Meditations on First Philosophy

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Meditations on First Philosophy (subtitled In which the existence of God and the real distinction of mind and body, are demonstrated) is a philosophical treatise written by René Descartes first published in Latin in 1641. The French translation was made by the Duke of Luynes with the supervision of Descartes and was published in 1647 with the title Méditations Metaphysiques. The orginal Latin title is Meditationes de prima philosophia, in qua Dei existentia et animae immortalitas demonstratur. The book is made up of six meditations, in which Descartes first discards all belief in things which are not absolutely certain, and then tries to establish what can be known for sure.

The Meditations consist of the presentation of Descartes' methaphysical system in its most detailed level and in the expanding of Descartes' philosophical system, which he first introduced in the fourth part of his Discourse on Method (1637). Descartes' metaphysical thought is also found in the Principles of Philosophy (1644), which the author intended to be a philosophy guidebook.

Contents 1 Meditations 1.1 Meditation I 1.2 Meditation II 1.3 Meditation III 1.4 Meditation IV 1.5 Meditation V 1.6 Meditation VI 2 Objections & Replies 3 See also 4 References 4.1 Collected works in French and Latin 4.2 English translations 4.3 Single works 5 Further reading 6 External links

Meditations

Meditation I

Meditation I: On What Can Be Called into Doubt is written in first person and in the dialectic style. It proceeds through three stages in "tearing down" opinion with one common principle throughout. The principle is that one should refrain from asserting anything that is uncertain just as if it were false. However, he recognized that the mind has a habit of believing what it perceives and, thus, the will must deliberately suppose that all prior beliefs are false. In order to support this, he discusses three stages: senses, dreams, and the evil demon hypothesis.

Although each of these can falsify our perceptions, Descartes asserts that they do not have the power to falsify what we "seem" to perceive. The powers to think and exist are also deemed untouchable.

Meditation II

In Meditation II: On the Nature of the Human Mind, Which Is Better Known Than the Body, Descartes lays out a pattern of thought, sometimes called representationalism, in response to the doubts forwarded in Meditation I. He identifies five steps in this theory:

1. We only have access to the world of our ideas; things in the world are only accessed indirectly.
2. These ideas are understood to include all of the contents of the mind, including perceptions, images, memories, concepts, beliefs, intentions, decisions, etc.
3. The ideas represent things that are separate from themselves.
4. These represented things are many times "external" to the mind.
5. It is possible for these ideas to constitute either accurate or false representations.

Descartes argues that this representational theory disconnects the world from the mind, leading to the need for some sort of bridge to span the separation and provide good reasons to believe that the ideas accurately represent the outside world. The first plank he uses in constructing this bridge can be found in the following excerpt: Template:Quote box

In other words, one's consciousness implies one's existence. In one of Descartes' replies to objections to the book, he summed this up in the phrase, I am, I exist, which is often confused with the famous quote, I think, therefore I exist.

Once he has secured his existence, however, Descartes seeks to find out what "I" is. He rejects the typical method which looks for a definition because the words used in the definition would then need to be defined. He seeks simple terms that do not need to be defined in this way, but whose meaning can just be "seen." From these self-evident truths, complex terms can be built up.

The first of these self-evident truths is Descartes' proof of existence turned on its head: Template:Quote box

To define himself further, Descartes turns to the example of wax. He determines that wax isn't wax because of its color, texture or shape, as all of these things can change and the substance still be wax. Therefore, he distinguishes between ordinary perception and judgment. The reality of the wax is "grasped, not by the senses or the power of having mental images, but by the understanding alone." When one understands the mathematical principles of the substance, such as it's expansion under heat, figure and motion, the knowledge of the wax can be clear and distinct.

If a substance such as wax can be known in this fashion, then the same must be of ourselves. The self, then, is not determined by what we sense of ourselves - these hands, this head, these eyes - but by simply the things one thinks. Thus, one "can't grasp anything more easily or plainly than [their] mind."

Meditation III

Building upon the foundation that "I exist," Descartes seeks to prove that "I am not alone" in Meditation III: On God's Existence. Along the way, he solves the skeptical problem of the criterion with an argument as follows:

1. I exist as a thinking thing.
2. How can I be certain?

Using the "clarity and distinctness" criterion, Descartes then seeks to prove he is not alone by proving that God exists. He chooses this method because without a knowledge of whether God exists or if he is a deceiver, there is no way to discuss the all-powerful deceiver challenge of reality. In order to do this, he first establishes a causal principle: There must be at least as much reality in the cause as there is in the effect. For example, if a thought of an elephant is caused by a picture of an elephant, the picture must have as much reality as the thought. If it were not so, it could not have produced it.

