Military of the Republic of China
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| Image:Rocmnd.gif | |
| Military of the Republic of China | |
|---|---|
| Military manpower | |
| Military age | 19 years of age |
| Availability | males age 19-49: 5,883,828 (2005 est.) |
| Fit for military service | males 4,749,537 (2005 est.) |
| Reaching military age annually | males: 174,173 (2005 est.) |
| Military expenditures | |
| Dollar figure | $7.574 billion (2003) |
| Percent of GDP | 2.6% (2004) |
| Cited from <ref>Template:Cite web</ref> | |
The Republic of China (ROC) maintains a large military establishment, which accounted for 16.8 % of the central budget in the fiscal year of 2003. It is historically continuous with the Nationalist Army that fled from mainland China to Taiwan with the Kuomintang at the end of the Chinese Civil War, when the mainland was taken over by the Communist Party of China.
Until the 1970s, the military's primary mission was to retake mainland China. <ref>Template:Cite web</ref>However, the military's current foremost mission is the defense of the islands of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu against an invasion by the Communists' People's Liberation Army, which is seen as the predominant threat to the ROC <ref>Template:Cite web See page 60: "... the PLA is exploring assets and techniques for conducting information and asymmetric warfare, which are expected to diversify and sharpen the PRC's invasion into the ROC. The PRC's threat against the ROC's security is ever increasing."</ref> <ref>Template:Cite web Pages 89-90: "The PRC refusal to renounce using military power against Taiwan, its current emphasis on "enhancing preparation for military struggle," its obvious intention of preparing a war against Taiwan reflected in operational deployment, readiness efforts, and annual military exercises in the Southeast China coastal region, and its progress in aerospace operations, information warfare, paralyzation warfare, and non-conventional warfare, all of these factors work together so that the ROC Armed Forces face an increasingly complicated and difficult situation in terms of self-defense and counterattack. These multiple daunting challenges are testing our defense security."</ref>, as the Communists have not renounced the use of military force against Taiwan in an ongoing dispute over the political status of Taiwan.
Contents |
Personnel
Template:Seealso Image:ROC Marines.jpg The ROC's armed forces number approximately 300,000, and reserves reportedly total 3,870,000. Conscription remains universal for qualified males reaching age 18. Force streamlining programs under way since 1997 are combining redundant institutions and steadily reducing the military to 270,000 personnel by 2012. However, even then there would be compulsory basic training for all males reaching 18. As the size of the force decreases, Taipei intends to gradually expand the number of volunteer soldiers with the eventual goal of forming an all volunteer military. <ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
The ROC military's officer corps is generally viewed as being competent, capable, technically proficient, and generally pro-U.S. in outlook, displaying a high degree of professionalism. However, as a whole, the culture in the officer corps tends to be very cautious and conservative. The military also faces difficulties in the recruitment and retention of junior officers and NCO's due to competition with the private sector.
Morale in the enlisted corps is generally believed to be rather low, due in part to difficulties in retention of experienced NCO's, force reduction, antiquated management and a traditional military culture with very rigid command structures which discourages lower-level risk-taking, and competition with the private sector which is generally viewed as offering better opportunities, especially for the technically savvy. <ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
There are, however, reports that this is changing as military benefits have been increased to compete more favourably with the private sector. In 2005 the MND exceeded its recruitment goal of volunteer enlisted personnel by almost twice the required amount. This may be indicative of changing cultural perceptions of military service as well as more experience on the part of MND recruiting officers.Template:Citeneeded
Because of the historical legacy having once controlled Mainland China, the army has traditionally been the most important of Taiwan's military forces, although this has declined in recent years with the realization that the army's role in defending against a PRC invasion is limited. For the same reason, more emphasis is being placed on the development of the navy and air force.<ref>Template:Citepaper publisher See "Reforming the Armed Forces", page 5.</ref>
Organization
Military branches and structure
The following service commands are directly subordinate to the General Staff, which in turn answers to the Minister of Defense and the ROC President:<ref>2004 National Defense Report. See Part 3: Organization of National Defense and Armed Forces.</ref>
- Republic of China Army
- Republic of China Navy
- Republic of China Air Force
- Republic of China Military Police
The Republic of China Coast Guard was created as a separate branch in 2001 from related police and military units and is administered by the Executive Yuan.
