Objectivity (philosophy)
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- This article is about philosophical aspects of objectivity. For use in other fields see objectivity and objectivity (disambiguation)
Objectivity, as a concept of philosophy, is dependent upon the presupposition distinguishing references in the field of epistemology regarding the ontological status of a possible objective reality, and the state of being objective in regard to references towards whatever is considered as objective reality. Inherent to the distinction is a paradoxical notion that despite the various meanings or definitions assigned to the concept by various disciplines, schools of thought, or individual philosophers, there is ultimately a body of knowledge representative of a single reality.
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Objectivity and subjectivity
The meaning of the term "objectivity", like "subjectivity", is by no means unambiguous, and rather than attempting precision in definition it is more practical to simply illustrate what it involves, and perhaps by elimination, what it is not. The ontological status of a possible objectivity reality and references towards the objective should not be confused with, or reduced to, the dichotomous relations between object and subject, or subjectivity and objectivity, without considerable qualifications. Essential to this notion is the reconciliation of the objective and references to the objective, where the state of being objective is to correctly represent reality. However, the term "reality" itself can lack clarity and is not without ambiguity. One only needs to consider the relation of an individual subject to the objective world in isolation to see that the relation is constituted by too many unknowns to give any meaning or content to the concept of "objectivity", or that the state of being objective has no meaning where in an isolated relationship the subject and object may be indistinguishable except to an external observer. Thus, reconciliation of the objective and references to it involves not simply the object-subject relation, but at least one external observer and the possibility of discourse, even where communication is limited to ostensive definition (pointing).
The concept of objectivity in philosophy does not necessarily entail notions about a neutral point of view, as the term is defined and prescribed, for example, in such disciplines as journalism. A neutral point of view is not to personally take a point of view, that is, it is to represent all sides of the story without personal observation or conjecture. Logically, if represented as "A v ~A" (A or not A), a neutral point of view represents a tautology which some philosophers state has no content, or is meaningless because it provides no new information or knowledge. If represented as "A v B", it may represent alternative positions without regard to personal observation, but in philosophy, due to the rule of conditionalization in modern logic, objectivity and the possibility of knowledge always allows for the application of the rule of addition, that is, "(A v B) v C".
The Principle of Parsimony
The Principle of Parsimony is economy in explanation as a principle of method, and states that generalization or plurality should not be assumed unnecessarily, and the least assumptions made in explanation is the optimum.
The principle has also come to be known as "Ockham’s Razor" because of its frequent use by the fourteenth century philosopher William of Ockham, whose primary statement of the principle is that in accounting for the facts nothing should be assumed as necessary unless it is established through evidentiary experience or reasoning, or is required by the articles of faith.
Propositions and propositional acts
In philosophy, objectivity is also considered as the compatibility of propositions (the objective) distinct and independent of propositional attitudes or acts (the subjective). A proposition is an objective constituent the meaning of which is the same as the object or entity being named by it. The value of a proposition is to be either true or false, and its many forms include the axioms and formulas of the sciences and mathematics, as well as the rules and processes of logic. The notion of a timeless nature of truth requires that the content of judgments, or propositional acts, be identical. This assures that:
- What is judged in different acts and attitudes is identical. If there is no objective constituent common to and independent of different judgments, communication and science would not be possible.
- An individual or individuals may think the same thought at different times and with different attitudes. Consistent belief systems and identity over time requires that there be propositions independent of propositional acts.
- Independent propositions are required in order to account for the incompatibility between different propositional acts. If I state that "Plato was a Greek", and you state that "Plato was not a Greek", the objective constituent must be a content independent of our propositional acts.
The objective and timeless notion of truth requires that there be temporally neutral propositions independent of propositional acts. Whether or not there are propositions is one of the most disputed questions of philosophy. The position that there are propositions which are timeless truths independent of our propositional acts, and which are not the products of or dependent upon our propositional acts, must be distinguished from conceptualism or relativism.
