Problem of evil

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In the philosophy of religion and theology, the problem of evil is the problem of reconciling the existence of evil or suffering in the world with the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent god.

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Form

The problem of evil arises from the supposition that a completely good deity would not have created a world containing evil, or would not permit its continued existence in the world, and that an omniscient and omnipotent god should be able to arrange the world according to its intentions. Since evil manifestly exists, either the deity intends it to exist, does not know of it, or has no power to destroy it, and is therefore not completely benevolent, omniscient, and/or omnipotent. Thus, no such deity exists.

The problem also rests upon the chosen definition of evil. Usually, "evil" is defined in widely acceptable terms, such as suffering. However, some theists choose to argue that "evil" cannot be defined in human terms, claiming that only God can define good and evil and thus the premise "evil exists" cannot be verified. This also makes the definition of "benevolent" (all good) problematic. However, this approach does not refute the argument, as the logic of the argument is still valid if applied to a clearly stated definition such as suffering or pain, and "benevolence" includes being against human suffering.

It is also important to note the key distinction between moral evil and natural evil. Moral evil is any evil (often defined as seemingly pointless pain and suffering) that results from the free actions of human beings. Natural evil is any other kind of seemingly pointless pain and suffering, such as deaths which occur as a result of natural disasters, or even death in general. Free will theodicies attempt to address the problem of moral evil, whereas law-consistency theodicies attempt to address the problem of natural evil.

There are a great many variants of the problem of evil, including inductive variants, logical variants, evidential variants, soteriological variants, arguments from natural law, pain and pleasure, and more. Template:Seealso

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History

Template:Section-stub Epicurus is credited with first expounding this problem, and it is sometimes called the Epicurean paradox (or the riddle of Epicurus) — although the argument is not really a paradox or a riddle, but rather a reductio ad absurdum of the premises. Epicurus drew the conclusion that the existence of evil is incompatible with the existence of the gods. More generally, no paradox or problem exists for those who do not accept the premises, in particular the existence of a god or gods (or their benevolence if they do exist).

"Either God wants to abolish evil, and cannot; or he can, but does not want to. ... If he wants to, but cannot, he is impotent. If he can, but does not want to, he is wicked. ... If, as they say, God can abolish evil, and God really wants to do it, why is there evil in the world?" (Epicurus, as quoted in 2000 Years of Disbelief)
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Formalized arguments

One example among many of a formulation of the problem of evil may be schematized as follows:

  1. If God exists, then there would be no evil in the world.
  2. There is evil in the world.
  3. Therefore, God does not exist.

This argument is of the logically valid form modus tollens (denying the consequent). In this case, P is "God exists" and Q is "there is no evil in the world". Other logical forms of arguments articulating the problem follow.

Logical problem of evil

  1. God is omnipotent (premise)
  2. God is benevolent (premise)
  3. Benevolent beings are opposed to all evil. (premise)
  4. God is opposed to all evil. (conclusion from 2 and 3)
  5. God can eliminate evil completely. (conclusion from 1)
    1. Whatever end result of suffering, God can bring about by ways which do not include suffering. (conclusion from 1)
    2. God has no reason not to eliminate evil (conclusion from 5.1)
  6. God will eliminate evil completely. (conclusion from 4, 5 and 5.2)
  7. Evil exists, has existed, and probably will always exist. (premise)
  8. Items 6 and 7 are contradictory; therefore the premises are wrong
  9. Therefore, premises are false, or God does not exist.

Evidential problem of evil

  1. Gratuitous evils exist.
  2. Gratuitous evils are incompatible with the existence of a god (omnipotent, omniscient, all-good).
  3. Therefore, no god exists.

Argument from evil natural laws

  1. A god is omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent.
  2. If a god exists, then there exist no instances of an ultimately evil natural law.
  3. The laws of predation are ultimately evil.
  4. There are instances of the laws of predation.
  5. Therefore, no god exists.