Reforms and development
Civilian control of the military
Two defense reform laws implemented in 2002 granted the civilian defense minister control over the entire military and expanded legislative oversight authority for the first time in history.<ref>Template:Cite web, see sections "Military Conservatism" and "Stovepiped Bureaucracy"</ref> In the past the ROC military was closely linked with and controlled by the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party). Following the democratization of the 1990s the military has moved to a politically neutral position, though the senior officer ranks remain dominated by KMT members. <ref>Template:Cite book</ref>
Arms purchases
Image:ROCN kang ding class.jpg Acquisitions over the next several years will emphasize modern C 4 ISR equipment that will vastly improve communications and data-sharing among services. These and other planned acquisitions will gradually shift the island’s strategic emphasis to offshore engagement of invading Chinese forces. It is hoped that this will serve to reduce civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure in the event of armed conflict.<ref>2004 National Defense Report. See Part 2: Defense Policy and Military Strategy.</ref>
The ROC's armed forces are equipped with weapons obtained primarily from the United States which has supplied it with 150 F-16A/B Block-20 MLU fighters,4 E-2 Hawkeyes, the licence production of Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates, 60 AH-1W attack helos, 39 OH-58D scout helos and 200 Patriot PAC-II SAMs among others. The United States has also authorized the sale of eight diesel submarines in 2001, although it is not clear if and how these subs are to be delivered since the United States does not build diesel submarines and other nations are unlikely to sell these weapons because of PRC pressure. As consequence Taiwan might get a modernised Babel-class design. But Taiwan will take delivery of four Kidd-class destroyers starting from late 2005. Also delivery of M109A6 units started in 2003 together with two additional E2C Hawkeyes and nine Chinook heavy transport helos in 2004. In 1992 the USA also agreed to sell the AEGIS SPY 1F to Taiwan to be installed on a special version of the Perry. However due to technical difficulties this plan was later given up by Taiwan.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> In light of the continuous ballistic missile buildup by the PRC, Taipei has also expressed interest in participating in or developing ballistic missile defense capibilities, possibly in conjunction with the U.S. or Japan, though it is unclear whether the U.S. would permit such collaboration to take place. <ref>Swaine, M., Mulvenon, J. [2001], "5", 147-152, "...BMD systems became more attractive in some quarters in Taiwan, as they were increasingly seen as potent political symbols of enhanced U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation."</ref>
The ROC has also procured 2 Zwaardvis MK2 class submarines from the Netherlands, and 60 Mirage 2000-5Di/Ei fighters from France together with six French La Fayette stealth frigates. Also Taiwan acquired four minesweepers from Germany. These sales were made in the late 1980s/early '90s and because of PRC pressure, future large scale sales from Europe appear unlikely.Template:Citeneeded
The military has also stressed military "self-reliance," which has resulted in the growth of indigenous military production in certain fields most notably the Indigenous Defense Fighter, Taiwan's own MLRS the RT-2000 and SAMs like the Sky Bow I and II. Taiwan also developed its own Hsung Feng series of supersonic anti-ship missile. <ref>2004 National Defense Report. Part 4, Ch 12: "Government agencies under the Executive Yuan shall follow national defense policies to consolidate efforts of the private sector to develop defense technology industries and acquisition of weapon equipment shall firstly consider those built domestically."</ref> The ROC's efforts at arms purchases have consistently been blocked by PRC. <ref>Template:Cite news</ref> In addition the PRC has consistently attempted to block communications between the ROC military and other militaries and this has led some observers to fear that this is causing ROC's military to fall behind doctrinally.Template:Citeneeded
Doctrine and exercises
Image:ROCAF IDF.jpg The primary goal of the ROC Armed Forces is to provide a credible deterrent against hostile action by establishing effective counterstrike and defense capabilities. Should hostilities occur, current ROC military doctrine centers upon the principle of "offshore engagement" where the primary goal of the armed forces in any conflict with the PRC would be to keep as much of the fighting away from Taiwan proper for as long as possible to minimize damage to infrastructure and civilian casualties. The military has also begun to take the threat of a sudden "decapitation attack" by the PRC seriously. Consequently, these developments have seen a growing emphasis on the role of the Navy and Air Force (where the Army had traditionally dominated); as well as the development of rapid reaction forces and quick mobilization of local reserve forces.<ref>2004 National Defense Report. See Part 2: Defense Policy and Military Strategy.</ref>
