Second Sino-Japanese War

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{{Infobox Military Conflict |conflict=Second Sino-Japanese War |image=Image:Japanese Occupation - Map.jpg |caption=Map showing the extent of Japanese control in 1940 |date=7 July 1937 - 9 September 1945 |place=China |casus=Marco Polo Bridge Incident |territory=Retrocession of Manchuria and Taiwan, loss of Outer Mongolia |result=Chinese Victory |combatant1=National Revolutionary Army, Republic of China
Image:Flag of the Republic of China.svg |combatant2=Imperial Japanese Army, Empire of Japan
Image:Flag of Japan.svg |commander1=Chiang Kai-shek, Yan Xishan, Feng Yuxiang, Zhu De, He Yingqin |commander2=Tojo Hideki, Matsui Iwane, Minami Jiro, Kesago Nakajima, Toshizo Nishio, Neiji Okamura. |strength1=5,600,000 (including Chinese Communist forces) |strength2=4,100,000 (including collaborators) |casualties1=3,200,000 military, 17,530,000 non-military |casualties2=1,100,000 military |}} Template:Campaignbox Second Sino-Japanese War The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) was a major war fought between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan, both before and during World War II. It ended with the surrender of Japan in 1945. The Japanese invasion was a strategic plan made by the Imperial Japanese Army as part of their large-scale plans to control the Asian mainland. The early manifestations of this plan were commonly known as "China Incidents", and according to Japanese propaganda of the time were referred to as "incidents" supposedly provoked by China, in order to downplay Japan's illegality in these invasions. The 1931 invasion of Manchuria by Japan is referred to as the Mukden Incident. The last of these was the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937, marking the official beginning of full scale war between the two countries. From 1937 to 1941, China fought alone. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Second Sino-Japanese War merged into the greater conflict of World War II.

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Nomenclature

In Chinese, the war is most commonly known as the War of Resistance Against Japan (Template:Zh-tsp), but also known Eight Years' War of Resistance (八年抗戰), or simply War of Resistance (抗戰).

In Japan, the name Japan-China War (日中戦争, Nicchū Sensō) is most commonly used due to its neutrality. When the battle began in July 1937 near Beijing, government of Japan used North China Incident (北支事變{事変 in Shinjitai}, Hokushi Jihen), and with the outbreak of large-scale battle around Shanghai next month, it was changed to China Incident 支那事變, [Shina Jihen].

The word "事変 incident" was chosen as both countries did not declare war each other. Japan wanted to avoid intervention by other countries like the U.S. and Britain, and China wanted to avoid a possible embargo by the US, which Roosevelt would have to impose due to the Neutrality Acts. When both sides formally declared war in December 1941, the name was replaced by Great East Asian War (大東亜戦争, Daitōa Sensō).

Although Japanese government still uses "Shina Incident" in formal documents, because the word Shina is considered a derogatory word, media in Japan often paraphrase with other expressions like The Japan-China Incident (日華事變 [Nikka Jihen], 日支事變 [Nisshi Jihen].

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Invasion of China

Image:Zangjiesi-declare.jpg Most historians place the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War on the Battle of Lugou Bridge (Marco Polo Bridge Incident) on July 7, 1937. Some Chinese historians, however place the starting point at the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931. Following the Mukden Incident, the Japanese Guandong Army occupied Manchuria and established the puppet state of Manchukuo in February 1932. Japan pressured China into recognising the independence of Manchukuo.

Image:Sihang defenders.jpg Following the Battle of Lugou Bridge in 1937, the Japanese occupied Shanghai, Nanjing and Southern Shanxi as part of campaigns involving approximately 200,000 Japanese soldiers, and considerably more Chinese soldiers. Chinese historians estimate as many as 300,000 people perished in the Nanjing Massacre, after the fall of Nanjing.

