Asymmetric warfare

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Asymmetric warfare describes the potential for an optimal interaction between the respective strengths and weaknessess of two belligerents.

Contents

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Concepts

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Strategic basis

Usually in warfare at the start of the conflict, the belligerents deploy forces of a similar type and the outcome of the war can be determined by the quality and quantity of the opposing forces. Unless one side calculates that the cost of war is offset by advantages to be gained, there is no point in going to war, otherwise one would assume that the potential belligerents will either be deterred from war or will agree to terms without resorting to warfare.

Often when the belligerents deploy forces of a similar type the outcome of a battle and a campaign can be determined by the side which has a slight numerical advantage or slightly better command and control of their forces. There are times where this is not true because the two belligerents have developed strategies which makes it impossible for them to bring forces to bear against the other. An example of this is the stand off between the continental land forces of French army and the maritime forces of the United Kingdom's Royal Navy during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. In the words of Admiral Jervis during Campaigns of 1801, "I do not say, my Lords, that the French will not come. I say only they will not come by sea".

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Tactical basis

The tactical success of asymmetric warfare is dependent on at least some of the following assumptions:

  • One side can have a technological advantage which outweighs the numerical advantage of the enemy; the decisive English Longbow at the Battle of Agincourt is an example. The advantage may be the other way around. For example, the vast numerical superiority of the Chinese forces during their initial involvement in the Korean War overwhelmed the technological superiority of the United Nations forces.
  • Training and tactics as well as technology can prove decisive and allow a smaller force to overcome forces much larger than they are. For example, for several centuries the Greek hoplite's (heavy infantry) use of phalanx was far superior to that of any enemies they encountered. The Battle of Thermopylae, which also involved good use of terrain, is a well known example.
  • If the inferior power is in a position of self-defense; i.e., under attack or occupation, it may be possible to use unconventional tactics, such as hit-and-run and selective battles where the superior power is weaker, as an effective means of harassment without violating the Laws of war. Variations of this tactic succeeded for the North Vietnamese and its allied forces in the Vietnam war, in that the local forces did not win the war by a straightforward defeat of the US forces, but rather tired out the superior power. This tactic can sometimes be used to play on the inward political situations of a nation, its citizen's patience with the war, and their demonstration.
  • If the inferior power is in an aggressive position, however, and/or turns to tactics prohibited by the laws of war (jus in bello), its success depends on the superior power's refraining from like tactics. For example, the Law of land warfare prohibits the use of a flag of truce or clearly-marked medical vehicles as cover for an attack or ambush, but an asymmetric combatant using this prohibited tactic depends on the superior power's obedience to the corresponding law. Similarly, laws of warfare prohibit combatants from using civilian settlements, populations or facilities as military bases, but when an inferior power uses this tactic, it depends on the premise that the superior power will respect the law that they are violating, and will not attack that civilian target, or if they do the propaganda advantage will outweigh the material loss.
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The use of terrain in asymmetric warfare

Terrain can be used as a force multiplier by the smaller force and as a force inhibitor against the stronger force.

Guerrilla warfare can be classified into two main categories: urban guerrilla warfare and rural guerrilla warfare. In both cases, guerrillas rely on a friendly population to provide supplies and intelligence.

"The guerrillas must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea."
- Mao Tse-Tung.

Rural guerrillas prefer to operate in regions providing plenty of cover and concealment, especially heavily forested and mountainous areas. Urban guerrillas, rather than melting into the mountains and jungles, blend into the population and are dependent on a support base among the people.

"The contour of the land is an aid to the army; sizing up opponents to determine victory, assessing dangers and distances... those who do battle without knowing these will lose."
-Sun Tzu, The Art of War

For a detailed description of the advantages for the weaker force in the use of built-up areas when engaging in asymmetric warfare, see the article on urban warfare.

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War by proxy

Where asymmetric warfare is carried out (generally covertly) by allegedly non-governmental actors who are connected to or sympathetic to a particular nation's (the "state actor's") interest, it may be deemed war by proxy. This is typically done to give deniability to the state actor. The deniability can be important to keep the state actor from being tainted by the actions, to allow the state actor to negotiate in apparent good faith by claiming they are not responsible for the actions of parties who are merely sympathizers, or to avoid being accused of belligerent actions or war crimes.

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Asymmetric warfare and terrorism

Asymmetric warfare is not synonymous with terrorism. Rather, terrorism is sometimes used as a tactic by the weaker side in an asymmetric conflict. Terrorism is sometimes called asymmetric warfare by advocates for partisans using terrorist methods [1] to avoid the pejorative connotations of the word. Likewise, occupying powers often label partisans "terrorists" as part of propaganda campaigns to maintain support in the occupying power's home country, and to win over the occupied people so as to cut off the partisans' principal support base. This is the root of the phrase "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter."

