Pickett's Charge
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Image:Pickett's-Charge.png Pickett's Charge was a disastrous infantry assault ordered by Confederate General Robert E. Lee on July 3 1863, the last day of the Battle of Gettysburg. The charge was against Major General George G. Meade's Union positions on Cemetery Ridge. After Confederate attacks on both Union flanks had failed the day and night before, Lee determined to strike the Union center on the third day. On the night of July 2, General Meade correctly predicted at a council of war that Lee would try an attack on his lines in the center the following morning.
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Plans and command structures
The charge was planned for three Confederate divisions, commanded by Major Generals George Pickett, J. Johnston Pettigrew, and Isaac R. Trimble, consisting of troops from James Longstreet's First Corps and A.P. Hill's Third Corps. Pettigrew commanded brigades from Henry Heth's old division, under Col. Birkett D. Fry (Archer's Brigade), Col. James K. Marshall (Pettigrew's Brigade), Brig. Gen. Joseph R. Davis, and Col. John M. Brockenbrough. Trimble, commanding Dorsey Pender's division, had the brigades of Brig. Gens. Alfred M. Scales and James H. Lane. Two brigades from Richard H. Anderson's division (Hill's Corps) were to support the attack on the right flank: Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox and Col. David Lang (Terry's brigade).
The target of the Confederate assault was the center of the Union Army of the Potomac's II Corps under Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock. Directly in the center was the division of Maj. Gen. John Gibbon with the brigades of Brig. Gen. William Harrow, Col. Norman J. Hall, and Brig. Gen. Alexander S. Webb. To the north of this position were brigades from the division of Brig. Gen. Alexander Hays and to the south was Maj. Gen. Abner Doubleday's division of the I Corps, including the Vermont Brigade of Brig. Gen. George J. Stannard. General Meade's headquarters were just behind the II Corps line, in the small house owned by the widow Lydia Leister.
From the beginning of the planning, things went awry for the Confederates. While Pickett's division had not been used yet at Gettysburg, A.P. Hill's health became an issue and he did not participate in selecting which troops of his were to be used for the charge. Some of Hill's corps had fought lightly on July 1 and not at all on July 2. However, troops that had done heavy fighting on July 1 ended up making the charge.
Although the assault is known to popular history as Pickett's Charge, overall command was given to James Longstreet, and Pickett was one of his divisional commanders. Lee did tell Longstreet that Pickett's fresh division should lead the assault, so the name is appropriate, although some recent historians have used the name Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble Assault to more fairly distribute the credit (or blame). With Hill sidelined, Pettigrew's and Trimble's divisions were delegated to Longstreet's authority as well. Thus, General Pickett's name has been lent to a charge in which he commanded about one third of the men and was under the supervision of his corps commander throughout. Pickett's men were almost exclusively from Virginia, with the other divisions consisting of North Carolinians, Mississippians, Alabamans, and Tennesseeans. The supporting troops under Wilcox and Lang were from Alabama and Florida.
In conjunction with the infantry assault, Lee planned a cavalry action in the Union rear. J.E.B. Stuart led his cavalry division to the east, prepared to exploit Lee's hoped-for breakthrough by attacking the Union rear and disrupting its line of communications (and retreat), the Baltimore Pike.
Despite Lee's hope for an early start, it took all morning to arrange the infantry assault force. Meanwhile, on the far right end of the Union line, a seven-hour battle raged for the control of Culp's Hill. Lee's intent was to synchronize his offensives across the battlefield, keeping Meade from concentrating his numerically superior force, but the assaults were poorly coordinated and Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's attacks against Culp's Hill petered out just as Longstreet's cannonade began.
Artillery barrage
The infantry charge was preceded by what General Lee hoped would be a powerful and well-concentrated cannonade of the Union center, destroying the Union artillery batteries that could defeat the assault and demoralizing the Union infantry. But a combination of inept artillery leadership and defective equipment doomed the cannonade from the beginning. Longstreet's corps artillery chief, Colonel Edward Porter Alexander, was in effective command of the field; Lee's artillery chief, Maj. Gen. William N. Pendleton, played little role other than to obstruct the effective placement of artillery from the other two corps. Despite Alexander's efforts, then, there was insufficient concentration of Confederate fire on the objective.
