Truth
From Free net encyclopedia
Common dictionary definitions of truth include some form of accord with facts. There is, however, no single definition of truth about which scholars agree. Numerous theories of truth have been proposed and continue to be widely debated. Standing beside the issue of definition are many other issues about which scholars have various views. What sorts of things can properly be called true or false? What tests can establish a claim as being true? How do we know something to be true? Which truths, if any, are subjective, relative, objective, or absolute?
Contents |
Bearers of truth
Philosophers call any entity that can be true or false a "truth bearer." The term truth bearer is not intended to apply to a person or a god. In philosophy, a truth bearer is something, normally a very specific something, that has the potential to be said to bear truth, something that can be readily subjected to an analysis of whether it is true (or not). Propositions, sentences, statements, ideas, beliefs, and judgements are said to be truth bearers. Some philosophers exclude one or more of these categories, or argue that some of them are true (or false) only in a derivative sense.<ref name=SCT>See, e.g., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/#2</ref> These claims are made on the basis of theories about truth such as those discussed below.
A proposition is the abstract entity which is expressed by a sentence, held in a belief, affirmed in a statement or judgement. All these parts of language are called true only if they express, hold, or affirm true propositions. While many truth-bearers can have two values (true and false), some, such as fact and fiction can have only one.<ref>Note that fact and fiction here do not refer to the judgment whether some proposition is fact or fiction, but rather to concept fact or fiction (i.e., true or false). Where a judgment is involved whether a particular proposition is fact or fiction, the judgment is an additional truth bearer </ref> Expressions such as "floor", that do not involve propositions and are not intended as shortened forms of propositions, are generally not regarded as having any truth-value at all.
Because both a belief and a statement can be said to be truth bearers (albeit of different types), the analysis can become somewhat complex. For instance, if truth is said to consist in an accord between belief and fact,<ref>Russell, Bertrand, The Problems of Philosophy , Ch. XII, "Truth and Falsehood" (1912)</ref> as well as to consist in an accord between statement and fact, there must at an absolute minimum be an additional accord between two truth bearers, the belief and the statement, in order for one person to successfuly utter a statement of truth. This comes into the analysis of such things as honest mistakes and intentional misrepresentations. If a person intentionally makes a statement that is judged not to accord with her or his belief, it is called a lie or misrepresentation.<ref>The judgment whether it is a lie is yet another truth bearer, which could be true or false, or it could be partially true if other entities (additional factors or additional truth bearers) are involved.</ref> If one's belief does not accord with fact, one would appear to lack the ability to make a true statement, in which case a statement based on such a belief may be termed an honest mistake or good-faith error.<ref> Similarly, with judgments such as whether there is "honest mistake" or "unintentional error," at least two additional truth bearers become involved, the judgment about whether the statement is a mistake or error, and the further judgment about whether the error is honest or unintentional. Both judgments can be true, false, or partially true if there are yet further multiple components to the analysis. </ref> Further, the person receiving a truth bearer (e.g., hearing or reading the statement) must make an accord on the receiving end — this may involve such things as misreading, mishearing or misunderstanding. Questions about what is a proper basis upon which to decide whether, and to what extent, belief is in accordance with fact, and to what extent statements and the ideas they convey are in accord with real things, whether for a single person or an entire community or society, are among the many important questions dealt with by the theories introduced below.
Introduction to the major theories of truth
Robust or substantive theories of truth share the claim that truth is a property that certain types of things may have, perhaps in relation to other things, and so the assertion that something is true makes a substantive, significant claim about it (Blackburn & Simmons, 1999). Deflationary or minimalist theories of truth are based on the idea that the application of a term like true to a statement does not assert anything significant about it, for instance, anything about its nature, but that the label truth is a tool of discourse used to express agreement, to emphasize claims, or to form certain types of generalizations (Horwich, 1988; Field, 2001). As always with classification schemes, a caution against cut-and-dried categories needs to be observed. There are perspectives on truth that combine selected elements from one or more of the identified types. For example, Susan Haack (1993) proposes a theory of foundherentism that seeks a middle ground between the perspectives on knowledge known as foundationalism and coherentism, closely related to the correspondence and coherence theories of truth, respectively.
