United States intervention in Chile

From Free net encyclopedia

(Redirected from U.S. Intervention in Chile)

The United States on several occasions sought to influence the policies or government of Chile. This article focuses on the period starting in the early 1960s.

The Marxist presidential candidate Salvador Allende was a top contender in the 1964 election, and the US, through the CIA, spent millions campaigning against him, mostly through radio and print advertising. Allende was defeated, for which the CIA took some credit. Allende ran again in the 1970 presidential election; and again, US intelligence sought to prevent his election, but he won a plurality (near 37%), and was duly invested as President. The US, led by President Richard Nixon (who stated his fear that Chile could become "another Cuba"), implemented economic sanctions against Chile to encourage Allende's resignation, his overthrow, or his defeat in the impending election of 1976.

Once Allende was in office, the US, led by Nixon, who stated his fear that Chile could become "another Cuba", initiated plans to work with insurgent elements within Chile to overthrow Allende in a coup.

The US began implementing economic sanctions against Chile to encourage Allende's resignation, his overthrow, or his defeat in the impending election of 1976.

The Chamber of Deputies of Chile condemned Allende by passage of the Declaration of the Breakdown of Chile’s Democracy, the declaration stated that "it is (the Armed and Police Forces) duty to put an immediate end to all situations...that breach the Constitution and the laws of the land with the goal of redirecting government activity toward the path of Law." Less than a month later on September 11, 1973, Chief Commander Augusto Pinochet, ousted Allende from power.

Contents

1964 and 1970 elections

According to the 1975 Church Report, covert United States involvement in Chile in the decade between 1963 and 1973 was extensive and continuous. The Central Intelligence Agency covertly spent three million dollars in an effort to influence the outcome of the 1964 Chilean presidential elections [1], and eight million dollars in the three years between 1970 and the military coup in September 1973, with over three million in fiscal year 1972 alone. Covert American activity was present in almost every major election in Chile in the decade between 1963 and 1973, but its actual effect on electoral outcomes is not altogether clear. Chile, more than any of its South American neighbors, had an extensive democratic tradition dating back to the early 1930's, and even before. Because of this, it is difficult to gauge how successful its tactics were in swaying voters.

1970

Efforts by the U.S. government to prevent Allende from taking office after his 1970 election are documented in U.S. metarials declassified during the Clinton administration. For example, a formal instruction was issued on 16 October 1970 to the CIA base in Chile, saying in part, "It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup. It would be much preferable to have this transpire prior to 24 October but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously beyond this date. We are to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end, utilizing every appropriate resource. It is imperative that these actions be implemented clandestinely and securely so that the USG [United States Government] and American hand be well hidden..." [2], [Karamessines, 1970]

There is no doubt that U.S. officials ordered measures up to and including support for a potential coup to prevent Allende from taking office, although there are conflicting views as to whether the U.S. later pulled back from this position.

The killing of the Chief Commander of the Army

An early documented action in this regard was the killing of René Schneider by an anti-Allende group. Schneider was the army chief commander and a constitutionalist, which meant he would not support a coup. The CIA in Santiago kept contact with two groups inside the military and provided guns and money for kidnapping Schneider, but he was killed inside his car during the operation. This incident caused the citizens and the military to rally behind the just-elected Allende.

On September 10, 2001, a suit was filed by the family of Schneider, accusing former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger of arranging Schneider's 1970 murder because he would have opposed a military coup [3]. However, CIA documents indicate that while the CIA had sought his kidnapping, his killing, which was committed by a rebel military group that had been in contact with the CIA, was never intended. Kissinger apparently declared the coup "hopeless" and ordered it turned off [4]. It appears that the CIA maintained contacts with the group in the lead-up to and after Schneider's death, though.

Economic pressure on Allende

After the Allende government won office, the U.S. began high-level planning to ensure the Marxist experiment would not succeed. This would be achieved by, among other strategies, massive reduction in economic aid. U.S. National Security Council documents, later ordered released by U.S. President Bill Clinton [5], include decision memorandum no. 93, dated November 9, 1970, written by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and addressed to the heads of diplomatic, defense and intelligence departments. This document stated that pressure should be placed on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability to implement policies contrary to U.S. and hemisphere interests, specifically, the President has directed no new bilateral economic aid commitments be undertaken with the government of Chile [Kissinger, 1970].