Moral argument from evil

  1. The most rational theists know (i.e., have a justified, true belief) that God exists.
  2. If a god exists, then there is objective justification for every actual instance of evil (even if no-one intervenes to prevent that evil).
    1. For any possible world W, if a god exists in W, then every instance of evil in W is objectively justified.
    2. If a god exists, then there is an objective justification for every actual instance of evil, (including those evils where there is a witness).
  3. Some members of the class of most rational theists (as defined above) are theists who know (2).
  4. Some of the most rational theists (namely, those who know 2) know that there is objective justification for any actual instance of evil, justification that will occur even if no onlooker intervenes to stop or prevent that evil.
  5. If human person P knows that there is objective justification for evil E, and that this justification will occur even if P does not intervene to stop or prevent E, then P is morally justified in allowing E to occur.
  6. Some of the most rational theists (namely, those who know 2) are morally justified in allowing any actual evil to occur. (from 4 and 5)
  7. If the most rational theists know that a god exists, then some of those theists (namely, those who know 2) are morally justified in allowing any evil to occur. (from 1 to 6)
  8. Even the most rational theists (including those who know 2) are not morally justified in allowing just any evil to occur.
  9. Even the most rational theists do not know that a god exists. (from 7 and 8)
  10. If the most rational theists do not know that a god exists, then no theist knows that a god exists.
  11. No theist knows that a god exists. (from 9 and 10)
  12. For any given theist, that theist's belief that a god exists is either false or unjustified.
  13. If a god exists, then some theists are justified in believing that a god exists.
  14. If a god exists, then no theist has a false belief that a god exists.
  15. If a god exists, then some theists know (i.e., have a justified, true belief) that God exists. (from 13 and 14)
  16. It is not the case that some theists know (i.e., have a justified and true belief) that a god exists. (from 12)
  17. No god exists. (from 15 and 16)

Inductive argument from evil

  1. All evil in the kinds of created entities are the result of the fallibility of one or more of its creators. (Premise)
  2. The universe is a created entity. (Premise)
  3. The universe contains evil. (Premise)
  4. Evil is the result of the actions of a fallible creator(s) or is not the result of any creator(s). (From 1, 2 and 3 by predictive inference)
  5. If god created the universe, then he is fallible. (From 4)
  6. Therefore, god did not create the universe, is imperfect, or does not exist. (From 5)

Argument from the biological role of pain and pleasure

  1. Consider the following observations:
    • Moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure we know to be biologically useful.
    • Sentient beings that are not moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure that we know to be biologically useful.
    • Sentient beings experiencing pain or pleasure that we do not know to be biologically useful.
  2. The observations in 1 are more probably the result of natural law than a god.
  3. Therefore, probably no god exists.
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Criticisms and reponses

In Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal, a well-known essay written in 1710, Leibniz introduced the term "theodicy" to describe the formal study of this subject. This term is also used for an explanation of why God permits evil to exist without it being a contradiction of his perfect goodness.

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Definition of "evil"

The fifth century theologian Augustine of Hippo mounted what has become one of the most popular defences of the existence of God against the Epicurean paradox. He maintained that evil was only privatio boni, or a privation of good. An evil thing can only be referred to as a negative form of a good thing, such as discord, injustice, and loss of life or liberty. If a being is not totally pure, evil will fill in any gaps in that being's purity. This is commonly called the Contrast Theodicy — that evil only exists as a "contrast" with good. However, the Contrast Theodicy relies on a metaphysical view of morality which few people, even theologians, agree with (that good and evil are not moral judgments). In On Free Choice of the Will, Augustine also argued that Epicurus had ignored the potential benefits of suffering in the world. However, it is pointed out that an omnipotent God could give the world any benefits derived from suffering without those in the world having to suffer.

Another response to this paradox argues that asserting "evil exists" would infer a moral standard against which to define good and evil (see also Argument from morality). Therefore, by using this argument one implies the existence of a moral law, which requires a law-maker. Most theists would assert that this law-maker is God, whilst many atheists would argue that morality can just as easily be reached through reason – that this law is in fact a social contract agreed to by all humans; subconsciously developed from social prisoner's dilemma and/or that this problem is more accurately described as a problem of physical suffering, which can be objectively defined against a standard (of zero physical suffering).

Another theological answer to this problem is that it takes for granted that humans understand what, exactly, consitutes good and evil. It is a common religious response that there could very well be an entirely positive plan maintained by God that one, as a mere mortal, could not possibly fathom, and that to judge God's existence based on what one perceives in the natural world is shortsighted.

