Perception management

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Perception management is a term originated by the U. S. military. The U. S. Department of Defense (DOD) gives this definition:

perception management—Actions to convey and/or deny selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning as well as to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to influence official estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign behaviors and official actions favorable to the originator’s objectives. In various ways, perception management combines truth projection, operations security, cover and deception, and psychological operations.

This would appear to include propaganda (which Wikipedia defines as "a specific type of message presentation, aimed at serving an agenda") as well as other activities. It is clear from the definition that unlike Public diplomacy, perception management is specifically intended to include the use of deception; that is, perception management is not supposed to be limited to the dissemination of truthful information.

Although perception management is specifically defined as being limited to foreign audiences, critics of the DOD charge that it also engages in domestic perception management. An example cited is the prohibition of viewing or photographing the flag draped caskets of dead military as they are unloaded in bulk upon arrival in the U.S. for further distribution, a policy only recently implemented.

As of 2004, the phrase "perception management" is filtering into civilian use as a synonym for "persuasion." Public relations firms now offer "perception management" as one of their services. Similarly, officials who are being accused of shading the truth are now frequently charged with engaging in "perception management." .

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Definition of Perception Management

“Perception Management”, as the Editor defines it includes the broad range of U.S. government activities specifically intended and designed to provide information about the U.S. to foreign audiences in order to create a perception which will shape their views or guide their behaviors and actions in response to U.S. government policies, foreign policy, strategy, plans and initiatives. • This can include statements by policymaking officials in speeches, interviews, press conferences, or on background, as well as by diplomats in their regular representational activities or negotiations. It can involve the dissemination of information by official organs of the government through press releases, publications, radio and television broadcasts. It can include information conveyed by military officials by their statements, writings and activities. All of those means provide valid information–i.e., the truth. But, realistically, it is clear that many can be and are often incomplete because of security considerations or exaggerated or shaded to create a desired perception–i.e., they are not always “the whole truth” and not always “nothing but the truth”.

•Also, it can include a variety of clandestine and covert means conducted by various government agencies to provide information to specific target audiences. Likewise, it can include means to deny information by security or censorship. Such means can convey the truth, but are usually used to hide the truth, or be misleading, deceiving, or false.

It should be noted that PM, by definition, does not include statements or actions intended to inform and influence U.S. audiences, even when politicians or officials apply so-called “spin” to their views or actions, make statements tailored to gain public support for policies, or otherwise dissemble. Thus, it is difficult to separate PM from public relations and, thereby, the most important issue is raised-how to control and coordinate PM so that U.S. and friendly audiences are not misinformed while still shaping the perceptions, decisions and actions of the adversary….

(From the Editor, Defense Intelligence Journal: Volume 12: Number 1: 2003.

Perception Management and the War on Terrorism

…the war on terrorism is to be a long war. Furthermore, it is a war against an adversary who can strike the U.S. homeland and who has demonstrated the use of weapons capable of mass destruction and is seeking even more powerful weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The U.S. has previously fought such a war and won—the Cold War. That war was not won by direct military action against the adversary. Rather, it was won by deterrence.

“Deterrence” [according to the Joint Dictionary of Military Terms] is “The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind...” It is a state of mind existing among the decisionmakers, members of the adversary forces and their supporters, based on their perceptions that the actions which they may plan and conduct would have unfavorable consequences—they might be unsuccessful or too costly or too difficult to carry out and result in the loss or waste of terrorist assets. They are prevented from action by fear of the consequences—failure and loss of assets. Those perceptions, of course, are formed from all of the information available to the adversary decisionmakers, members and supporters.

Clearly, the most important information that can form such perceptions and create deterrence among the adversary terrorists and their supporters is the recognition of the U.S. enunciated and demonstrated offensive and defensive counter-terrorism policy, strategy, capabilities and effectiveness. But, in a free society such as the U.S., a flood of additional publicly available commentary and criticism about counter-terrorism policy, strategy, capabilities and effectiveness reaches our terrorist adversaries and their supporters every day. Based on that information, they also are able to form perceptions of U.S. weaknesses and vulnerabilities upon which they can plan, support and conduct terrorist attacks. Thus, the deterrence provided by our enunciated and demonstrated offensive and defensive efforts is often reduced or nullified. Furthermore, as the President has stated in his National Security Strategy.

Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness.

Accordingly, the President has wisely reserved to the U.S. the “option of preemptive actions”. That enunciated option of preemption can also create perceptions that support deterrence. In the Cold War, the U.S. refusal to match the Soviet policy of “no first use” of nuclear weapons and the development of warning systems providing the capability to launch on warning—i.e., preempt—to assure mutual assured destruction (MAD) contributed mightily to assuring deterrence at the nuclear level. The later development of the Star Wars ballistic missile defense concept only further strengthened that deterrence.

Furthermore, while not deterred by the chance of failure, the terrorists do desire success and will select their targets and plan their attacks hoping for success. Thus, by controlling the information available to the terrorists which suggests weaknesses and vulnerabilities and by creating or shaping other information to undercut, confuse or contradict the accuracy of much of the publicly available information, the U.S. could cause the terrorists to form perceptions of greater U.S. strengths and lesser weaknesses and vulnerabilities in general or in specific target areas. That could deter some attacks. But, even if not successful on that level, such an effort might, at least, provide enough additional information to overload and confuse decisionmaking by the terrorist planners and, thereby, slow the pace and reduce the number of attacks that could be planned and conducted.

Additionally, while the terrorists may be fanatics, much of their supporting infrastructure is provided by misguided but rational people who value their own lives and livelihood. Thus, a concerted effort to inform those known or potential supporters of terrorists that, if they provide any intelligence, financial, logistic or weapons support to terrorists, the consequences for them would be grave would be a useful effort in the war on terrorism. Such an effort to create the perception among the supporters of terrorism that, they are putting themselves, their livelihood and other interests at extreme risk could, at least, deter some persons from providing support, deter others from providing more visible or extensive support and undercut the capabilities of the terrorists to mount some attacks.

Deterrence is also required against states that support terrorism, actively or indirectly. Paul Pillar, formerly the Deputy Chief of the Intelligence Community Counter-terrorist Center and now the National Intelligence Officer for the near East and South Asia [March 2003] believes that a constant, unwavering diplomatic and economic pressure on the nations that are tolerant of terrorists, along with rewards for cooperating with the U.S. are the most important tools to stop terrorism.

Again, rightly, the President, when addressing the need for counter-proliferation efforts has stated that; “We must deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed [by actions] that impede states and terrorists seeking WMD [and] deter those who possess such weapons and dissuade those who seek to acquire them by persuading enemies that they cannot attain their desired ends.”

Clearly then, deterrence has a role to play in the U.S. war on terrorism. And a perception management campaign to enhance deterrence would be a useful adjunct to other political, military, financial and military efforts. Of course, perception management efforts to misinform the terrorists themselves about U.S. weaknesses and vulnerabilities or inform their supporters of exaggerated consequences of their actions cannot be done openly or indirectly. They must be done by clandestine and covert means directly to the parties concerned. Furthermore, to be believable, they must be well integrated with reality. Accordingly, they must be conducted by an organization which is tightly controlled and which operates as part of a fully coordinated information effort.

Extracts from "Perception Management Today", Defense Intelligence Journal,Volume 12: Number 1: 2003.

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