Theories of truth as "substantive"
Some theories hold in common that truth is a robust concept. These theories all hold that truth is some kind of substantive quality or a relation between things beyond what is expressed by the surface grammar of sentences that predicate truth or falsity. Such theories analyze truth as a substantive or descriptive property with a nature which can be discovered through philosophical investigation and reflection. The task for such theories is to explain this alleged nature of truth. Hence, according to these theories, truth needs explanation and is something about which significant things can be said.
Correspondence theory
Correspondence theories claim that true beliefs and true statements correspond to the actual state of affairs. <ref>Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.2, "Correspondence Theory of Truth", auth:Arthur N. Prior, p223 Macmillan, 1969)</ref> This type of theory, in essence, attempts to posit a relationship (a "truth relation") between thoughts or statements on the one hand, and things or objects on the other, as it might theoretically exist independently of the persons involved in the exchange and independently of other issues. It is a traditional model which goes back at least to some of the classical Greek philosophers.<ref>Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.2, "Correspondence Theory of Truth", auth:Arthur N. Prior, p223-224 Macmillan, 1969)</ref> This class of theory holds that the truth or the falsity of a representation is determined in prinicple solely by how it relates to objective reality, by whether it accurately describes (that is, corresponds with) that reality.
Correspondence theory operates on the presumption that there is an objective truth relation with which it is the human task to become properly aligned. In practice, however, more recent theorists have articulated that this ideal cannot be achieved independently of some analysis of additional factors. For example, analyses of correspondence that are cast within particular languages are forced to admit the particular language in question as an additional parameter at the outset of theoretical work, and only gradually construct a language-independent truth predicate by means of a careful theory of translation among different languages. There are strong theoretical limitations on the extent to which this can be done. Commentators and proponents of several of the theories introduced below also have widely asserted that the correspondence theory neglects the role of the persons involved in the "truth relation."
Coherence theory
Template:Main The coherence theory sees truth as coherence with some specified set of sentences or, more often, of beliefs. Thus, by this theory, truth requires consistency, or a proper fit of elements within the belief system. Taken on the strictest interpretation of the concept of coherence, if one believes that every biffle is a boffle and that every boffle has six legs, then in this worldview, the assertion that every biffle has six legs is true. By a strict interpretation, one of a person's beliefs is true only when it is coherent with all or most of his or her other beliefs. Usually, however, coherence is taken to imply something more than mere consistency: the comprehensiveness of the belief set is an important issue in judging an argument for the usefulness of that belief set. Coherence theory has extremely strong applicability in mathematics and logic. It encounters problems with justification in its application to other areas of truth, such as empirical truths or assertions about the natural world and truths or assertions about social and other pracitcal matters, especially when used without additional reference to another theory such as correspondence theory and/or one of the theories introduced below. <ref>Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.2, "Coherence Theory of Truth", auth:Alan R. White, p130-133, see esp., section on "Epistemological assumptions" (Macmillan, 1969)</ref>
The coherence theory arises out of the thought of continental rationalist philosophers including Spinoza, Leibniz, G.W.F. Hegel, and the British philosopher F.H. Bradley. It also found a resurgence among several proponents of logical positivism such as Otto Neurath and Carl Hempel.
Pragmatic theory
Template:Main Three influential versions of the pragmatic theory of truth are due to Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey.
Peirce defines truth as follows: "Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief, which concordance the abstract statement may possess by virtue of the confession of its inaccuracy and one-sidedness, and this confession is an essential ingredient of truth" (CP 5.565). Thus ideas of continuous improvement, what Peirce calls fallibilism and "reference to the future", are essential to his conception of truth. Although Peirce uses words like concordance and correspondence to describe one aspect of the pragmatic sign relation, he is also quite explicit in saying that definitions of truth based on mere correspondence are no more than nominal definitions, which he accords a lower status than real definitions.
Peirce's theory of truth depends on his theories of signs and inquiry. Inquiry is a process that transforms signs in regard to an object, for example, any form of belief revision or logical inference, and it includes scientific method, "the right method of transforming signs". A transaction that turns signs into signs in respect of an object is a three-place relation, known in logic as a triadic relation. In sum, pragmatism involves a triadic theory of truth.
