebold Election Systems.<ref>Hardy, Michael (Mar. 3, 2004). California nixes e-voting. FCW.com.</ref> The California Attorney-General decided against criminal prosecution, but subsequently joined a lawsuit against Diebold for fraudulent claims made to election officials.Template:Fact On February 17, 2006 the California Secretary of State then recertified Diebold Election Systems DRE and Optical Scan Voting System in a document that only addresses some of its problems. <ref>State of California Secretary of State (February 17, 2006). Approval of use of Diebold Election Systems, Inc.</ref>
- Diebold machine review
- Diebold system discussion
- Fairfax County, Virginia, November 4, 2003. Machines quit, jammed the modems in voting systems when 953 voting machines called in simultaneously to report results, leading to a denial of service incident on the election. 50% of precincts were unable to report results until the following day. Also, some voters complained that they would cast their vote for a particular candidate and the indicator of that vote would go off shortly after. Had they not noticed, their vote for that candidate would have remained uncounted; an unknown number of voters were affected by this.
- Florida Primary 2002: Back to the Future — A litany of problems with voting systems in Florida since the 2000 Presidential election
- Napa County, California, March 2, 2004, an improperly calibrated mark-sense scanner overlooked 6692 absentee ballot votes. [1]
- Voting machine testing shrouded in secrecy
- The U.S. League of Women Voters, who generally favor electronic voting, nonetheless point out that "HAVA allocates $100 million to make polling places physically accessible, but there is no national definition of 'accessible' or a deadline for implementation." [2]
- Because the software used in electronic voting machines is often not available for public review, it could contain undetected mistakes or deliberate cheating. Clint Curtis, a former employee of Yang Enterprises, stated that, in 2000, at the request of Congressman Tom Feeney, who was then the Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives, Curtis developed a "vote fraud software prototype" ([3]) that could alter machine results. [4] Both Feeney and Yang have denied the charge, however, and some critics of electronic voting have expressed doubt about Curtis's charge. [5]
Recommendations for improvement
In December of 2005 the US Election Assistance Commission unanimously adopted the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, which significantly increase security requirements for voting systems and expand access, including opportunities to vote privately and independently, for individuals with disabilities. The guidelines will take effect in December 2007 replacing the 2002 Voting System Standards (VSS) developed by the Federal Election Commission.
Some groups such as the Open Voting Consortium believe that to restore voter confidence and eliminate voter fraud all electronic voting systems must be completely available to public scrutiny.
In the summer of 2004, the Legislative Affairs Committee of the Association of Information Technology Professionals issued a nine-point proposal for national standards for electronic voting. <ref>"Legislative Committee Resolution Awaiting BOD Approval". (July 2004). Information Executive</ref> In an accompanying article, the committee's chair, Charles Oriez, described some of the problems that had arisen around the country.<ref>Oriez , Charles (July 2004). "In Search of Voting Machines We Can Trust". Information Executive</ref>
See also
- Certification of voting machines
- Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail
- Electoral systems
- Electronic voting in Belgium
- Electronic voting in Brazil
- Electronic voting in Canada
- Electronic voting in India
- Electronic voting in Ireland
- Ballot
- Vote counting system
- Voting system
- Internet voting in Geneva, Switzerland
- E-democracy
- eGovernment
References
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External links
- US Federal Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, Election Assistance Commission
- Estonia pulls off nationwide Net voting
- David Allen's Black Box Voting website
- Bev Harris's Black Box Voting website
- California Voter Foundation
- Electronic Voting — Rebecca Mercuri's web site, includes articles, published papers, an e-mail list, and other electronic voting information.
- European Association Electronic Libre
- Helger Lipmaa's Electronic Voting page — large collection of links to useful resources.
- Security expert Bruce Schneier occasionally discusses voting security:
- Internet Voting vs. Large-Value e-Commerce — Why securing voting is not the same thing as securing financial transactions via the Internet (Bruce Schneier)
- The Problem with Electronic Voting Machines (Bruce Schneier)[6]
- Jason Kitcat's guide to the pros and cons of e-voting — By UK-based e-voting expert
- National Committee for Voting Integrity, a group working to promote verifiable electronic voting
- NORC Florida Ballots Project — Discusses various types of ballots
- Open Directory Project: Electronic Voting Systems
- Open Voting Consortium — Developing open source software for electronic voting machines
- Verified Voting — Campaign to Demand Verifiable Election Results
- Voter Verified e-voting explained — (FREE Project & FIPR)
- Ramsey County Elections Public Test of Vote System Fails, Does Not Test Final Vote Count Ramsey County Minnesota, October 29, 2004. Unsigned, apparently by Steven Hauser according to [7].de:E-Voting