However, this response is plagued by a host of difficulties. First, it is only effective if one presupposes the existence of God. If God does not exist, and if humans are the highest form of sentient lfe, then our understanding of what constitutes good and evil simply is what constitutes good and evil. Of course, one must define in what sense the word "evil" is being used. In this debate, it simply means any state of affairs in which the sentient beings experiencing them would consider them to be negative. Typical examples of such negativity include pain and suffering. Now, it is plausible that God may allow some suffering in order that we may learn lessons, overcome struggles, and grow stronger. This type of second-order good could reasonably be argued to be superior to a world with no evil but also no second-order good. This higher good seems like it could be part of some plan that humans do not fully understand. Yet certain problems still remain. They are encapsulated in this example: If one less person had died in the Holocaust, could we still have learned a lesson? Could we still have had the opportunity to overcome suffering and achieve second-order good? If the answer is yes, then the problem of evil remains. Even one tiny bit of unjustified evil is enough for the full force of the argument to be felt.

Another problem with the argument from human ignorance is that it is non-empirical, (aka unfalsifiable). No amount of empircal evidence could conclusively rule out the possibility that we do not really understand what constitues evil. In the same way, one cannot know anything beyond one's own existence with absolute certainty. Yet this does not mean that we should not bother to consume breakfast in the morning because we may lack that understanding that we are really dreaming and would therefore be engaging in a futile enterprise. As humans we make certain intuitive assumptions because they work, despite the fact that we may, in reality, all be brains in vats. Among these intuitive assumptions is the universally shared intuition that minimal suffering is better than any amount of suffering that exceeds a minimal amount of suffering.

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Free choice

Some theists argue that God allows evil to exist so that humans can have freedom of choice, to do good or evil, so that they are whole beings, and not mindless machines. Critics of this argument point out that according to this logic, everyone who is not omnipotent can be argued not to have "free choice." However, the choices a person can make are totally subjective and are dependent upon one's nature. If someone were naturally good, he would still have free choice. They point out that many people who live or have lived are good and have caused no suffering, and argue that they are naturally good people, and must also have free will if God made them.

Free choice arguments, however, have no relevance to the problem of natural (non-human created) evil, such as natural disasters.

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Other criticisms

A unique response to the problem of evil comes from the early Christian sect called Gnosticism. Gnostics claim that the god of the Jewish Bible or Old Testament who created the world, is not God, but an inept, though highly powerful, being that they call the Demiurge. They view him as a malicious being who made the world of matter and flesh as a prison to hide humanity's true spiritual nature. Hence, part of their answer to the problem of evil is that the true God, whom they sometimes call "the True Father," did not in fact make this world of suffering, evil and pain. However they do not provide an explanation for why the true God would allow another being to create them.

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Problem of evil in Hinduism

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In Hinduism, the problem of evil is present but does not exist per se as souls are eternal and not directly created by God. In Dvaita philosophy, jivas (souls) are eternally existent and hence not a creation of God ex nihilo (out of nothing). The souls are bound by beginningless avidya (ignorance) that cause a misidentification with products of nature (body, wealth, power) and hence suffering. In effect, Hinduism identifies avidya (ignorance) as the cause of evil and this ignorance itself is uncaused. Suffering from natural causes are explained as karmic results of previous births.

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See also

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External links

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References

  • Beebe, James R. "Logical Problem of Evil," The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, James Fieser and Bradley Dowden (eds.).
  • Farrer, Austin. Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961.
  • Hick, John. Evil and the God of Love, first edition. London: Macmillan, 1966.
  • Mackie, J. L. The Miracle of Theism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.
  • Murray, Michael. "Leibniz on the Problem of Evil," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2005 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
  • Plantinga, Alvin. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974.
  • Plantinga, Alvin. God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1977.
  • Swinburne, Richard. The Coherence of Theism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
  • Tooley, Michael, "The Problem of Evil," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
  • Trakakis , Nick. "Evidential Problem of Evil," The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, James Fieser and Bradley Dowden (eds.).
  • Wilson, William McF., and Julian N. Hartt. "Farrer's Theodicy." In David Hein and Edward Hugh Henderson, eds., Captured by the Crucified: The Practical Theology of Austin Farrer. New York and London: Continuum / T & T Clark, 2004. 100-118.es:Problema del mal

eo:Paradokso de Epikuro lv:Ļaunuma problēma pl:Problem zła sv:Epikuros paradox zh:伊壁鸠鲁悖论

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