William James's version of the pragmatic theory, while complex, is often summarized by his statement that "the 'true' is only the expedient in our way of thinking, just as the 'right' is only the expedient in our way of behaving" (James, 1909). By this, James meant that truth is a quality the value of which is confirmed by its effectiveness when applying concepts to actual practice (thus, "pragmatic"). James's pragmatic theory is in part a synthesis of correspondence and coherence theory, with an added dimension. Truth is verifiable to the extent that thoughts and statements correspond with actual things, as well as "hang together", or cohere, fit as pieces of a puzzle might fit together, and these are in turn verified by the observed results of the application of proposed truths to actual practice (James, 1904, 1907, 1912).<ref>Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.6, "Pragmatic Theory of Truth", auth:Gertrude Ezorsky, p427-428 (Macmillan, 1969)</ref> James extended his pragmatic theory well beyond the scope of scientific verifiability, and even into the realm of the mystical: "On pragmatic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, then it is 'true'". <ref name=WJP /> John Dewey, less broadly than James but more broadly than Peirce, held that inquiry, whether scientific, technical, sociological, philosophical or cultural, is self-corrective over time if openly submitted for testing by a community of inquirers in order to clarify, justify, refine and/or refute proposed truths.<ref> Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.2, "Dewey, John", auth Richard J. Bernstein, p383 (Macmillan, 1969) </ref>
Constructivist theory
Template:Main Social constructivism holds that truth is constructed by social processes, is historically and culturally specific, and that it is in part shaped through the power struggles within a community. Constructivism views all of our knowledge as "constructed," because it does not reflect any external "transcendent" realities (as a pure correspondence theory might hold). Rather, perceptions of truth are viewed as contingent on convention, human perception, and social experience. It is believed by constructivists that representations of physical and biological reality, including race, sexuality, and gender are socially constructed (Hegel, Garns, and Marx were among the first to suggest such an ambitious expansion of social determinism).
Consensus theory
Template:Main The consensus theory holds that truth is whatever is agreed upon, or in some versions, might come to be agreed upon, by some specified group. The label "consensus theory" of is variously attached to a number of otherwise very diverse philosophical perspectives. Some variants of "pragmatic theory of truth" have been included as consensus theory, though the range of "pragmatic theories" is sufficiently broad that it merits its own classification. Among the current advocates of consensus theory as a useful accounting of the concept of "truth" is Jürgen Habermas. Among its current strong critics is the philosopher Nicholas Rescher.
"Deflationary" (minimalist) theories
Template:Main Other philosophers reject the idea that truth is a robust concept in the sense discussed in the previous section. From this point of view, to say "2 + 2 = 4 is true" is to say no more than to say "2 + 2 = 4", and that there is no more to say about truth than this. These positions are broadly called "deflationary" theories of truth (because the concept has been "deflated" of importance) or "disquotational" theories (to draw attention to the mere "disappearance" of the quotation marks in cases like the above example), or alternately, "minimalist" views.<ref>Blackburn, Simon, and Simmons, Keith (eds., 1999), Truth in the Introductory section of the book.</ref><ref name=EPT>Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supp., "Truth", auth:Michael Williams, p572-573 (Macmillan, 1996)</ref> Whichever term is used, deflationary theories can be said to hold in common that "[t]he predicate 'true' is an expressive convenience, not the name of a property requiring deep analysis." <ref name=EPT/>
In addition to highlighting this formal feature of the predicate "is true", some deflationists point out that the concept enables us to express things that might otherwise require infinitely long sentences. For example, one cannot express confidence in Michael's accuracy by asserting the endless sentence:
- Michael says, 'snow is white' and snow is white, or he says 'roses are red' and roses are red or he says ... etc.
But it can be expressed succinctly by saying:
- Whatever Michael says is true.
Once we have identified the truth predicate's formal features and utility, deflationists argue, we have said all there is to be said about truth. The primary theoretical concern of these views is to explain away those special cases where it appears that the concept of truth does have peculiar and interesting properties. (See Semantic paradoxes, and below.)