Between 1964 and 1970 (under President Eduardo Frei), over $1 billion in economic assistance flowed into Chile; during Allende's tenure (1970-73), disbursements were non-existent or negligible [Petras & Morley, 1974]. The reduction in aid was combined with the fall in the value of copper from a 1970 high of US$66 to a low of US$48 per ton, which undermined Allende's proposed restructuring of the Chilean economy. As the program was dependent on government spending, this caused a decline in the socio-economic circumstances of Chile's poorest citizens.

The U.S. government under Richard Nixon never hid its dislike of the Allende regime, so they could hardly have been expected to render Allende active support. Whether the United States' economic policy towards Chile caused the economic crisis or merely aggravated what was already an intractable situation for Allende is unclear. However, it is realistic to remark that these policies did adversely affect Allende's chances of alleviating the crisis.

1973 coup

Main article: Chilean coup of 1973

While U.S. government hostility to the Allende government is unquestioned, the U.S. role in the coup itself remains a highly controversial matter. Claims of their direct involvement in the actual coup are neither proven nor contradicted by publicly available documentary evidence; many potentially relevant documents still remain classified. Regarding Pinochet's rise to power, the CIA undertook a comprehensive analysis of its records and individual memoirs as well as conducting interviews with former agents, and concluded in a report issued in 2000 that the CIA "did not assist Pinochet to assume the Presidency." [6]

The CIA was notified by contacts of the impending Pinochet coup two days in advance, but contends it "played no direct role in" the coup. On September 16 1973, after Pinochet had assumed power, the following exchange about the coup took place between U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon:

Nixon: Nothing new of any importance or is there?
Kissinger: Nothing of very great consequence. The Chilean thing is getting consolidated and of course the newspapers are bleeding because a pro-Communist government has been overthrown.
Nixon: Isn't that something. Isn't that something.
Kissinger: I mean instead of celebrating – in the Eisenhower period we would be heroes.
Nixon: Well we didn't – as you know – our hand doesn't show on this one though.
Kissinger: We didn't do it. I mean we helped them. [Garbled] created the conditions as great as possible.
Nixon: That is right. And that is the way it is going to be played. [7]

The coup, regardless of the degree of U.S. involvement, achieved the U.S. government's objective of eliminating the possibility of socialism being constructed in Chile, and brought about a regime sympathetic to U.S. interests.

Support for Pinochet

The U.S. provided material support to the military regime after the coup, although criticizing it in public. A document released by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 2000, titled "CIA Activities in Chile", revealed that the CIA actively supported the military junta after the overthrow of Allende and that it made many of Pinochet's officers into paid contacts of the CIA or U.S. military, even though some were known to be involved in human rights abuses [8]. The CIA's publicly announced policies on paid informants have since been modified to exclude those involved in such abuses, but at the time they were evaluated on a case-by-case basis and measured with the value of the information they provided.

Later comments and actions by U.S. officials

In her evaluation of United States foreign policy around the time of the coup in Chile, Jeane Kirkpatrick, later U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, highlighted her country's lack of overt aggressiveness in the developing world while events were transpiring in Chile. "In the last decade especially we have practiced remarkable forbearance everywhere." [Kirkpatrick, 1979] While this is the case for overt U.S. policy, severely constrained by the movement that had grown up in opposition to the Vietnam War, nonetheless, as discussed above, United States policy regarding aid (at the very least) helped lead to Allende's downfall, and the U.S. actively supported coup planning on some occasions, although possibly not that of the coup that actually took place.

U.S. President Bill Clinton ordered the release of numerous documents relating to U.S. policy and actions toward Chile. [9] The documents produced by various U.S. agencies were opened to the public by the US State Department in October 1999. The collection of 1,100 documents dealt with the years leading up to the military coup. One of these documents establishes that U.S. military aid to the Chilean armed forces was raised dramatically between the coming to power of Allende in 1970, when it amounted to US$800,000 annually, to US$10.9 million in 1972.

In a 2003 interview on the U.S. Black Entertainment Television network, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell was asked about why the United States saw itself as the "moral superior" in the Iraq conflict, citing the Chilean coup as an example of U.S. intervention that went against the wishes of the local population. Powell responded: "With respect to your earlier comments about Chile in the 1970s and what happened with Mr. Allende, it is not a part of American history that we're proud of." Chilean newspapers hailed the news as the first time the U.S. government had conceded a role in the affair.

See also

2004 investigation

The lower house of the Chilean Congress announced on October 6, 2004 that an investigation would begin of alleged CIA activities in Chile over a period of several decades. Of particular interest are the CIA's efforts to prevent Allende's election in 1970. [10]

References

  • James F. Petras & Morris H. Morley (1974). How Allende fell: A study in U.S.–Chilean relations, Nottingham: Spokesman Books.

External links