Using this causal principle, Descartes lays out two ontological arguments in Meditation III for the existence of God. The first begins with the fact that each of us has an idea of God and the second begins with the fact that it is true that the self exists.

Argument 1

1. I have an idea of God (an infinitely perfect substance).
2. That idea must have a cause.
3. Nothing comes from nothing.
4. The cause must have at least as much formal reality as the idea.
5. I am not infinitely perfect.
6. I could not be the cause of the idea.
7. There must be a cause that is infinitely perfect.
8. God exists.

Argument 2

1. I exist.
2. My existence must have a cause.
3. The cause must be either:

a) myself

b) my always having existed

c) my parents

d) something less perfect than God

e) God

1. Not a. If I had created myself, I would have made myself perfect.
2. Not b. Continued existence does not follow from present existence.
3. Not c. This leads to an infinite regress.
4. Not d. This idea cannot account for the fact that the idea is of something supreme.
5. e. God exists.

From these arguments, Descartes feels he has proved he is not alone in the universe as an infinitely intelligent and powerful and perfect substance exists, also. Not only that, but that this God cannot be a deceiver: Template:Quote box

Meditation IV

The conclusions of the previous Meditations that "I" and "God" both exist lead to another problem: If God is perfectly good and the source of all that is, how is there room for error or falsehood? Descartes attempts to answer this question in Meditation IV: On Truth and Falsity. Template:Quote box

The framework of his arguments center on the Great Chain of Being, in which God's perfect goodness is relative to His perfect being. On the extreme opposite end of the scale is complete nothingness, which is also the extremity of evil. Thus, humans are an intermediary between these two extremes, being less "real" or "good" than God, but more "real" and "good" than nothingness. Thus, error (as a part of evil) is not a positive reality, it is only the absence of what is correct. In this way, its existence is allowed within the context of a perfectly inerrant God. Template:Quote box

Descartes also concedes two points that might allow for the possibility of his ability to err. First, he notes that it is very possible that his limited knowledge prevents him from understanding why God chose to create him so he could make mistakes. If he could see the things that God could see, with a complete and infinite scope, perhaps he would judge his ability to err as the best option. He uses this point to attack the Aristotelian structure of causes. The final cause described by Aristotle are the "what for" of an object, but Descartes claims that because he is unable to completely comprehend the mind of God, it is impossible to completely understand the "why" through science - only the "how." Template:Quote box

Second, he realized that God has the ability to create a large number of things of which he would just be a part. Perhaps the error is only apparent when looking at the individual and is reconciled when looking at the whole. Template:Quote box

Lastly, Meditation IV attributes the source of error to a discrepancy between two divine gifts: understanding and will. Understanding is given in an incomplete form, while will (by nature) can only be either completely given or not given at all. When he is presented with a certain amount of understanding and then chooses to act outside of that, he is in error. Thus, the gifts of God (understanding and will) both remain good and only the incorrect usage by him remains as error. Template:Quote box

Meditation V

Meditation V: On the Essence of Material Objects and More on God's Existence begins with the stated purpose of expanding the "known items" of God and self to include outside material objects, Descartes saves that for Meditation VI in lieu of something he deems more fundamental but in the same direction: a discussion concerning the ideas of those external items. Along the way, he stumbles upon another claimed logical proof of God's existence. Template:Quote box

In pondering these ideas of external objects, Descartes realizes they can be separated into those that are clear and distinct and those that are confused and obscure. The former group consists of the ideas of extension, duration and movement. These geometrical ideas cannot be misconstrued or combined in a way that makes them false. For example, if the idea of a creature with the head of a giraffe, the body of a lion and tail of a beaver was constructed and the question asked if the creature had a large intestine, the answer would have to be invented. But, no matter how you combine or rearrange mathematical properties, the three angles of a triangle will still add up to 180 degrees and the largest side will always be opposite the largest angle. Thus, Descartes discovers that these truths have a nature or essence of themselves, completely independent of one's thoughts or opinions. Template:Quote box

While thinking about the independence of these ideas of external objects, Descartes realizes that he is just as certain about God as he is about these mathematical ideas. He asserts that this is natural as the ideas of God are the only ideas that imply God's existence. He uses the example of a mountain and a valley. While one cannot picture a mountain without a valley, it's possible that these do not exist. However, the fact that one cannot conceive of God without existence inherently rules out the possibility of God's non-existence. Simply put, the argument is framed as follows:

1. God is defined as an infinitely perfect being.
2. Perfection includes existence.
3. So God exists.

While Descartes had already claimed to have confirmed God's existence through previous arguments, this one allows him to put to rest any discontent he might have had with his "distinct and clear" criteria for truth. With a confirmed existence of God, all doubt that what one previously thought was real and not a dream can be removed. Having made this realization, Descartes asserts that without this sure knowledge in the existence of a supreme and perfect being, assurance of any truth is impossible. Template:Quote box