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Morality of asymmetric warfare

Asymmetric warfare is not inherently any more immoral than symmetrical forms of warfare, but often the side in a war that uses asymmetric warfare will turn to more immoral actions(Plundering civilians for supplies, using civilian homes as bases, hiding behind Red Cross banners, etc.) out of desperation or because they feel that the ends justify the means. Of course, this often drives the stronger, symmetrically fighting, opponent to immoral actions such as attacking civilian areas to root out "freedom fighters" or "terrorists." However, the symmetric force may turn to immoral actions even against a moral, asymmetric foe, especially if said foe is supported by the civilian populace in general.

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Examples of asymmetric warfare

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Pre-20th century asymmetric warfare

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Mythos

The biblical story of David and Goliath -- in which David slew Goliath with "five smooth stones" hurled from a sling -- is often cited as the inspiration for the triumph of the weak and the oppressed over the strong and the mighty. David's victory is also thought by some to symbolize the triumph of the new and advanced versus the old and outdated; his superior planning, skill, and knowledge defeated Goliath's dependence on overt force, intimidation, and heavy weapons. However, devout Christians and Jews also credit God's specific help.

The Jews, Huns, Gauls (French), and British subjects of Rome also conducted "terrorism" against their occupiers in ways that would never cease over thousands of years.

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Hannibal

Hannibal attacked Roman forces on the Italian peninsula with a small military force, bolstered by loose alliances. He successfully used raids and threats to survive a Roman force that at times consisted of as many as 23 Legions, with another 15 Legions and two Consuls retained in Italy to thwart Hannibal. He never fought a battle in which he was not badly outnumbered. What finally terminated his Italian campaigns were political enemies in Carthage who cut off what supplies he had. Had Hannibal had the full economic power of Carthage behind him at any point in his campaigns, there is little doubt in the mind of most military historians that he would have swiftly prevailed against Rome. Rome overwhelmed one of history's most brilliant military minds with sheer manpower, and numbers. This expensive response almost bankrupted the Roman Republic.[2]

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20th century asymmetric warfare

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Second Boer War

Image:Afrikaner commandos.JPG The Second Boer War was the first major war of the 20th century and it introduced asymmetric warfare as a tactic which could be used in modern warfare by the weaker side. After an initial phase, which was fought by both sides as a conventional war, the British captured Johannesburg, the Boers' largest city, and the capitals of the two Boer Republics. The British then expected the Boers to accept peace as dictated by the victors in the traditional European way. Instead of capitulating the Boer's commandos fought a protracted guerrilla war in which between twenty and thirty thousand Boer commandos were only defeated after the British brought to bear four hundred and fifty thousand troops, about ten times as many as were used in the conventional phase of the war, and introduced internment in concentration camps for the Boer civilian population along with a scorched earth policy. The commando raids, which were organized and commanded by Jan Smuts, deep into the Cape Colony, were to resonate down the century as the British learned from the tactics used against them and adopted and adapted them for use in later conflicts.

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World War I

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World War II

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British
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United States
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Cold War

The end of World War II established the two most powerful victors, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) as the two dominant world superpowers.

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Cold War examples of proxy wars

An example of war by proxy was East Germany's covert support for the Red Army Faction (RAF) which was active from 1968 and carried out a succession of terrorist attacks in West Germany during the 1970s and to a lesser extent in the 1980s. After German reunification in 1990, it was discovered that the RAF had received financial and logistic support from the Stasi, the security and intelligence organization of East Germany. It had also given several RAF terrorists shelter and new identities. It had not been in the interests of either the RAF or the East Germans to be seen as co-operating. The apologists for the RAF argued that they were striving for a true socialist (communist) society not the sort that existed in Eastern Europe. The East German government was involved in Ostpolitik, and it was not in its interest to be caught overtly aiding a terrorist organization operating in West Germany. For more details see the History of Germany since 1945.

The war between the mujahadeen and the Red Army during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a classic asymmetric war. The aid given by the U.S. to the mujahadeen during the war was only covert at the tactical level, the Reagan Administration was only too pleased to be able to tell the world that it was helping the freedom-loving people of Afghanistan. Of all the proxy wars fought by the USA against the USSR during the Cold War this was the most cost effective and politically successful, as it was the USSR's most humiliating military defeat, and that defeat was a contributing factor to the implosion of the Soviet Union and some 1.5 million Afghan deaths.

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Post Cold War

In the rivalry that arose during the Cold War, small powers, especially those described as composing the Third World, were able to seek protection from one power or the other, or play the powers off against each other, to try to achieve their own national or regional goals.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, powers that had been client states of the Soviet Union, states that were able to gain aid and support from the United States as "bulwarks" against Soviet power, and states that had successfully played the superpowers against each other, found themselves with fewer options to defy US influence or gain material advantages from either of the former rivals.

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21st century

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Israel/Palestinians

The example of the Israelis and Palestinians is a classic case of asymmetrical warfare. Palestinians have no army, but rely on small factions and terrorist organizations (Hamas, Islamic Jihad) with small arms, Qassam rockets, and Katyusha rockets. On the other hand, Israel has one of the strongest armies in the world. Israel obviously cannot use its army in a conventional sense, because Palestinian fighters do not engage in conventional warfare. By not distinguishing themselves from the civilian population, Palestinian terrorists are breaking the rules of war, as laid down by the Geneva Conventions. In addition, terrorism and the murder of Israeli civilians have been used in order to advance the Palestinian cause. Palestinian sympathizers have tried to justify this by pointing out the lack of a Palestinian army and the need to defend themselves; however, terrorism is defined by the means used, not the reasoning behind them. There is an argument however that since Israel is a militarised society and that a large proportion of the civilians undergo military training and are often engaged in some form of military activity, then it is legitimate to target all Israelis. This type of warfare is certainly asymmetric: a country with a strong military that is largely unable to use it is up against armed factions that frequently target civilians.