Performative theory of truth
Attributed to P. F. Strawson is the performative theory of truth which holds that to say "Snow is white" is true is to perform the speech act of signalling one's agreement with the claim that snow is white (much like nodding one's head in agreement). The idea that some statements are more actions than communicative statements is not as odd as it may seem. Consider, for example, that when the bride says "I do" at the appropriate time in a wedding, she is performing the act of taking this man to be her lawful wedded husband. She is not describing herself as taking this man. In a similar way, Strawson holds that "to say a statement is true is not to make a statement about a statement, but rather to perform the act of agreeing with, accepting, or endorsing a statement. When one says 'It's true that it's raining,' one asserts no more than 'It's raining.' The function of [the statement] 'It's true that...' is to agree with, accept, or endorse the statement that it's raining." <ref> Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.6: Performative Theory of Truth, auth:Gertrude Ezorsky, p88 (Macmillan, 1969) </ref>
Redundancy and related theories
Template:Sect-POV The redundancy theory of truth holds that to assert that a statement is true is just to assert the statement itself. Thus, to say that "Snow is white is true" is to say nothing more nor less than "snow is white". The theory is commonly attributed to Frank P. Ramsey (1927). Ramsey held that to think of truth as any sort of property is mere "linguistic muddle." <ref name=EPT/><ref name=Ramsey>Ramsey, F.P. (1927), "Facts and Propositions", Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 7, 153–170. Reprinted, pp. 34–51 in F.P. Ramsey, Philosophical Papers, David Hugh Mellor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1990. </ref>
A variant of redundancy theory is the disquotational theory which uses a modified form of Tarski's schema: To say that '"P" is true' is to say that P. Yet another version of deflationism is the prosentential theory of truth, first developed by Dorothy Grover, Joseph Camp, and Nuel Belnap as an elaboration of Ramsey's claims. They argue that sentences like "That's true" are prosentences (see pro-form), expressions that merely repeat the content of other expressions. In the same way that it means the same as my dog in the sentence My dog was hungry, so I fed it, That's true is supposed to mean the same as It's raining if you say the latter and I then say the former. These variations do not necessarily follow Ramsey in asserting that truth is not a property, but rather that, for instance, the assertion "P" may well involve a substantial truth, and are minimalizing only the redundancy or prosentence involved in the statement such as "that's true." <ref name=EPT/>
Proponents of pragmatic, constructivist and consensus theories would differ with all of these conclusions, however, and instead assert that the second person making the statement "that's true" is actually participating in further verifying, constructing and/or achieving consensus on the proposed truth of the matter — e.g., the proposition that "it's raining".
Deflationary principles do not apply to representations that are not analogous to sentences and they do not apply to many other things that are commonly judged to be true or otherwise. Consider the analogy between the sentence "Snow is white" and the person Snow White, both of which can be true in a sense. To say "Snow is white" is true is to say "Snow is white", but to say Snow White is true is not to say Snow White.
Types of truth
Subjective versus objective
Metaphysical subjectivism holds that the truth or falsity of all propositions depends, at least partly, on what we believe. In contrast, metaphysical objectivism holds that truths are independent of our subjective beliefs. Except for propositions that are actually about our beliefs or sensations, what is true or false is independent of what we think is true or false.
Relative versus absolute
Relative truths are statements or propositions that are true only relative to some standard or convention or point-of-view. Usually the standard cited is the tenets of one's own culture. Everyone agrees that the truth or falsity of some statements is relative: That the fork is to the left of the spoon depends on where one stands. But Relativism is the doctrine that all truths within a particular domain (say, morality or aesthetics) are of this form, and Relativism entails that what is true varies across cultures and eras. For example, moral relativism is the view that moral truths are socially determined. Some logical issues about Relativism are taken up in the article on the relativist fallacy.
Relative truths can be contrasted with absolute truths. The latter are statements or propositions that are taken to be true for all cultures and all eras. For example, for most Muslims "God is great" expresses an absolute truth; for the microeconomist, that the laws of supply and demand determine the value of any consumable in a market economy is true in all situations; for the Kantian, "act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law" forms an absolute moral truth. They are statements that are often claimed to emanate from the very nature of the universe, God, human nature, or some other ultimate essence or transcendental signifier.
Absolutism in a particular domain of thought is the view that all statements in that domain are either absolutely true or absolutely false: none is true for some cultures or eras while false for other cultures or eras. For example, Moral absolutism is the view that moral claims such as "Abortion is wrong" or "Charity is good" are either true for all people in all times or false for all people in all times.
The two truths doctrine of Buddhism distinguishes between statements which reflect ultimate reality and relatively true statements. The Jain doctrine of anekantavada (Sanskrit for "non-onesidedness") dictates that statements be considered from many points of view. The contemporary writer Ken Wilber has used these ideas to develop a four-fold conception of truth.
Formal definitions
Semantic theory of truth
The semantic theory of truth has as its general case for a given language:
- 'P' is true if and only if P
where 'P' is a reference to the sentence (the sentence's name), and P is just the sentence itself.
