Sino-Vietnamese War

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{{Infobox Military Conflict |conflict=Sino-Vietnamese War (Third Indochina War) |partof= |image= |caption= |date=February 17-March 16, 1979 |place=Vietnam |casus= |territory= |result=Disputed — both sides claimed to have achieved their objectives. |combatant1=People's Republic of China |combatant2=Vietnam |commander1= |commander2= |strength1=90,000 entered Vietnam and another 160,000 in Yunnan and Guangxi |strength2=100,000+ |casualties1=Disputed. Perhaps 20,000 (China claims 30,000) killed¹ |casualties2=Disputed. Perhaps 20,000 (Vietnam claims 26,000) killed
10,000 civilian casualties¹ }}

The Sino-Vietnamese War or Third Indochina War was a war fought in 1979 between the neighboring countries of the People's Republic of China and Vietnam. After a brief incursion into northern Vietnam, PRC troops withdrew less than a month later, and both sides claimed victory.

1 Causes of War
- 1.1 Sino-Soviet Split
- 1.2 Cambodia
2 The war
3 Aftermath
4 Footnotes
5 External links

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Causes of War

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Sino-Soviet Split

During the initial stages of the Vietnam War with France, Communist China and Vietnam had close ties and both mistrusted the former French rulers of Vietnam. During the conflict, both the PRC and the Soviet Union were supplying Vietnam--partners against the common colonialist enemy.

With the death of Stalin, the situation changed. Mao Zedong despised Nikita Khrushchev, Stalin's successor, and criticized the Soviet Union's interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. This led to increasingly hostile relations, and eventually the Sino-Soviet Split. From this period on, Vietnamese communists gradually aligned with the Soviet Union. Both the Soviet Union and China continued to supply what was now North Vietnam during their war against the South, and their U.S., French, and Australian supporters.

The Soviets welcomed this change, and saw Vietnam as a way to demonstrate themselves as the "real power" behind communism in the Far East. In this respect, the United States government's fear of the domino effect may have been partly justified, as the Soviets were attempting to turn countries towards them. The problem with the US interpretation is that what they saw as a unified and growing chain of Communist expansion was in fact motivated at least as much by Soviet interest in isolating the PRC.

To the PRC, the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship was a worrying development. It then seemed very clear that the Soviets were trying to encircle China.

The PRC's response was two-fold: for one they started talks with the USA in the late 1960s and early 1970s, culminating in high level meetings with Henry Kissinger and later Richard Nixon. These contributed to a PRC shift toward the American camp. Meanwhile, they also supported the Khmer Rouge regime led by Pol Pot in Cambodia. The PRC supported Cambodia partially for ideological reasons (the Khmer Rouge's philosophy was a radical variant of Maoism) and partially to keep Vietnam "boxed in" between the PRC in the north and Cambodia in the west.

The relative success of the two neighboring states would have a powerful effect on opinions of the PRC and USSR in the area: after the collapse of the Saigon government in 1975, Vietnam stabilized, while Cambodia descended into genocidal chaos.

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Cambodia

Although the Vietnamese and the Khmer Rouge had once cooperated, the relationship deteriorated when KR leader, Pol Pot, came to power and established Democratic Kampuchea. The Cambodian regime started to demand that certain tracts of land be "returned" to Cambodia, lands that had been "lost" centuries earlier. Unsurprisingly, the Vietnamese refused the demands, and Pol Pot responded by massacring ethnic Vietnamese inside Cambodia (see History of Cambodia), and, by 1978, supporting a Vietnamese guerrilla army making incursions into western Vietnam.

Realizing that Cambodia was being supported by the PRC, Vietnam approached the Soviets about possible actions. The Soviets saw this as a major opportunity; the Vietnamese army, fresh from combat with the US's ground forces, would easily be able to defeat the Cambodian forces. This would not only remove the only major PRC-aligned political force in the area, but at the same time demonstrate the benefits of being aligned with the USSR. The Vietnamese were equally excited about the potential outcome; Laos was already a strong ally; if Cambodia could be "turned," Vietnam would emerge as a major regional power, political master of the majority of Indochina.

Of course, the PRC would not be terribly happy with this course of events, and their possible counteractions had to be considered. Over a period of several months in 1978, the Soviets made it clear that they were supporting the Vietnamese against Cambodian incursions. They felt this political show of force would keep the Chinese out of any sort of direct confrontation, allowing the Vietnamese and Cambodians to fight out what was to some extent a Sino-Soviet war by proxy.