"Objectivity" as a term has become quite specific and technical within the discipline, and should not be confused with a particular philosopher's criteria for "objective knowledge" or different notions of objectivism within the several branches of philosophy. Notions of objectivism tend to state that there is a reality or realm of objects existing independent of the mind, e.g. metaphysical objectivism. Objectivism then is inclusive of objects which we may not know about and are not the intended objects of mental acts. Thus, objectivism attempts to define the ontological status of the objects of reality and as a position may be true or false, but it does not assign truth value to the objects of that reality. Objectivity, or the state of being objective presupposes some definition of truth, but the objects themselves are not true or false. Only propositions, or references to objective constituents by means of our propositional acts, are true or false.
Criticisms
The ontological status of propositions independent of propositional acts is a compound inquiry which can be stated as "If they do exist, do they exist independently of the mind as do the objects of various objectivisms, or do they come into being when an object becomes the intended object of a mental act?" The answer to this question is not, however, essential to the fundamental criticism of independent propositions as the objective constituents of our propositional acts, i.e. the truth. Whether independent propositions exist as do the objects of objectivism, or as the timeless truths concerning an object once it has become the intended object of a mental act, their reason for being would appear to be essential only to the process of discovery. The fundamental criticism then becomes one that is similar to the criticisms levied against, for example, historical objectivity. "What is the basis for our selection of inquiries and methodologies, and is the selection tainted by considerations that can be considered as value-impregnated?" For example, if the intended objects of mental acts is a selective process guided by simply what is useful, then objectivity is based upon pragmatics, or perhaps some form of relativism, and should be considered as depicting propositional attitudes where the existence of propositions is dependent upon those attitudes.
Taking an objective approach may not always be relevant, particularly in cases where it is impossible to be objective either because the relevant facts and viewpoints necessary are lacking, or because it is the subjective opinion or response that happens to be important (e.g. propositional attitude). Thus it is possible to take an objective approach appropriately in situations which call for an expression of subjective thought or feeling. In this the problematic relation of truth to objectivity becomes evident. For example, the statement "I am cold" may be considered by some philosophers as the expression of a subjective state, but unless the expression is an intent to deceive, it must also be considered a true statement. If it is true, then is it also objective? As a statement of fact it may not be a universal truth in the sense that it is correct for all time and place, but its facticity lies in that, given the particular time, place, and set of circumstances, it will always be a true statement. The problem has its earliest formulation in Plato's Theaetetus, where Socrates addresses the suggestion that knowledge consists of true judgment or true belief, wondering if false belief or judgment is possible. A refutation of true belief or judgment is compromised by Socrates in the notion that false belief cannot be a belief in what is not, for as Parmenides had shown, there is no such thing as what is not.
Objectivity in ethics ("objectivism")
Ethical Subjectivism
(See also, David Hume, non-cognitivism, ethical subjectivism).
Moral judgments are judgments made by people about the way they think or feel about men and their actions. Moral predicates are not present in men or their actions in the absense of people who pass judgment upon or react to others and their actions. According to ethical nonpropositional or noncognitivist theories, there are no moral propositions and thus moral judgments cannot be propositions about people's feelings. Terms such as "right" and "wrong" may be deemed meaningful according to the accepted code of that society, and is therefore not subjective. Ethical subjectivism holds that no ethical theory should state that the truth of ethical assertions is never dependent upon time, place, and the individual making the assertion. A statement which has been historically untrue may be true with the qualification "now". This view of objectivity precludes the notion that the non-objective is the same as subjectivism.
Ethical Objectivism
(See also, ethical objectivism)
According to the objectivist, the truth of moral assertions is independent of the person who uses the sentence and the particular time and place in which the statement is issued. Moral judgments expressing feelings of approval or disapproval of men and their actions do not count as objective independently of the criteria, time, place, and who is making the assertion.
Ethical Naturalism
(See also, ethical naturalism, the Naturalistic Fallacy)
Ethical naturalism holds that ethical terms can be defined and the meaning of ethical sentences can be given in totally non-ethical terms. Moral judgments are just another set of facts about the natural world. This is a denial of the distinction between statements that may be factual and statements which may be an evaluative assessment of the facts. For example, we may accept the empirical scientist's factual assessment of the world while holding that his evaluative assessment is no more authoritative than anyone else's. The naturalist does not accept this distinction.