The Marco Polo Bridge Incident not only marked the beginning of an open, undeclared, war between China and Japan, but also hastened the formation of the second Kuomintang-Communist Party of China (CCP) United Front. The collaboration took place with salutary effects for the beleaguered CCP. The distrust between the two antagonists was scarcely veiled. Their alliance was forged literally at gun point when Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped in the Xi'an incident and forced to ally with the CCP. The uneasy alliance began breaking down by late 1938, despite Japan's steady territorial gains in northern China, the coastal regions, and the rich Yangtze River Valley in central China. After 1940, conflict between the Nationalists and Communists became more frequent in the areas outside Japanese control. The Communists expanded their influence wherever opportunities were presented, through mass organizations, administrative reforms, land and tax reform measures favoring peasants -- and the Nationalists attempted to neutralize the spread of Communist influence.

The Japanese had neither the intention nor the capability of directly administering China. Their goal was to set up friendly puppet governments favorable to Japanese interests. However, the atrocities of the Japanese army made the governments that were set up very unpopular. In addition, the Japanese refused to negotiate with the Kuomintang or the Communist Party of China, which could have brought them popularity. The Japanese then forced the Chinese people to change their money into military banknotes. The Japanese government still refuses to exchange these military banknotes today.

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Chinese strategy

Image:Chinese soldiers 1939.jpg

Unlike Japan, China was unprepared for total war and had little military industrial strength, few mechanized divisions, and virtually no armor support. Up until the mid-1930s China had hoped that the League of Nations would provide countermeasures to Japan's aggression. In addition, the Kuomintang government was mired in a civil war against the Communists. Chiang famously quoted: "the Japanese are a disease of skin, the Communists are a disease of the heart". Though the communists formed the New Fourth Army and the 8th Route Army which were nominally under the command of the National Revolutionary Army, the United Front was never truly unified, as each side was preparing for a showdown with the other once the Japanese were driven out. All these disadvantages forced China to adopt a strategy whose first goal was to preserve its army strength, whereas a full frontal assault on the enemy would often prove to be suicidal. Also, pockets of resistance were to be continued in occupied areas to pester the enemy and make their administration over the vast lands of China difficult. As a result the Japanese really only controlled the cities and railroads, while the countrysides were almost always hotbeds of partisan activity.

However, Chiang realized that in order to win the support from the United States or other foreign nations, China must prove that it was indeed capable of fighting. A fast retreat would discourage foreign aid so Chiang decided to make the Battle of Shanghai his grand stage. Chiang sent his elite German-trained army to defend China's largest and most industrialized city from the Japanese. The battle saw heavy casualties on both sides and ended with a Chinese retreat. While the battle was a military defeat for the Chinese, it proved that China was not willing to be defeated and showcased the Chinese determination to the world. The battle lasted over three months and proved to be an enormous morale booster as it ended the Japanese taunt of conquering Shanghai in three days and China in three months.

While this direct army to army fighting lasted during the early phases of the war, large numbers of Chinese defeats compared to few victories eventually led to the strategy of stalling the war. Large areas of China were conquered during the early stages of the war but the Japanese advancements began to stall. The Chinese strategy at this point was to prolong the war until it had sufficient foreign aid to defeat the Japanese. Chinese troops engaged in a practice of scorched earth in an attempt to slow down the Japanese. Dams and levees were sabotaged which led to the 1938 Huang He flood. By 1940, the war had reached a stalemate with both sides making minimal gains. The Chinese had successfully defended their land from oncoming Japanese on several occasions while strong resistance in areas occupied by the Japanese made a victory seem impossible to the Japanese. This frustrated the Japanese and led them to employ the "Three Alls Policy" (kill all, loot all, burn all) (三光政策, Hanyu Pinyin: Sānguāng Zhèngcè, Japanese On: Sankō Seisaku). It was during this time period that a bulk of Japanese atrocities were committed.

Image:Taierzhuang.jpg

In 1941, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor which brought the United States into the war. China officially declared war on Japan on 8 December. It refused to declare war earlier because receiving military aid while officially at war would break the neutrality of the donor nation. At this point, the strategy changed from survival to minimizing warfare. Chiang realized that the Americans would do a bulk of the fighting and were better equipped to fight the Japanese so he decided to curtail the activities of his army and focus on the potential civil war after the war. By 1945, it was obvious that the Japanese would soon be defeated so small advances were made by the Chinese army.

