Viktor Suvorov

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Image:Victor-suvorov.jpg Viktor Suvorov (Template:Lang; real name Vladimir Rezun : Template:Lang) (born April 20, 1947) was a Soviet intelligence officer of Ukrainian and Russian descent who had been working for the Soviet military intelligence (GRU), but defected to the United Kingdom in 1978, where he worked as an intelligence analyst and lecturer. Later he wrote several highly controversial books, best known for his speculations about Stalin's alleged plans for attack on Europe.

Suvorov claims his pseudonym was his army nickname, which was actually intended to mean "smart-ass" (Aleksandr Suvorov was a famed Russian military commander of the 18th century).

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Publications and ideas

Suvorov has written several books about his Soviet Army experiences and also joined the team led by the British General Sir John Hackett in writing the book The Third World War: The Untold StoryTemplate:Ref . Published in 1982, this book was the sequel to the 1978 original The Third World WarTemplate:Ref, in which Hackett and his team had speculated about the possible course of a Soviet/NATO war in Germany.

Suvorov has also written a number of books about Stalin's times in a polemic, popular-science style, an approach considered unacceptable by some professional historians. The first such work was Icebreaker. Other books followed about World War II, and were based on fragments of officially written memoirs and Soviet documents. Suvorov's most significant claim is that Stalin wished to extend Socialism in one country by launching an invasion of Germany and Nazi occupied Eastern and Central Europe in July 1941 (most probably on July 6). Had this theorized invasion occurred it would have fallen only two weeks after the date on which the actual Axis invasion of the Soviet Union took place.

The idea about Stalin's preparations to strike prior to the Axis invasion was proposed earlier by dissident Pyotr Grigorenko. Suvorov evolved it in further detail and worked to substantiate it in his own books.

Suvorov's theory has been hotly debated, partly due to its political implications.

Suvorov's books may appear under slightly different titles depending upon the publisher; for example, Aquarium, published in the UK by Hamish Hamilton, subsequently appeared in the United States as Inside the Aquarium.

Suvorov's books and comments about the Russian Armed forces have been dismissed by some historians as a combination of hyperbole and made up facts. It has been proposed that Suvorov was under pressure to retain his status as a high profile defector of some worth, so he manufactured his claims and evidence. Many military historians are skeptical of Suvorov's works. One writer supportive of Suvorov’s thesis is Mikhail Meltyukhov in his book “Stalin's Missed Chance” Template:Ref. Most of Meltyukhov's material comes from various Russian state archives (for review of the book see[1]).

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Criticism and Support

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Criticism

Among the noted critics of Suvorov's work are Israeli historian Gabriel Gorodetsky, and Russian generals Makhmut Gareyev and Dmitri Volkogonov. One criticism of Suvorov's work is that he did not complete his analysis of the disastrous beginning of the war. While it may be possible that Suvorov is correct in discerning Stalin's true plans and exposing the huge hardware potential of the Soviet military machine, he unreasonably dismisses the traditional arguments about problems plaguing the Red Army — Among these: poor leadership after the purges of 1938 and low morale. While Suvorov attempted to address these points in his later books the dispute remains unsettled.

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An example of Suvorov's arguments is his citation of the development of the KT/A-40 Antonov "flying tank" as evidence of Stalin's aggressive plans. Critics suggest that much of this type of evidence is not convincing, or can be explained in terms other than those of Suvorov.

Military historian David Glantz disputed the argument that the Red Army was deployed in an offensive stance in 1941. Glantz work demonstrates that the Red Army was in a state of partial mobilization in July 1941 from which neither effective defensive nor offensive action could be offered without considerable delay.

Another criticism of Suvorov's position includes the claim that there is no evidence that Stalin ever "encouraged" Hitler to start WWII. In his political works, Stalin was always firmly opposed to Trotsky's theory of Permanent Revolution, implementation of which regarded worldwide war and other countries' usurpation as necessary (because practice showed that war, the ultimate devastation, could create revolutionary conditions that usually did not occur in any natural way). Stalin instead insisted on the policy of Socialism in One Country which promoted separation and peaceful standalone development of socialism in a selected country, while waiting for two-stage revolutions that would lead other countries to socialism. Conventional theory states that Stalin prepared the Soviet Army for international war because he knew he would have to free Europe of Fascism, and the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was nothing more than the way to suspend the war with Nazism - exactly for the purpose to have time for preparations that Suvorov's researches exposed. However, it is Suvorov's contentionTemplate:Ref that the Communist system inherently demands both outward claims of peaceful intent, and the secret but nevertheless inescapable long-term imperative of the conversion of capitalist states to Communism, lest those living under Communism draw unfavourable comparison. Under this theory, whether Hitler would ever have attacked the Soviet Union or not is irrelevant; the mere existence of a non-Communist state is by definition complete justification for aggression. Suvorov cites Soviet attitudes towards Romania as an example of this; although the Ceauşescu regime maintained an aggressively independent stance towards the Soviet Union for many years, no invasion took place such as were launched against Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968; because, Suvorov claims, no Soviet citizen envied the Romanians.

A middle position seems to be taken by the Israeli historian Martin van Creveld. In an interview in the April 11, 2005 edition of the German news magazine FOCUS, which is the third largest weekly magazine in Germany, he said: "I doubt that Stalin wanted to attack as early as autumn 1941, as some writers argue. But I have no doubt that sooner or later, if Germany would have been entangled in a war with Great Britain and the USA, he would have taken what he wanted. Judging by the talks between Ribbentrop and Molotov in November 1940 this would have been Romania, Bulgaria, an access to the North Sea, the Dardanelles and probably those parts of Poland that were under German control at that time." Asked to what degree the leaders of the Wehrmacht needed to feel threatened by the Soviet military buildup, van Creveld replies "very much" and adds: "In 1941 the Red Army was the largest army in the world. Stalin may, as I said, not have planned to attack Germany in autumn 1941. But it would be hard to believe that he would not have taken the opportunity to stab the Reich in the back sometime."