Constructivism
(See also: constructivist epistemology, intersubjective verifiability, social constructionism, relativism, conceptualism)
Objectivity, as the act of, or propensity for being objective, may not be identical with, or may preclude the notion of an independent and timeless objective reality. The possibility of a complete objectivity has been often debated, in particular in the fields of history, journalism, epistemology, and the philosophy of science. It has been considered as the result of a specific historical method or scientific method, or even, as in the classic marxist conception, as the result of social interactions. In this sense, the discourse's objectivity is the result of social interactions, and scientific discourse can't be disassociated from the social context. In philosophy, constructivist epistemology is a view that reality, or at least our knowledge of it, is a value-laden subjective construction rather than a passive acquisition of objective features.
Jürgen Habermas believed in a dialogue which could be isolated from power relations, and reach a consensus considered as the condition of possibility of the discourse itself. He thus thought that objectivity was achieved through a continuous dialogue, which would only lead toward further improvement and accuracy. According to this conception, objectivity requires communication and good faith. Even if one does not accept the existence of independent propositions or timeless truths, this does not exclude the possibility of viable communication or knowledge.
This optimistic view of necessary progress through conversation was criticized by philosophers such as Michel Foucault or Gilles Deleuze, whom solidified an alleged definition of philosophy as "marketing" or as simple "democratic conversation", where everyone would expose his personal point of view.
Objectivism
Objectivism tends to state that there is a reality or realm of objects existing independent of the mind. Metaphysical objectivism, opposed to subjectivism (for example, Berkeley's immaterialism), believes in the existence of an objective reality inclusive of objects which may not be the intended objects of mental acts.
The relationship of probability and objectivism
The significance of probability to objectivism is recognized when attempting to understand situations with unknown underlying truths. For example, it can be supposed that a coin is flipped without looking at it, and then covered with a piece of paper. Objectivism assumes that there is an underlying truth about the state of the coin, regardless of the fact that it cannot be seen by an observer. Probability becomes useful in understanding and realizing possible situations of this unknown part of objective reality.
Endnotes
- Template:Note Vernant, Jean-Pierre and Detienne, Marcel, Les ruses de l’intelligence - La mètis des Grecs, Paris, Flammarion, 1974.
See also
- Epistemology
- Truth
- Historical method
- Scientific method
- Scholarly method
- Subject-object problem
- Objectivity (journalism)
- Michel Foucault's analysis of historical and political discourse
- Gilbert Ryle
- Gilles Deleuze's definition of Philosophy as singular creation of concepts, opposed to the contemplation of universal objects
- Habermas' conception of dialogue
- Jaakko Hintikka
- Alexius Meinong
- George Edward Moore
- Paul Ricœur's conception of history
- Bertrand Russell
- Franz Brentano
External links
- Objectivity Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Further reading
- Bachelard, Gaston, La formation de l'esprit scientifique : contribution à une psychanalyse de la connaissance, Paris: Vrin, 2004 ISBN 2711611507.
- Popper, Karl. R. Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, Oxford University Press, 1972, trade paperback, 395 pages, ISBN 0198750242, hardcover is out of print. See libraries.
- David Castillejo, The Formation of Modern Objectivity, Madrid: Ediciones de Arte y Bibliofilia, 1982.
- Thomas S. Kuhn, The structure of scientific revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996, 3º ed. ISBN 0226458083
- Allan Megill, Rethinkink Objectivity, London: Duke UP, 1994.
- Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science, New York: Brace and World, 1961.
- Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere, Oxford: Oxford UP, 1986
- Robert Nozick, Invariances: the structure of the objective world, Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2001.
- Nicholas Rescher, Objectivity: the obligations of impersonal reason, Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1977.
- Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991
- Bernard Rousset, La théorie kantienne de l'objectivité, Paris: Vrin, 1967.
- Israel Schaeffler, Science and Subjectivity, Hackett, 1982.
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