The July 3 bombardment was likely the largest of the war, with hundreds of cannons from both sides firing along the lines for almost two hours, starting around 1 p.m. Confederate guns numbered over 170 and fired from a line over two miles long, starting in the south at the Peach Orchard and running roughly parallel to the Emmitsburg Road. But the fire was mostly ineffectual. Confederate shells often overshot the infantry front lines, and the smoke covering the battlefield concealed that fact from them. Union artillery chief Henry J. Hunt had only about 80 guns available to conduct counter-battery fire; the geographic features of the Union line had limited areas for effective gun emplacement. He also ordered cease fires to conserve ammunition and Alexander interpreted this to mean that many of the batteries had been destroyed. (Hunt had to resist the strong arguments of General Hancock, who demanded Union fire to lift the spirits of the infantrymen pinned down under Alexander's bombardment. Even Meade was affected by the artillery—the Leister house was a victim of frequent overshots and he had to evacuate with his staff to Powers Hill.)
The day was hot, 87 °F (31 °C) by one account and humid, and the Confederates suffered under the hot sun awaiting the order to advance. But they suffered from the Union counter-battery fire as well. When Union cannoneers overshot their targets, they often hit the massed infantry waiting in the woods of Seminary Ridge or in the shallow depressions just behind Alexander's guns, causing significant casualties before the charge began.
From the beginning, Longstreet opposed the charge, preferring his own plan for a strategic movement around the Union left flank. He told Lee that he didn't think there were "15,000 men on earth capable of taking that [the Union] position." Longstreet looked for ways to avoid ordering the charge by attempting to pass responsibility to young Col. Alexander, but he eventually did pass the order himself non-verbally; when Alexander notified Pickett that he was running dangerously short of ammunition, Longstreet nodded reluctantly to Pickett's request to step off. Unfortunately for Pickett, there would be virtually no Confederate artillery with ammunition available to support his assault directly.
Infantry assault
The entire force that charged against the Union positions consisted of about 12,500 men, marching deliberately in line with Pettigrew and Trimble on the left, and Pickett to the right. The nine brigades of men stretched over a mile-long front. The Confederates encountered heavy artillery fire while advancing across open fields nearly a mile to reach the Union line. The ground between Seminary Ridge and Cemetery Ridge is slightly undulating and the advancing troops periodically disappeared from the view of the Union cannoneers. But the Confederates were visible all too often. Murderous fire from Lt. Col. Freeman McGilvery's concealed artillery positions north of Little Round Top raked the Confederate right flank; fire from Cemetery Hill hit the left. Shell and solid shot in the beginning turned to canister and musket fire as the Confederates came within 400 yards of the Union line. The mile-long front shrank to less than half a mile as the men filled in gaps that appeared throughout the line and they followed their natural tendency to move away from the flanking fire.
On the left flank of the attack, Brockenbrough's brigade virtually evaporated, decimated by artillery fire from Cemetery Hill. Davis's brigade, now on the left flank of the charge, was then subjected to the direct attention of the artillery and to a surprise musket fusillade from the 8th Ohio Infantry regiment, which had moved out from its position on the Emmitsburg Road to envelop Davis's left.
Image:3698.jpgPickett's Virginians had been subjected to the least fire in the beginning of the charge and wheeled to their left toward a minor salient in the Union center. This position of the lines was marked by a low stone wall taking a short right-angle turn known afterwards as "The Angle." They marched in two lines, led by the brigades of James L. Kemper on the right and Richard B. Garnett on the left; Lewis A. Armistead's brigade followed closely behind. As the division wheeled to the left, its right flank was exposed to the front of Doubleday's Union division on Cemetery Ridge. Stannard's Vermont Brigade marched forward, faced north, and delivered withering fire into the rear of Kemper's brigade.
The Confederates partially breached the Union's first line of defense, but were forced back soon after as Union troops gathered on their right flank and stabilized the center of the line. The charge lasted less than an hour. The supporting attack by Wilcox and Lang on Pickett's right was never a factor; they did not approach the Union line until after Pickett was defeated, and their advance was quickly broken up by McGilvery's guns and by the Vermont Brigade.
Aftermath
Pickett's Charge was a bloodbath. While the Union lost about 1,500 killed and wounded, the Confederate casualty rate was over 50%. Pickett's three brigade commanders and all thirteen of his regimental commanders were casualties. Kemper was wounded and Garnett and Armistead did not survive. Garnett had a previous leg injury and rode his horse during the charge, despite knowing that conspicuously riding a horse into heavy enemy fire would mean certain death. Armistead is known for leading his brigade with his cap on the tip of his sword. His brigade made the farthest progress through the Union lines. Armistead was mortally wounded, falling near "The Angle" at what is now considered the High Water Mark of the Confederacy. Trimble and Pettigrew were the most senior casualties, the former losing a leg and the latter wounded in the hand and dying on the retreat to Virginia. Pickett himself has received some historical criticism for surviving the battle personally unscathed, but his position well to the rear of his troops was command doctrine at the time for division commanders.