The basis of Chinese strategy during the war, which can be divided into three periods:

First Period: 7 July 1937 (Battle of Lugou Bridge) - 25 October 1938 (Fall of Hankou).
- In this period, one key concept is the trading of "space for time" (Chinese: 以空間換取時間). The Chinese army would put up token fights to delay Japanese advance to northeastern cities, to allow the home front, along with its professionals and key industries, to retreat further west into Chongqing to build up military strength.
Second Period: 25 October 1938 (Fall of Hankou) - July, 1944
- During the second period, the Chinese army adopted the concept of "magnetic warfare" to attract advancing Japanese troops to definite points where they were subjected to ambush, flanking attacks, and encirclements in major engagements. The most prominent example of this tactic is the successful defense of Changsha numerous times.
Third Period: July 1944 - 15 August 1945
- This period employs general full frontal counter-offensive.

The three periods are each divided into finer phases.

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Number of troops involved

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National Revolutionary Army

Main article: National Revolutionary Army

Image:ROC Army.gif

The NRA had approximately 4,300,000 regulars, in 370 Standard Divisions (正式師), 46 New Divisions (新編師), 12 Cavalry Divisions (騎兵師), 8 New Cavalry Divisions (新編騎兵師), 66 Temporary Divisions (暫編師), and 13 Reserve Divisions (預備師), for a grand total of 515 divisions. However, many divisions were formed from 2 or more other divisions, and were not active at the same time. Therefore the number of divisions in active service at any given time is much smaller than this. The average NRA division had 8,000-9,000 troops.

Main article: Chinese Red Army

Although during the war the Chinese Communist forces fought as a nominal part of the NRA, the number of those on the CCP side, due to their guerrilla status, is difficult to say, though estimates place the total number of the Eighth Route Army, New Fourth Army, and irregulars in the Communist armies at 1,300,000.

For more information of combat effectiveness of communist armies and other units of Chinese forces see Chinese armies in the Second Sino-Japanese War.

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Japanese side

Image:Japanese-War-Ensign.svg

The IJA had 2,000,000 regulars. More Japanese troops were quagmired in China than deployed anywhere else in the Pacific Theater, during the war.
The Collaborationist Chinese Army (zh:僞軍) formed approximate 2,100,000, the only collaborationist army in World War II which outnumbered the invading army. Almost all of them belonged to the regional puppet governments such as Manchukuo and collaborationist political leaders such as Wang Jingwei. The collaborationists were mainly assigned to garrison and logistics duties in areas held by the puppet governments and in occupied territories. They were rarely fielded in combat because of low morale and distrust by the Japanese, and fared poorly in skirmishes against real Chinese forces, whether the KMT or the CCP.

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Chinese and Japanese equipment

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The National Revolutionary Army

The National Revolutionary Army possessed 80 Army infantry divisions with approximately 8,000 men each, nine independent brigades, nine cavalry divisions, two artillery brigades, 16 artillery regiments and one or two armored divisions. The Chinese Navy displaced only 59,000 tonnes and the Chinese Air Force comprised only 600 aircraft.

Chinese weapons were mainly produced in the Hanyang and Guangdong arsenals. However, for most of the German-trained divisions, the standard firearms were German-made 7.92 mm Gewehr 98 and Karabiner 98k. The 98 style rifles were often called the "Chiang Kai-shek" rifles. The standard light machine gun was a local copy of the Czech 7.92 mm Brno ZB26. There were also Belgian and French LMGs. Surprisingly, the NRA did not purchase any of the infamous Maschinengewehr 34s from Germany, but did produce their own copies of them. On average in these divisions, there was 1 machine gun set for each platoon. Heavy machine guns were mainly locally-made 1924 water-cooled Maxim guns, from German blueprints. On average every battalion would get one heavy machine gun (about half of what actual German divisions got during the war). The standard sidearm was the 7.63 mm Mauser M1932 semi-automatic pistol, also known as C96.

