Operation Cerberus
From Free net encyclopedia
Operation Cerberus (German: Zerberus after Cerberus the three-headed dog of Greek mythology who guards the gate to Hades.) was the name given to the escape during World War II of the Kriegsmarine's ships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Prinz Eugen and a number of smaller ships from Brest to ports in Germany and Denmark via the English Channel.
On 11 February, 1942, the ships left port at night and escaped detection for more than twelve hours approaching the Straits of Dover without check. Despite British air attacks, by the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy by 13 February all the ships had completed their transit. The action has entered history as the "Channel Dash".
The three ships had arrived at Brest via the Atlantic where they were able to repair and refuel. The British Home Fleet commanded the long return route to their home ports via the Atlantic. This left as the only alternative the short but dangerous route through the Channel. Hitler, convinced of an impending Allied invasion of Norway, ordered the transfer to the North Sea or that the ships should be scrapped there and their armament taken to Norway.
Vice-Admiral and Kriegsmarine Fleet Commander Otto Ciliax agreed to go via the Channel provided Luftwaffe support was guaranteed. This was assured and extensive plans made. His chief opponent was Vice-Admiral Bertram Ramsay of the Royal Navy who was allocated six destroyers equipped with torpedoes, which should have been at four hours' notice in the Thames Estuary but were not. There were also three Hunt class escorts but they had no torpedoes so posed little threat to the German capital ships. The 32 Motor Torpedo Boats of the Dover and Ramsgate flotillas under his command were counterbalanced by the German flotilla of E-boats. For various reasons the Fleet Air Arm, RAF Coastal Command and RAF Bomber Command all failed in a timely fashion to provide the level of support they had promised. This was in part because all services expected the Germans to time the dash through the Channel so that the most dangerous spot at Dover-Calais would be passed at night time (there the ships needed to move within range of British coastal batteries). But the Germans considered it far more important to slip out of Brest unnoticed to take advantage of the element of surprise as long as possible. So it was decided to leave Brest at night and pass Dover at daylight rather than risking the twelve hour warning time that an early discovery would have given the British. This led to the British being wrong footed by the Germans' audacious move. Night patrols of the Fleet Air Arm reconnaissance failed to spot the ships leaving Brest because their radars failed. The first information that something was happening came from RAF radar-operators, who noticed the unusual high German air-activity in the channel. Two Spitfires of RAF Fighter Command spotted the ships in the channel but as they were under strict orders not to break radio silence (and they had not been briefed to look for the German flotilla), they waited until they landed to inform their superiors of what had been seen.
Because Fighter Command was not expected to be the first to spot the German flotilla in the Channel, valuable time was lost reporting the sighting up the chain of command and on to the Royal Navy and Bomber Command. Uncoordinated attacks by the motor boats and the Fleet Air Arm Swordfish torpedo biplanes failed to harm their targets. Although they failed to hit their targets, the bravery of the Swordfish crews was commented on by friend and foe alike. RAF Bomber Command's response was tardy, only 39 of the 242 bombers which took part found and attacked the ships and no hits were scored.
The six old destroyers and four more recently-built escort Hunts were taken by surprise. Instead of being on station, they were practising their gunnery in the North Sea. They steamed south to intercept the flotilla but arrived only in time to deliver one salvo of torpedoes, all of which missed. Counter fire severely damaged the destroyer HMS Worcester.
The British had failed to stop the flotilla before it reached the safety of German home waters and had suffered severe damage to a destroyer and the loss of 42 aeroplanes. The Germans did not escape damage free though, both the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau hit mines and were damaged.