A series of computer simulations conducted by the ROC Ministry of National Defense in 2004 predicted that, in the event of a full scale invasion by the PRC, Taipei would fall after almost three weeks. It also showed that the ROC Air Force would be eliminated by about the fifth day. However, the simulation results indicate that the PRC would lose about two-thirds of all its military forces in the process. The results of the simulation are hotly debated since they came at a time when the Legislative Yuan was debating one of the largest arms procurement packages in recent years.Template:Citeneeded <ref>Template:Cite book Example of a simulated wargame of a cross-straits conflict.</ref>
Foreign cooperation
Japan
While some reports have also indicated the presence of retired JSDF personnel as advisorsTemplate:Citeneeded, there is no official cooperation between the ROC military and the JSDF. It is believed that any Japanese involvement in a cross-Straits conflict would be very much contingent upon the US response, due to the nearest US forces in the region being based in Japan and the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan.<ref>Swaine, M., Mulvenon, J. [2001], "5", 142-147, "For Taiwan’s efforts to implement pragmatic diplomacy and expand its international space, Japan is perhaps second only to the United States in importance... its key role in the U.S.-Japan defense alliance does offer indirect defense support."</ref>
Singapore
Starting in 1975, Singapore has sent units from its military to train in Taiwan due to the lack of space in the city-state under the Starlight training program (星光計畫). Singapore forces training in Taiwan numbered roughly 3000 as of 2005.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
United States
Collaboration between the ROC and US militaries began during World War II when both nations were members of the Allied forces, and continued through the Chinese Civil War when ROC forces were supplied primarily by the US until the final evacuation of ROC forces to Taiwan in 1949. Initially the U.S. expected the ROC government to fall and withdrew support until the outbreak of the Korean War when the U.S. 7th Fleet was ordered to the Taiwan Straits both to protect Taiwan from a PRC attack, and to stop ROC actions against the PRC. <ref>Template:Citepaper publisher version Page 1: "In addition 7th Fleet will take station so as to prevent invasion of Formosa and to insure that Formosa not be used as base of operations against Chinese mainland." Page 4: "Seventh Fleet is hereby assigned to operational control CINCFE for employment in following task hereby assigned CINCFE: By naval and air action prevent any attack on Formosa, or any air or sea offensive from Formosa against mainland of China."</ref> A formal US-ROC security pact was signed in 1954 establishing a formal alliance that lasted until US recognition of the PRC in 1979.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref> During this period US military advisors were deployed to the ROC and joint exercises were common. The US and ROC also collaborated on human and electronic intelligence operations directed against the PRC. ROC units also participated in the Korean War and the Vietnam War in noncombat capacities, primarily at the insistence of the United States which was concerned that high profile roles for ROC forces in these conflicts would lead to full scale PRC intervention. <ref>Template:Citepaper publisher</ref>
High level cooperation ended with the US recognition of the PRC in 1979, when all remaining US forces in Taiwan were withdrawn. The US continued to supply the ROC with arms sales per the Taiwan Relations Act, albeit in a diminished role. While ROCAF pilots continued to train at Luke AFB in Arizona, cooperation is still limited primarily to civilian contractors.
In recent years, the ROC military has again begun higher level cooperation with the U.S. Military after over two decades of relative isolation. Senior officers from the U.S. Pacific Command observed the annual Han Kuang military exercises in 2005. The US also upgraded its military liason position in Taipei from a position held by retired officers hired on a contractual basis to one held by an active duty officer the same year.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>Nonetheless the US continues to maintain a policy of strategic ambiguity as to whether or not it would intervene in a cross-Straits conflict.<ref>Template:Cite press release</ref>
Military ranks
The ROC Military's rank structure is patterned after that of the U.S. Armed Forces. Note that the titles of each rank are the same in Chinese for all four military branches, and there are no Brigadier Generals/Commodores in the rank structure. The corresponding titles in English for each service are also provided.<ref>Template:Cite web</ref>