Logician and philosopher Alfred Tarski developed the theory for formal languages (such as formal logic). Here he restricted it in this way: no language could contain its own truth predicate, that is, the expression is true could only apply to sentences in some other language. The latter he called an object language, the language being talked about. (It may, in turn, have a truth predicate that can be applied to sentences in still another language.) The reason for his restriction was that languages that contain their own truth predicate will contain paradoxical sentences like the Liar: This sentence is not true. See The Liar Paradox. As a result Tarski held that the semantic theory could not be applied to any natural language, such as English, because they contain their own truth predicates. Tarski thought of his theory as a species of correspondence theory. Donald Davidson used it as the foundation of his truth-conditional semantics and linked it to radical interpretation in a form of coherentism.
Bertrand Russell, who is often credited with originating the first such paradox, the Barber Paradox, solved this problem in Principia Mathematica by putting statements into a hierarchy, in which a statement cannot refer to itself, but only to a statement lower on the hierarchy. This eliminates paradoxical self-reference.
The mathematical meaning of truth
In formal, abstract mathematics "truth", also represented as "T" or "1", is an undefined constant. "False" is also an undefined constant, which can be represented as "F" or "0". In propositional logic, these symbols can be manipulated according to a set of axioms, often given in the form of truth tables.
Kripke's theory of truth
Saul Kripke contends that a natural language can in fact contain its own truth predicate without giving rise to contradiction. He showed how to construct one as follows:
- Begin with a subset of sentences of a natural language that contains no occurrences of the expression "is true" (or "is false"). So The barn is big is included in the subset, but not ' The barn is big is true', nor problematic sentences such as "This sentence is false".
- Define truth just for the sentences in that subset.
- Then extend the definition of truth to include sentences that predicate truth or falsity of one of the original subset of sentences. So ' The barn is big is true' is now included, but not either This sentence is false nor "' The barn is big is true' is true".
- Next, define truth for all sentences that predicate truth or falsity of a member of the second set. Imagine this process repeated infinitely, so that truth is defined for The barn is big; then for ' The barn is big is true'; then for "' The barn is big is true' is true", and so on.
Notice that truth never gets defined for sentences like This sentence is false, since it was not in the original subset and does not predicate truth of any sentence in the original or any subsequent set. In Kripke's terms, these are "ungrounded." Since these sentences are never assigned either truth or falsehood even if the process is carried out infinitely, Kripke's theory implies that some sentences are neither true nor false. This contradicts the Principle of bivalence: every sentence must be either true or false. Since this principle is a key premise in deriving the Liar paradox, the paradox is dissolved.
Other uses of "Truth"
In addition to its use in reference to propositions, there are other uses of "truth" and "true" in the English language:
- most often applied to people, and is used as a commendation, synonymous with "loyal", as in she is true to her friends. This sense of truth should be contrasted with being fake, insincere, misleading and so on.
- True can mean "in accordance with a standard or archetype," which is how it is used in "He is a true Englishman."
- True in engineering and construction can be used as meaning "straight", not warped but in the same flat plane - as the spokes of a wheel.
Double truth
In thirteenth century Europe, the Roman Catholic Church denounced what it described as theories of "double truth," i.e. theories to the effect that although a truth may be established by reason, its contrary ought to be believed as true as a matter of faith.
The condemnation was aimed specifically at a "Latin Averroist," (see Averroës), Siger of Brabant, but it was more broadly an attempt to halt the spread of Aristotle's ideas, which the reconquest of Spain and, accordingly, access to the libraries of the Moors had re-introduced into the Latin literate world. At the time, much of the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church was based upon neoplatonic ideas, and Aristoteleanism struck many as heresy. Siger and others seem to have conceded this, and to have used the sharp reason/faith distinction that came to be known as "double truth" as a way of legitimizing discussion of Aristotle despite that concession.
True testimony
Witnesses who swear under oath to testify truthfully in courts of law, are not expected to make infallibly true statements, but to make a good faith attempt to recount an observed event from their memory or provide expert testimony. That what one witness says may differ from true accounts of other witnesses is a commonplace occurrence in the practice of law. Triers-of-fact are then charged with the responsibility to determine the credibility or veracity of a witness's testimony.
Truthfulness
Truthfulness refers to when one says what he thinks is the truth in good faith. Even though a habitual liar may say the truth for deception purposes, he would not be characterized as truthful. However, someone who is truthful may unwillfully say something false, thinking it is true.