Stuart's cavalry action in indirect support of the infantry assault was unsuccessful. He was met and stopped by Union cavalry about three miles to the east, in East Cavalry Field.
As soldiers straggled back to the Confederate lines along Seminary Ridge, Lee feared a Union counteroffensive and tried to rally his center, telling returning soldiers and Gen. Wilcox that the failure was "all my fault." General Pickett was inconsolable for the rest of the day and never forgave Lee for ordering the charge. When Lee told Pickett to rally his division for the defense, Pickett allegedly replied, "General Lee, I have no division."
The Union counteroffensive never came; the Army of the Potomac was exhausted and nearly as damaged as the Army of Northern Virginia. Meade was content to hold the field. On July 4, the armies observed an informal truce and collected their dead and wounded. Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant accepted the surrender of the Vicksburg garrison along the Mississippi River, splitting the Confederacy in two. These two Union victories are generally considered the turning point of the Civil War.
When asked, years afterward, why his charge at Gettysburg failed, General Pickett said: "I think the Yankees had something to do with it."
Controversies
A number of controversies color the study of Pickett's Charge:
- The origins of the name for the charge itself. Virginian newspapers praised Pickett's Virginia division as making the most progress during the charge and the papers used Pickett's "success" as a means of criticizing the actions of the other states' troops during the charge. Pickett's military career was never the same after the charge, and he was (unsurprisingly) displeased about having his name attached to the repulsed charge.
- The true objective of the assault. Traditionally, the copse of trees has been cited as the visual landmark for the attacking force. This view originated in the work of Gettysburg Battlefield historian John B. Bachelder in the 1880s. However, recent scholarship, including published works by some Gettysburg National Military Park rangers, has suggested that Lee's goal was actually Ziegler's Grove on Cemetery Hill, a more prominent and highly visible grouping of trees. The much debated theory suggests that Lee's general plan for the second-day attacks (the seizure of Cemetery Hill) had not changed on the third day, and the attacks on July 3 were also aimed at securing the hill and the network of roads it commanded. The copse of trees was under ten feet high in 1863, a minor landmark, only visible to a portion of the attacking columns from certain parts of the battlefield. History may never know the true story of Lee's intentions at Gettysburg. He never published memoirs and his after-action report from the battle was cursory. Most of the senior commanders of the charge itself were casualties and did not write reports. Pickett's report was apparently so bitter that Lee ordered him to destroy it and no copy has been found.
- The location of General Pickett during the charge. The fact that fifteen of his officers and all three of his brigadier generals were casualties while Pickett managed to escape unharmed led many to question his proximity to the fighting and, by implication, his personal courage. The 1993 movie Gettysburg depicts him observing on horseback from the Codori Farm at the Emmitsburg Road, but there is no historical evidence to confirm this. It was established doctrine in the Civil War that division commanders and above would "lead from the rear", while brigade and more junior officers were expected to lead from the front, and while this was often violated, there was nothing for Pickett to be ashamed about if he coordinated his forces from behind.
Battlefield today
The site of Pickett's Charge is one of the best-maintained portions of the Gettysburg Battlefield. Ironically, despite millions of annual visitors to Gettysburg National Military Park, very few have walked in the footsteps of Pickett's division. The National Park Service maintains a neat, mowed path alongside a fence that leads from the Virginia Monument on Confederate Boulevard (Seminary Ridge) due east to the Emmitsburg Road in the direction of the Copse of Trees. Pickett's division, however, started considerably south of that point, near the Spangler farm, and wheeled to the north after crossing the road. In fact, the Park Service pathway stands between the two main thrusts of Longstreet's assault, to the right of Trimble and considerably to the left of Pickett.
References
- Eicher, David J., The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War, Simon & Schuster, 2001, ISBN 0-684-84944-5.
- Harman, Troy D., Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg, Stackpole Books, 2003, ISBN 0811700542.
- Sears, Stephen W., Gettysburg, Houghton Mifflin, 2003, ISBN 0-395-86761-4.
- Wert, Jeffry D., Gettysburg: Day Three, Simon & Schuster, 2001, ISBN 0-684-85914-9.