Representative realism
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Representative Theory of Perception is a philosophical concept, largely developed by Bertrand Russell. It does, unlike naïve realism, take into account sense data (the way in which the object is interpreted, not simply the objective, mathematical object) - this induces the veil of perception wherein we are unsure the table we look at exists due to there being no direct objective proof of its existence. In other words, the table I'm looking at appears to have a particular shape to me, due to my angle of vision, and to have a particular colour due to the way in which the light bounces off it relative to my position, and that appearance differs from the appearance of the table as seen by the person next to me. Each of us sees not the actual table, but an appearance of it which merely represents an actual table out there.
The representative theory of perception states that we do not perceive the external world directly; instead we perceive our personal interpretation of an object by way of sense data. A naïve realist assumes she sees the dog upon perceiving a dog, whereas a representative realist assumes she sees a sensory representation of the dog upon perceiving a dog.
The external world is real and continues to exist unobserved. But we are only aware of it indirectly. Our perception of the external world is mediated by way of sense data such as photons and sound waves. We perceive a representation of reality (not the reality itself); this has been given many names: ideas, sense data, percept or appearance.
This is not the same thing as representative realism, which is the idea that our perceptions are direct causes of the intrinsic qualities of objects, and based on these perceptions we can infer things about these objects.
John Locke thought objects had two classes of qualities:
- Primary qualities exist even when not perceived and are utterly inseparable from the object. They cannot be removed by either thought or physical action (eg. Mass, mobility, solidity).
- Secondary qualities exist only when being perceived. They do not resemble the qualities of objects that cause them (eg. Colour, smell, taste, shape).