Some divisions were equipped with 37mm PaK 35/36 anti-tank guns, and/or mortars from Oerlikon, Madsen, and Solothurn. Each infantry division had 6 French Brandt 81 mm mortars and 6 Solothurn 20mm autocannons. Some independent brigades and artillery regiments were equipped with Bofors 72mm L/14, or Krupp 72mm L/29 mountain guns. They were 24 Rheinmetall 150mm L/32 sFH 18 howitzers (bought in 1934) and 24 Rheinmetall 150mm L/30 sFH 18 howitzers (bought in 1936).

Infantry uniforms were basically redesigned Zhongshan suits. Leg wrappings are standard for soldiers and officers alike since the primary mode of movement for NRA troops was by foot. The helmets were the most distinguishing characteristic of these divisions. From the moment German M35 helmets (standard issue for the Wehrmacht until late in the European theatre) rolled off the production lines in 1935, and until 1936, the NRA imported 315,000 of these helmets, each with the 12-ray sun emblem of the ROC on the sides. Other equipment included cloth shoes for soldiers, leather shoes for officers and leather boots for high-ranking officers. Every soldier is issued ammunition, ammunition pouch/harness, a water flask, combat knives, food bag, and a gas mask.

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The Imperial Japanese Army

Although Imperial Japan possessed significant mobile operational capacity it did not possess capability for maintaining a long sustained war. At the beginning of the Chinese-Japanese War the Japanese Army comprised 17 divisions, each composed of approximately 22,000 men, 5,800 horses, 9,500 rifles and submachine guns, 600 heavy machine guns of assorted types, 108 artillery pieces, and 24 tanks. Special forces were also available. The Japanese Navy displaced a total of 1,900,000 tonnes, ranking third in the world, and possessed 2,700 aircraft at the time. Each Japanese division was the equivalent in fighting strength of four Chinese regular divisions (at the beginning of Battle of Shanghai (1937)).

Stalemate and foreign aid

By 1940, the fighting had reached a stalemate. While Japan held most of the eastern coastal areas of China, guerrilla fighting continued in the conquered areas. The Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek struggled on from a provisional capital at the city of Chongqing; however, realizing that he also faced a threat from communist forces of Mao Zedong, he mostly tried to preserve the remaining strength of his army and avoid heavy battle with the Japanese in the hopes of defeating the Communists once the Japanese left. China, with its low industrial capacities and limited experience in modern warfare, could not launch any decisive counter-offensive against Japan. Chiang could not risk an all-out campaign given the poorly-trained, under-equipped, and disorganized state of his armies and opposition to his leadership both within Kuomintang and in China at large. He had lost a substantial portion of his best trained and equipped army defending Shanghai and the remaining troops were used to preserve his army. On the other hand, Japan had suffered tremendous casualties from unexpectedly stubborn resistance from China and already developed problems in administering and garrisoning fallen territories. Neither side could make any swift progress in a manner resembling the fall of France and Western Europe to Nazi Germany.

Most military analysts predicted that the Kuomintang could not continue fighting with most of the war factories located in the prosperous areas under or near Japanese control. Other global powers were reluctant to provide any support — unless supporting an ulterior motive — because in their opinion the Chinese would eventually lose the war, and did not wish to antagonize the Japanese who might, in turn, eye their colonial possessions in the region. They expected any support given to Kuomintang might worsen their own relationship with the Japanese, who taunted the Kuomintang with the prospect of conquest within 3 months.