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Iraq

The ease of victory by the U.S. lead coalition forces in the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, demonstrated that training, tactics and technology can still provide one sided victories in the field in conventional wars. After Saddam Hussein's regime was removed from power and the 2003 Occupation of Iraq began, the Iraq campaign moved into a different type of asymmetric warfare where the coalition's use of superior conventional warfare training, tactics and technology were of much less use against continued opposition from Iraq's various insurgent groups. In fact, the Iraqi insurgents have become increasingly sophisticated with fatal results for Iraqi civilians and US troops. A leading British officer has stated that the US military is the undisputed leader in winning a conventional war, but sadly inadequate for the task of seizing control of Iraq's oil.

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Al-Qaeda

In the last two decades of the 20th century, along with the globalisation of the world economy, and to a lesser extent a world popular culture, came the perception of a new phenomenon: a new organisational dynamic among terrorists which was not organised along tribal, regional or national lines, but saw them organised internationally under the banner of an international Muslim jihad, conducted by extremists who were otherwise unrelated. Among such organisations, the multi-national presence of Al-Qaeda has become most prominent, allegedly responsible for carrying out the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States and many other terrorist attacks worldwide. According to some sources, this organisation had been (and may still be) headquartered in Afghanistan, but has members and operatives in many countries.

The argument is put forward that this form of organisation allows Al-Qaeda (and analogous groups) to carry out their form of asymmetric warfare (as they see it) more safely, as it prevents an aggrieved nation from launching an overt military attack upon another nation harbouring Al-Qaeda members, since a nation can argue that Al-Qaeda might be within its borders but is an independent organisation which the government does not support, whether or not the government sympathizes with their cause.

The counter-argument to this states that Al-Qaeda members and other international terror groups do not exist in "disembodied space" or in international territory (i.e., the open seas, as pirates were claimed to do), but within the borders of a sovereign state, which is responsible for the capture or expulsion of members of such groups, and failure of a state to do this is tantamount to laying themselves open for aggrieved nations to attack them. Under this argument, the state of Pakistan, which refuses to allow US troops inside its territory, can be seen as a practical case in point.

However, there is some debate as to whether this qualifies as asymmetric warfare, as Al-Qaeda and other such organisations are essentially terrorists, not legal combatants under the laws of war. They can therefore be more accurately seen as an international non-governmental paramilitary force, not subject to a command structure as a regular military force is, and (being united as an organisation purely as a result of their religious beliefs) not affiliated with any specific nation's interests or doctrine. They could, however, be seen as an entity seperate from issues of government and sovereignty, against which a nation could legitimately wage a war.

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See also

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References

  • Robert B. Asprey, "War in the Shadows, The Guerilla in History", William Morrow, 1994, ISBN 0688128157 1279 pages. Authoritative survey from Darius the Great to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
  • Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy", The Atlantic Monthly, 1994?
  • Barbara Tuchman, "The Proud Tower, Europe 1880-1914" re: anarchist assassins
  • UN reports on use of child soldiers as assassins
  • Sun Tzu 6
  • Mackey, Robert R. (2004). The UnCivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press. ISBN 0806136243. Asymmetric warfare as practiced by the Confederate States in the American Civil War. Includes detailed information of U.S. Army counter-irregular operations as well as CSA irregulars.
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Further reading

  • Barnett, Roger W., Asymmetrical Warfare: Today's Challenge to U.S. Military Power, Washington D.C., Brassey's, 2003 ISBN 1574885634
  • Bing, Stanley, Sun Tzu Was a Sissy: Conquer Your Enemies, Promote Your Friends, and Wage the Real Art of War, New York, HarperCollins, 2004 ISBN 0060734779
  • Friedman, George, America's Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle between the United States and Its Enemies, London, Little, Brown, 2004 ISBN 0316728624
  • Giap, Vo Nguyen, People's War, People's Army, Honolulu, University Press of the Pacific, 2001 ISBN 0898753716
  • Guevara, Ernesto "Che", Guerrilla Warfare, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1998 ISBN 0803270755
  • Kaplan, Robert D., Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos, New York, Vintage, 2003 ISBN 0375726276
  • Liang, Qiao and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America, Panama City, Pan American Publishing Company, 2002 ISBN 0971680728
  • Poole, H. John, Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods, Emerald Isle, NC, Posterity Press, 2004 ISBN 0963869574
  • Sun Tzu, The Art of War, New York, Dover Publications, 2002 ISBN 0486425576
  • Tse-Tung, Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, Champaign, IL, University of Illinois Press, 2000 ISBN 0252068920
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External links

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