Meditation VI

In Meditation VI: On the Existence of Material Objects and the Real Distinction of Mind from Body, Descartes addresses the potential existence of material outside of the self and God. First, he asserts that such objects can exist simply because God is able to make them. Template:Quote box

Knowing that the existence of such objects is possible, Descartes then turns to the prevalence of mental images as proof. To do this, he draws a distinction between mental images and understanding, the former being something that is seen like a mental photograph and the latter being something that is understood but not pictured. He uses an example of this to clarify: Template:Quote box

Descartes has still not given proof that such external objects exist, however, only shown that their existence could conveniently explain this mental process. To obtain this proof, he first reviews his premises for the Meditations - that the senses cannot be trusted and what he is taught "by nature" does not have much credence. However, he views these arguments within a new context; after writing Meditation I, he has proved the existence of himself and of a perfect God. Thus, Descartes jumps quickly to proofs of the division between the body and soul and that material things exist:

Proof for the body being distinct from the soul

1. It is possible for God to create anything I can clearly and distinctly perceive.
2. If God creates something to be independent of another, they are distinct from each other.
3. I clearly and distinctly understand my existence as a thinking thing (which does not require the existence of a body).
4. So God can create a thinking thing independently of a body.
5. I clearly and distinctly understand my body as an extended thing (which does not require a soul).
6. So God can create a body independently of a soul.
7. So my soul is a reality distinct from my body.
8. So I (a thinking thing) can exist without a body.

Proof of the reality of external material things

1. I have a "strong inclination" to believe in the reality of external material things due to my senses.
2. God must have created me with this nature.
3. If independent material things do not exist, God is a deceiver.
4. But God is not a deceiver.
5. So material things exist and contain the properties essential to them.

After using these two arguments to dispel solipsism and skepticism, Descartes seems to have succeeded in defining reality as being in three parts: God (infinite), souls, and material things (both finite). He closes by addressing other details about reality that some could see as inconsistencies, such as senses in amputated limbs, dropsy and dreams.

Objections & Replies

Descartes submitted his manuscript to several philosophers, theologians and a logician before publishing the Meditations. Their objections and his replies (many of which are quite extensive) were included along the first publication of the Meditations. Thus, this dialogue could be seen as an integral part of Descartes' views expressed in the Meditations.

The seven objectors were, in order (of the sets as they were published): The Dutch theologian Johannes Caterus (Johan de Kater); various "theologians and philosophers" gathered by Descartes' friend and principal correspondent, Friar Marin Mersenne; the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes; the theologian and logician Antoine Arnauld; the philosopher Pierre Gassendi; another miscellany gathered by Mersenne; and the Jesuit Pierre Bourdin.

See also

• 17th-century philosophy

References

Collected works in French and Latin

• Oeuvres De Descartes, 11 vols., edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1983).

English translations

• The Philosophical Writings Of Descartes, 3 vols., translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
• The Philosophical Works of Descartes, 2 vols, translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane, and G.R.T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

Single works

• Meditations on First Philosophy, translated by John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
• Méditations Métaphysiques, translated by Michelle Beyssade (Paris: GF, 1993).

Further reading

• Alquié, Ferdinand. La découverte métaphysique de l'homme chez Descartes (Paris: PUF, 2000).
• Beyssade, Jean-Marie. La Philosophie première de Descartes (Paris: Flammarion, 1979).
• Cottingham, John. (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Descartes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
• Dicker, Georges. Descartes: An Analytical and Historical Introduction (New York: OUP, 1993)
• Frankfurt, Harry. Demons, Dreamers and Madmen (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970).
• Gilson, Étienne. Etudes sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien (Paris: Vrin, 1930).
• Gueroult, Martial. Descartes selon L'Ordre des Raisons (Paris: Aubier, 1968). Translated by Roger Ariew as Descartes' Philosophy Interpreted According to the Order of Reasons (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
• Hatfield, Gary. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Descartes and the Meditations (London: Routledge, 2003).
• Kenny, Anthony. Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1968).
• Rorty, Amelie. (ed.) Essays on Descartes' Meditations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).
• Williams, Bernard. Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (London: Penguin Books, 1978).
• Wilson, Margaret. Descartes (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978).

External links

• Descartes' Life and Works at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Descartes' Modal Metaphysics at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Online text of the Meditations translated by John Veitch
• SparkNotes: Meditations on First Philosophy
• Summary of the Meditations in 6,488 words
• Undergraduate essays on the Meditationsde:Meditationes de prima philosophia

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