Germany and the Soviet Union did provide support to the Chinese before the war escalated to the Asian theatre of World War II. The Soviet Union was exploiting the Kuomintang government to hinder the Japanese from invading Siberia, thus saving itself from a two front war. Furthermore, the Soviets expected any major conflict between the Japanese and the Chinese to hamper any Kuomintang effort to remove the Communist Party of China (CCP) opposition or, in the best case, hoped to install a Comintern ally surreptitiously after the dwindling of Kuomintang authority. In September 1937 the Soviet leadership approved Operation Zet. As part of the secret operation Soviet technicians upgraded and handled some of the Chinese war-supply transport. Bombers, fighters, military supplies and advisors arrived, including future Soviet war hero Georgy Zhukov, who won the Battle of Halhin Gol. It also supported the Communists, at least until war with Germany forced her into conserving everything for her own forces.

Because of Chiang Kai-shek's anti-communist nationalist policies and hopes of defeating the CCP, Germany provided the largest proportion of Kuomintang arms imports. German military advisors modernized and trained the Kuomintang armies; Kuomintang officers (including Chiang's second son, Chiang Wei-kuo) were educated in and served in the German army prior to World War II. More than half of the German arms exports during its rearmament period were to China. Nevertheless the proposed 30 new divisions equipped with all German arms did not materialize as the Germans sided with the Japanese later in World War II.

Other prominent powers, including the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and France, only officially assisted in war supply contracts up to the attack on Pearl Harbor in late 1941, when a major influx of trained military personnel and supplies significantly boosted the Kuomintang chance of maintaining the fight.

Unofficially, public opinion in the United States was becoming favorable to the Kuomintang. At the start of the 1930s, public opinion in the United States had tended to support the Japanese. However, reports of Japanese brutality added to Japanese actions such as the attack on the U.S.S. Panay swung public opinion sharply against Japan. By the summer of 1941, the United States had begun to sponsor the American Volunteer Group (later known as the Flying Tigers) to boost Chinese air defenses, though the AVG did not in fact go into combat until after the U.S. and Japan were at war. In addition, the United States began an oil and steel embargo which made it impossible for Japan to continue operations in China without another source of oil from Southeast Asia. This set the stage for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 (8 December west of the 180th meridian).

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The Pacific War

Within a few days of the attack on Pearl Harbor, both the United States and China officially declared war against Japan. Chiang Kai-shek then received great quantities of supplies from the United States, as the Chinese conflict was merged into the Asian theatre of World War II. Chiang was appointed Allied Commander-in-Chief in the China theater in 1942. General Joseph Stilwell served for a time as Chiang's chief of staff, while commanding US forces in the China Burma India Theater.

However, relations between Stilwell and Chiang soon broke down, due largely to the corruption and inefficiency of the Chinese government. Despite massive amounts of American lend-lease aid (over US$5 billion from 1941 through 1945), the Nationalist Chinese Army frequently avoided major engagements with the Japanese and was seen as preferring to stockpile material for a later struggle with the communists. Stilwell criticised the Chinese government's conduct of the war in the American media, and to President Franklin Roosevelt. Chiang was hesitant to deploy more Chinese troops because China already suffered tens of millions of war casualties, and believed that Japan would eventually capitulate to America's overwhelming industrial output and manpower. The Allies thus lost confidence in the Chinese ability to conduct offensive operations from the Asian mainland, and instead concentrated their efforts against the Japanese in the Pacific Ocean Areas and South West Pacific Area, employing an island hopping strategy.

Chiang and his associates also distrusted the intentions of the United Kingdom and Stilwell. Winston Churchill's "Europe First" policy obviously did not sit well with Chiang. Furthermore, the British insistence that China devote more and more troops into Indochina in the Burma Campaign, was regarded as an attempt by Great Britain to use Chinese manpower to secure Britain's foothold in India from Japan. Chiang voiced his support of Indian Independence in a meeting with Mahatma Gandhi in 1942, which further soured the relationship between China and the United Kingdom.

The United States saw the Chinese theater as a means to tie up a large number of Japanese troops, as well as being a possible location for American airbases. In 1944, as the Japanese position in the Pacific was deteriorating fast, they launched Operation Ichigo to attack the airbases which had begun to operate. This brought the Hunan, Henan, and Guangxi provinces under Japanese administration.