In late 1978, the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia. As expected, their experienced and well-equipped troops had little difficulty brushing the Khmer Rouge forces aside. On January 7, 1979 Vietnamese-backed Cambodian forces seized Phnom Penh, ending the Khmer Rouge regime.

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The war

Unknown to the USSR, the PRC, with US backing, was growing increasingly defiant. They felt that there was simply no way the USSR could directly support Vietnam against the PRC; the distances were too great to be effective, and any sort of reinforcement would have to cross territory controlled by the PRC or US allies. The only realistic option open to them would be indirect, re-starting the simmering border war in northern China. Vietnam was important to Soviet policy, but they felt it was not important enough to go to war over.

On February 15, the PRC publicly announced their intention to invade. Few observers realized the symbolic importance of this date; it marked the expiry of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty, and thus the first time that the PRC could "legally" invade a Soviet ally without breaking their own treaties. The reason cited for the invasion was the supposed mistreatment of Vietnam's ethnic Chinese minority and the Vietnamese occupation of the Spratly Islands (claimed by the PRC).

Two days later on February 17, a huge force of about 90,000 supported by tanks from the PRC People's Liberation Army crossed into northern Vietnam. Many of Vietnam's elite troops were in Cambodia, keeping a tight grip on its newly occupied territory. The Vietnamese government claimed they only left a force of about 100,000 (army regular divisions and border militia units) in its northern area. The PLA managed to advance about forty kilometres into Vietnam, with fighting mainly occurring in the provinces of Cao Bang, Lao Cai, and Lang Son. On March 6, the Chinese took Lang Son. They claimed the gate to Hanoi was open and declared their punitive mission achieved, and began withdrawing their forces. By March 16, the process was completed. The Vietnamese declared that they had defeated a Chinese army of 600,000.

To this day, both sides of the conflict describe themselves as the victor. The number of casualties is disputed, with the Vietnamese claiming that the Chinese suffered 60,000 casualties and 20,000 deaths. The Chinese claim they suffered casualties of about 20,000 to 30,000 with Vietnamese losses at about 40,000 to 60,000.

There is also debate about who "won" the war in the political sense. The answer depends on the perceived objectives of each side. If the PRC's aim was to force a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, it failed — while a certain number of troops were pulled out of Cambodia to fight the Chinese, Cambodia remained under Vietnamese military occupation for some time. Similarly, the border disputes between the PRC and Vietnam were not settled. If, however, the PRC's goals were entirely punitive, the war may have been more successful.

If the PRC's aims were really to test the resolve of the Soviet Union, which had pledged to defend Vietnam, then this alliance may have been proven hollow, as the Soviet Union provided no direct assistance to Vietnam in the conflict. It may be argued by some, however, that no assistance was needed, as both the Soviets and Vietnamese claimed that Vietnam defeated a Chinese army of 600,000. If their aim was to demonstrate the weakness of the Soviet Union and present China as the preeminent force in the area, the outcome appears mixed, certainly any Soviet ambitions in the area appear to have been stalled, but the same is equally true for the Chinese.

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Aftermath

The legacy of the war is lasting, especially in Vietnam. Occasional skirmishes continued over the border during the 1980s. Relations between the two neighbours were only improved in the early 1990s after the implosion of the Soviet Union.

The war also caused a forced migration of Vietnam's ethnic Chinese, who were discriminated against. They fled as "boat people" and were resettled in several Chinatowns and in other Asian communities in Australia, Europe, and North America.

In the People's Republic of China, this war is not frequently mentioned.

In Vietnamese history textbooks, the war is considered a small border skirmish, mentioned in two or three lines. Few young people know anything about the war.

In 1999, China and Vietnam signed a border pact after many years of negotiations, but the line of demarcation remained secret[1]. This pact was opposed by some Vietnamese overseas and in Vietnam. Some dissidents who voiced objection to the treaty were arrested by the Vietnamese government[2], who claimed that the pact does not exist.

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Footnotes

¹ Clodfelter, Michael. Vietnam in Military Statistics: A History of the Indochina Wars, 1772–1991 (McFarland & Co., Jefferson, NC, 1995). Maintains the Chinese-cited figures to be "inflated" and the Vietnamese-cited figures "preposterous." Argues 20,000 on both sides as a "realistic" figure.

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