Suvorov's critics argue that the suggestion that Stalin regarded war with Nazi Germany as inevitable sits oddly with the undisputed fact that the attack by Nazi Germany in 1941 took Stalin completely by surprise. On the other hand, the fact that Stalin was taken completely by surprise doesn't suit the established history either, as it is often claimed that Stalin was paranoical about a possible foreign invasion and had concentrated on defensive policies. The criticism was addressed in detail in Suvorov's book Suicide.

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Support

While most of the Western researchers (the exception being Albert L. WeeksTemplate:Ref[2]) reject or simply ignore Suvorov's thesis, he has gathered some support among Russian professional historians. Throughout the 1990s, a debate was carried out among the Russian historians. Support for Suvorov's claim that Stalin had been preparing a strike against Hitler in 1941 began to emerge, as some archive materials were declassified. Authors to support assault thesis are V.D.DanilovTemplate:Ref and V.A.NevezhinTemplate:Ref.

A noteworthy result of the discussion that followed, is Mikhail Meltyukhov's study Stalin's Missed Chance. The author states that the idea to strike Germany arose long before May of 1941 and was the very basis of Soviet military planning from 1940 to 1941. Contary to popular opinion, no significant defense plans have been found (Meltyukhov 2000:375). In his argumentation, Meltyukhov covers five different versions of the assault plan (“Considerations on the Strategical Deployment of Soviet Troops in Case of War with Germany and its Allies” (Russian original)), the first version of which was developed soon after the outbreak of World War 2. The last version was to be completed by May 1, 1941 (Meltyukhov 2000:370-372). Even the deployment of troops was chosen in South, which would have been more beneficial in case of Soviet assault (Meltyukhov 2000:381).

Suvorov's theories agree with some statements of the former Prime Minister of Estonia Mart Laar. On August 20, 2004 he published an article in Wall Street Journal titled When Will Russia Say 'Sorry'?. In this article he said: The new evidence shows that by encouraging Hitler to start World War II, Stalin hoped to simultaneously ignite a world-wide revolution and conquer all of Europe. Suvorov's name was not mentioned.

Another former statesman to share views of Soviet aggression plan is Mauno Koivisto, who wrote: It seems to be clear the Soviet Union was not ready for defense in the summer of 1941, but it was rather preparing for an assault... The forces mobilized in the Soviet Union were not positioned for defensive but for offensive aims. Ex-president Koivisto also adds some numerical data suggesting Soviet superiority. He concludes: Hitler's invasion forces didn't outnumber [the Soviets], but were rather outnumbered themselves. The Soviets were unable to organize defenses. The troops were provided with maps that covered territories outside the Soviet Union. Template:Ref

In Stalin's War of Extermination Joachim Hoffmann made extensive use of interrogations of Soviet prisoners of war, ranging in rank from general to private, conducted by their German captors during the war. These interviews, combined with the traditional exploitation of open-source, unclassified literature and recently declassified materials, irrefutably dispel the myth of a peace-loving Soviet Union led by a trusting, pacific Joseph Stalin. Hoffmann's research confirms conclusively that the Soviet Union was making final preparations for its own preemptive attack when the Wehrmacht struck. Hoffmann makes manifestly clear that the Zhukov's plan of May 15, 1941 has long been known and analyzed. Colonel Valeri Danilov and Dr. Heinz Magenheimer examined this plan and other documents that indicate Soviet preparations for attack almost ten years ago in an Austrian military journal (Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, nos. 5 and 6, 1991; no. 1, 1993; and no. 1, 1994). Both researchers concluded that the Zhukov plan of May 15, 1941, reflected Stalin's May 5, 1941 speech heralding the birth of the new offensive Red Army.

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See also

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Bibliography

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Books by Vladimir Rezun

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Books by other authors

  • Boog, H. Horst Boog: Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 4
  • Glantz, David M. Stumbling Colossus
  • Topitsch, Ernst. Stalin's War: A Radical New Theory of the Origins of the Second World War. Palgrave Macmillan, 1987 (ISBN 0312009895)
  • Weeks, Albert L. Stalin's Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy, 1939–1941. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002 (hardcover; ISBN 0742521915); 2003 (paperback, ISBN 0742521923)
  • Hoffmann, Joachim Stalin's War of Extermination. Theses & Dissertations Press, 2001 (ISBN: 0967985684)
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Reference

  1. Template:Note The Third World War: The Untold Story ISBN 0-283-98863-0
  2. Template:Note The Third World War ISBN 0425044777
  3. Template:Note Stalin's Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy, 1939-1941 ISBN 0742521915
  4. Template:Note Данилов.В.Д. Сталинская стратегия начала войны: планы и реальность -- Другая война. 1939-1945 гг; or Danilоv V. Hat der Generalsstab der Roten Armee einen Praventiveschlag gegen Deutschland vorbereitet? // Osterreichische Militarische Zeitschrift. 1993. №1. S. 41-51
  5. Template:Note Невежин В.А. Синдром наступательной войны. Советская пропаганда в преддверии "священных боев", 1939-1941 гг. М., 1997
  6. Template:Note Koivisto, M. Venäjän idea, Helsinki. Tammi. 2001
  7. Template:Note Мельтюхов М.И. Упущенный шанс Сталина (electronic version of the book)
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External links

pl:Wiktor Suworow ro:Victor Suvorov ru:Резун, Владимир Богданович fi:Viktor Suvorov uk:Суворов Віктор

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