Nevertheless the Japanese prospect of transferring their troops to fight the Americans was in vain and they only committed the Guandong Army from Manchuria in their "Sho plan", which later facilitated the Soviet advancement after the Soviet war declaration on August 8 1945.

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Casualties assessment

Image:Nanjing1937 BabyOnTracks.jpeg The conflict lasted for 97 months and 3 days (measured from 1937 to 1945).

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Chinese Casualties

The Kuomintang fought in 22 major engagements, most of which involved more than 100,000 troops on both sides, 1,171 minor engagements most of which involved more than 50,000 troops on both sides, and 38,931 skirmishes.
The CCP mostly fought guerilla attacks in rural area in North China. It would later give them credence to win them support in the Chinese Civil War.
The Chinese lost approximately 3.22 million soldiers. 9.13 million civilians died in the crossfire, and another 8.4 million as non-military casualties. Some Chinese historians claimed the total military and non-military deaths of the Chinese were at most 35 millions. Most Western historians believed that the casualties were at least 20 million.
Property loss of the Chinese valued up to 383,301.3 million US dollars according to the currency exchange rate in July 1937, roughly 50 times of the GDP of Japan at that time (7,700 million US dollars). Template:Fact
In addition, the war created ninety-five million refugees.

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Japanese Casualties

The Japanese recorded around 1.1 million military casualties, killed, wounded and missing. There were a lot of various claims about the Japanese casaulties. The official death-toll according to the Japan defense ministry was only about 200 thousand. But this is believed to be highly unlikely small. The Chinese (both the communists and nationalists) claimed to have at most killed 1.77 million of Japanese soldiers during the 8-year-war but it would be an exaggeration. 0.5 million deaths was the most trustable one comparatively.

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Aftermath

Image:Japanesesurrenderoilpainting.jpg As of mid 1945, all sides expected the war to continue for at least another year. However it was suddenly ended after the dropping of the two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan capitulated to the allies on August 14, 1945. The Japanese troops in China formally surrendered on September 9, 1945 and by the provisions of the Cairo Conference of 1943 the lands of Manchuria, Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands reverted to China. However, the Ryukyu islands were maintained as Japanese territory.

Image:Liuchow 1945.jpg

In 1945 China emerged from the war nominally a great military power but actually a nation economically prostrate and on the verge of all-out civil war. The economy deteriorated, sapped by the military demands of foreign war and internal strife, by spiraling inflation, and by Nationalist profiteering, speculation, and hoarding. Starvation came in the wake of the war, and millions were rendered homeless by floods and the unsettled conditions in many parts of the country. The situation was further complicated by an Allied agreement at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 that brought Soviet troops into Manchuria to hasten the termination of war against Japan (Operation August Storm). Although the Chinese had not been present at Yalta, they had been consulted; they had agreed to have the Soviets enter the war in the belief that the Soviet Union would deal only with the Nationalist government. After the war, the Soviet Union, as part of the Yalta agreement's allowing a Soviet sphere of influence in Manchuria, dismantled and removed more than half the industrial equipment left there by the Japanese. The Soviet presence in northeast China enabled the Communists to move in long enough to arm themselves with the equipment surrendered by the withdrawing Japanese army. The problems of rehabilitating the formerly Japanese-occupied areas and of reconstructing the nation from the ravages of a protracted war were staggering, to say the least. Image:Japansurrenderpapers.jpg The war left the Nationalists severely weakened and their policies left them unpopular. Meanwhile the war strengthened the Communists, both in popularity and as a viable fighting force. At Yan'an and elsewhere in the "liberated areas," Mao was able to adapt Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions. He taught party cadres to lead the masses by living and working with them, eating their food, and thinking their thoughts. When this failed, however, more repressive forms of coercion, indoctrination and ostracization were also employed. The Red Army fostered an image of conducting guerrilla warfare in defense of the people. In addition, the CCP was effectively split into "Red" (cadres working in the "liberated" areas) and "White" (cadres working underground in enemy-occupied territory) spheres, a split that would later sow future factionalism within the CCP. Communist troops adapted to changing wartime conditions and became a seasoned fighting force. Mao also began preparing for the establishment of a new China, well away from the front at his base in Yan'an. In 1940 he outlined the program of the Chinese Communists for an eventual seizure of power and began his final push for consolidation of CCP power under his authority. His teachings became the central tenets of the CCP doctrine that came to be formalized as "Mao Zedong Thought". With skillful organizational and propaganda work, the Communists increased party membership from 100,000 in 1937 to 1.2 million by 1945. Soon, all out war broke out between the KMT and CPC, a war that would leave the Nationalists banished to Taiwan and the Communists victorious on the mainland.