| Chinese title | Army / Marines / MP | Navy | Air Force |
|---|---|---|---|
| 一級/二級上將 | General | Admiral | General |
| 中將 | Lieutenant General | Vice Admiral | Lieutenant General |
| 少將 | Major General | Rear Admiral | Major General |
| 准將(無此階級) | Brigadier General | Commodore | Brigadier General |
| 上校 | Colonel | Captain | Colonel |
| 中校 | Lieutenant Colonel | Commander | Lieutenant Colonel |
| 少校 | Major | Lieutenant Commander | Major |
| 上尉 | Captain | Lieutenant | Captain |
| 中尉 | 1st Lieutenant | Lieutenant Junior Grade | 1st Lieutenant |
| 少尉 | 2nd Lieutenant | Ensign | 2nd Lieutenant |
| Chinese title | Army / Marines / MP | Navy | Air Force |
|---|---|---|---|
| 一等士官長 | Sergeant Major | Master Chief Petty Officer | Chief Master Sergeant |
| 二等士官長 | Master Sergeant | Senior Chief Petty Officer | Senior Master Sergeant |
| 三等士官長 | Sergeant First Class | Chief Petty Officer | Master Sergeant |
| 上士 | Staff Sergeant | Petty Officer 1st Class | Technical Sergeant |
| 中士 | Sergeant | Petty Officer 2nd Class | Staff Sergeant |
| 下士 | Corporal | Petty Officer 3rd Class | Senior Airman |
| 上等兵 | Private First Class | Seaman First Class | Airman First Class |
| 一等兵 | Private | Seaman | Airman |
| 二等兵 | Private Basic | Seaman Apprentice | Airman Basic |
Major deployments, battles & incidents
ROC on Mainland China (1912-1949)
Image:Chinese soldiers 1939.jpg
- Northern Expedition: 1925
- First Communist Insurrection/Purge: 1927-1937
- Nanchang Uprising: 1927
- Autumn Harvest Uprising: 1927
- Xi'an Incident: December 12, 1936
- Second Sino-Japanese War / World War II: 1937-1945
- Marco Polo Bridge Incident: July 7, 1937
- Battle of Shanghai: August 13 - November 9, 1937
- Battle of Nanjing: October - December, 1937
- Battle of Taierzhuang: March 24 - April 7, 1938
- First Battle of Changsha: September 17 - October 6, 1939
- Second Battle of Changsha: September 6 - October 8, 1941
- Third Battle of Changsha: December 24, 1941 - January 15, 1942
- Defense of Sichuan: 1942 - 1943
- Battle of Hengyang-Changsha: June 1944 - April 1945
- Chinese Civil War: 1945 - 1949
- New Fourth Army Incident: 1940
- 228 Incident: February 28 - March 1947
ROC on Taiwan (1949-present)
Image:ROCN Guard Martyrs Shrine.jpg
- Battle of Kuningtou: October 25 - October 28, 1949
- Korean War: 1950-1953, Translators, cross border raids into southwest China from Burma.
- First Taiwan Strait Crisis: August 1954 - May 1955
- Fall of Yijiangshan: January 18, 1955
- Tachen Evacuation: February 7 - 11, 1955
- Second Taiwan Strait Crisis: August 23 - early October, 1958
- Vietnam War: 1960s, Deployment of small groups of ROC troops disguised as locals, transportation, and technical assistance. Not widely publicized to avoid PRC involvement.<ref>S. Goldstein, 2000</ref>
- Third Taiwan Strait Crisis: July 21, 1995 - March 23, 1996
- Southeast Asian tsunami relief: January 2005
Nuclear weapons program
The development of nuclear weapons by the ROC has been a contentious issue, as it is one of the reasons over which the PRC has pledged to attack Taiwan. The U.S., hoping to avoid escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait, has continually opposed arming Taiwan with nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the ROC adheres to the principles of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has stated that it does not intend to produce nuclear weapons. Past nuclear research by the ROC makes it a 'threshold' nuclear state.
In 1967, a nuclear weapons program began under the auspices of the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER) at the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology. The ROC was able to acquire nuclear technology from abroad (including a research reactor from Canada and low-grade plutonium from the United States) allegedly for a civilian energy system, but in actuality to develop fuel nuclear weapons.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>
After the International Atomic Energy Agency found evidence of the ROC's efforts to produce weapons-grade plutonium, Taipei agreed in September 1976 under U.S. pressure to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. Though the nuclear reactor was soon shut down and the plutonium mostly returned to the U.S., work continued secretly.
A secret program was revealed again when Colonel Chang Hsien-yi, deputy director of nuclear research at INER, defected to the U.S. in December 1987 and produced a cache of incriminating documents. General Hau Pei-tsun claimed that scientists in Taiwan had already produced a controlled nuclear reaction. Under pressure from the U.S., the program was halted yet again.
During the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, then ROC President Lee Teng-hui proposed to reactivate the program, but was forced to back down a few days later after drawing intense criticism.
See also
- Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology
- Military history of China
- People's Liberation Army
- Taiwan and weapons of mass destruction