Buddha: “Herein someone avoids false speech and abstains from it. He speaks the truth, is devoted to truth, reliable, worthy of confidence, not a deceiver of people. Being at a meeting, or amongst people, or in the midst of his relatives, or in a society, or in the king's court, and called upon and asked as witness to tell what he knows, he answers, if he knows nothing: "I know nothing," and if he knows, he answers: "I know"; if he has seen nothing, he answers: "I have seen nothing," and if he has seen, he answers: "I have seen." Thus he never knowingly speaks a lie, either for the sake of his own advantage, or for the sake of another person's advantage, or for the sake of any advantage whatsoever.”<ref>Right Speech, Right Action, Right Livelihood</ref>
Marx's criterion of truth
Karl Marx argues that the sole factor which determines the truth of something is its practical efficacy. In his own words:
The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, the this-worldliness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question. ("Theses on Feuerbach", 2)
Notes and references
<references/>
- Blackburn, Simon, and Simmons, Keith (eds., 1999), Truth, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. Includes papers by James, Ramsey, Russell, Tarski, and more recent work.
- Field, Hartry (2001), Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
- Haack, Susan (1993), Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK.
- Horwich, Paul, (1988), Truth, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
- James, William (1904), A World of Pure Experience.Template:Fact
- James, William (1907), Pragmatism, A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, Longmans, Green, and Company, New York, NY.
- James, William (1909), The Meaning of Truth, A Sequel to 'Pragmatism', Longmans, Green, and Company, New York, NY.
- James, William (1912), Essays in Radical Empiricism.Template:Fact Cf. Chapt. 3, "The Thing and it's Relations", pp. 92–122.
- Le Morvan, Pierre (2004), "Ramsey on Truth and Truth on Ramsey", British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 12 (4) 2004, 705–718, PDF.
- Peirce, C.S., Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vols. 1–6, Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (eds.), vols. 7–8, Arthur W. Burks (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1931–1935, 1958. Cited as CP vol.para.
- Ramsey, F.P. (1927), "Facts and Propositions", Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 7, 153–170. Reprinted, pp. 34–51 in F.P. Ramsey, Philosophical Papers, David Hugh Mellor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1990.
- Ramsey, F.P. Philosophical Papers, David Hugh Mellor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1990.
- Tarski, A., Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923 to 1938, J.H. Woodger (trans.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1956. 2nd edition, John Corcoran (ed.), Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, IN, 1983.
Further reading
- Dummett, Michael (1991), Frege and Other Philosophers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
- Grover, Dorothy (1992), A Prosentential Theory of Truth, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
- Habermas, Jürgen (2003), Truth and Justification, Barbara Fultner (trans.), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Kirkham, Richard L. (1992), Theories of Truth, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Kripke, Saul (1975), "An Outline of a Theory of Truth", Journal of Philosophy 72, 690–716.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich [1873] (1968). "Uber Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinn", ("On Truth and Lying in an Extra-moral Sense"), in Jürgen Habermas (ed.), Erkenntnistheoretische Schriften, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, Germany.
- Rescher, Nicholas (1973), The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
- Tarski, Alfred (1944), "The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3), 341-376.
- Williams, Bernard (2002), Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
See also
Template:Col-begin Template:Col-break
- Lie
- Lie-to-children
- Objectivity
- Philalethia (love of truth)
Truth in logic
Template:Col-begin Template:Col-break
Theories of truth
Template:Col-begin Template:Col-break
- Epistemic theories of truth
- Indefinability theory of truth
- Pragmatic theory of truth
- Semantic theory of truth
Major philosophers who have proposed theories of truth
Template:Col-begin Template:Col-break
- W.V. Quine
- Frank P. Ramsey
- Bertrand Russell
- Socrates
- P.F. Strawson
- Alfred Tarski
- Ludwig Wittgenstein
External links
Template:Wikiquote Template:Wiktionarypar
- Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Double Truth
- An Introduction to Truth by Paul Newall, aimed at beginners.
- A brief history of truth by Nic Damjanovich
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Template:Philosophy navigationTemplate:Link FA
be:Ісціна cs:Pravda de:Wahrheit eo:Vero es:Verdad et:Tõde fr:Vérité ga:Fírinne he:אמת ושקר (פילוסופיה) hu:Igazság is:Sannleikur it:verità ja:真理 la:Veritas mk:Вистина nl:waarheid no:Sannhet pl:Prawda pt:Verdade ro:Adevăr ru:Истина sv:Sanning fi:Totuus th:ความจริง zh:真理