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Legacy

Image:AntijapaneseWarMemorialMuseum.jpg To this day the war is a major point of contention between China and Japan. The war remains a major roadblock for Sino-Japanese relations today, and many people, particularly in China, harbour grudges over the war and related issues. A small but vocal group of Japanese nationalists and/or right-wingers deny a variety of crimes attributed to Japan. The Japanese invasion of its neighbours is often glorified or whitewashed, and wartime atrocities, most notably the Nanjing Massacre, comfort women, and Unit 731, are frequently denied by such individuals. The Japanese government has also been accused of historical revisionism by allowing the approval of school textbooks omitting or glossing over Japan's militant past. In response to criticism of Japanese textbook revisionism, the PRC government has been accused of using the war to stir up already growing anti-Japanese feelings in order to whip up nationalistic sentiments and divert its citizens' minds from internal matters.

The PRC government has also been accused of greatly exaggerating the CCP's role in fighting the Japanese. One such notable critic is KMT General Hau Pei-tsun, who refused to attend a joint celebration in China marking the sixtieth anniversary of the end of war in 2005, claiming that the PRC continues to distort history. In the PRC, citizens are frequently reminded of the exploits of the heroes of the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance.

The legacy of the war is more complicated in the ROC. Traditionally, the government has held celebrations marking the Victory Day on September 9 (now known as Armed Forces Day), and Taiwan's Retrocession Day on October 25. However, with the power transfer from KMT to the more pro-Taiwanese independence pan-green coalition and the rise of desinicization, events commemorating the war have become less commonplace. Many supporters of Taiwanese independence see no relevance in preserving the memory of the war of resistance that happened primarily on mainland China. Still, commemorations are held in regions where politics is dominated by the pan-blue coalition. Many pan-blue supporters, particularly veterans who retreated with the government in 1949, still have an emotional interest in the war. For example, in celebrating the sixtieth anniversary of the end of war in 2005, the cultural bureau of pan-blue stronghold Taipei held a series of talks in the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall regarding the war and post-war developments, while the KMT held its own exhibit in the KMT headquarters.

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Who fought the War of Resistance?

The question as to which political group directed the Chinese war effort and exerted most of the effort to resist the Japanese still remains a controversial issue.

In the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War of Resistance Memorial near the Marco Polo Bridge and in mainland Chinese textbooks, the People's Republic of China claims that it was the Communist Party that directed Chinese efforts in the war and did everything to resist the Japanese invasion. Recently, however, with a change in the political climate, the CCP has admitted that certain Nationalist generals made important contributions in resisting the Japanese. The official history in mainland China is that the KMT fought a bloody, yet indecisive, frontal war against Japan, while it was the CCP that engaged the Japanese forces in far greater numbers behind enemy lines. This emphasis on the CCP's central role is partially reflected by the PRC's labeling of the war as the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War of Resistance rather than merely the War of Resistance. According to the PRC official point of view, the Nationalists mostly avoided fighting the Japanese in order to preserve its strength for a final showdown with the Communists. However, for the sake of Chinese reunification and appeasing the ROC on Taiwan, the PRC has now "acknowledged" that the Nationalists and the Communists were "equal" contributors because the victory over Japan belonged to the Chinese people, rather than to any political party.

Leaving aside Nationalists sources, scholars researching third party Japanese and Soviet sources have documented quite a different view. Such studies claim that the Communists actually played a miniscule involvement in the war against the Japanese compared to the Nationalists and used guerilla warfare as well as opium sales to preserve its strength for a final showdown with the KuomintangTemplate:Ref. This is congruent with the Nationalist viewpoint, as demonstrated by history textbooks published in Taiwan, which gives the KMT credit for the brunt of the fighting. According to these third-party scholars, the Communists were not the main participants in any of the 22 major battles, most involving more than 100,000 troops on both sides, between China and Japan. Soviet liaison to the Chinese Communists Peter Vladimirov documented that he never once found the Chinese Communists and Japanese engaged in battle during the period from 1942 to 1945. He also expressed frustration at not being allowed by the Chinese Communists to visit the frontlineTemplate:Ref, although as a foreign diplomat Vladimirov may have been overly optimistic to expect to be allowed to join Chinese guerrilla sorties. The Communists usually avoided open warfare (the Hundred Regiments Campaign and the Battle of Pingxingguan are notable exceptions), preferring to fight in small squads to harass the Japanese supply lines. In comparison, right from the beginning of the war the Nationalists committed their best troops (including the 36th, 83rd, 88th divisions, the crack divisions of Chiang's Central Army) to defend Shanghai from the Japanese, a third of whom were killed or wounded. The Japanese considered the Kuomintang rather than the Communists as their main enemyTemplate:Ref and bombed the Nationalist wartime capital of Chongqing to the point that it was the most heavily bombed city in the world to dateTemplate:Ref. Also, the main bulk of Japanese forces were fighting mainly in Central and Southern China, away from major Communist strongholds such as those in Shaanxi.

A third perspective advocated by some historians is that the former warlords actually did most of the fighting with the Japanese, considering that a large part the National Revolutionary Army was actually composed of troops from different factions. Chiang Kai-shek's Central Army sustained heavy casualties in the beginning of the war in Shanghai-Nanjing campaigns and his military strengh was never to recover to pre-war levels. This situation forced Chiang to rely on other divisions of the National Revolutionary Army. These non-Whampoa divisions, also known as the "provincial army," were nominally part of the National Revolutionary Army but in reality had their own command structures. Some major engagements after the initial 1937 campaigns, such as Battle of Xuzhou and the Battle of Changsha were fought by former warlords under the banner of the Kuomintang.

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References

Chang, Flora and Ming, Chu-cheng. (July 12, 2005). Rewriters of history ignore truth. Taipei Times, pg. 8.
Gordon, David M. "The China-Japan War, 1931-1945" Journal of Military History (Jan 2006) v 70#1, pp 137-82. Historiographical overview of major books
Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (London, 2005); Jonathan Cape, ISBN 0679422714

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Major figures

China: Nationalist

Bai Chongxi (白崇禧)
Chen Cheng (陳誠,陈诚)
Chiang Kai-Shek (蔣介石,蒋介石)
Du Yuming (杜聿明)
Fang Xianjue (方先覺,方先觉)
Feng Yuxiang (馮玉祥,冯玉祥)
Gu Zhutong (顧祝同,顾祝同)
He Yingqin (何應欽,何应钦)
H. H. Kung (孔祥熙)
Hu Zongnan (胡宗南)
Li Zongren (李宗仁)
Long Yun (龍雲,龙云)
Song Zheyuan (宋哲元)
Soong May-ling (宋美齡,宋美龄)
T. V. Soong (宋子文)
Sun Lianzhong (孫連仲,孙连仲)
Sun Liren (孫立人,孙立人)
Tang Enbai (湯恩伯,汤恩伯)
Tang Shengzhi (唐生智)
Wang Jingwei (汪精衛,汪精卫)
Wei Lihuang (衛立煌,卫立煌)
Xue Yue (薛岳)
Yan Xishan (閻錫山,阎锡山)
Xie Jinyuan (謝晉元,谢晋元)
Ye Ting (叶挺)
Zhang Zhizhong (張治中,张治中)
Zhang Zizhong (張自忠,张自忠)

China: Communist

Chen Yi (陳毅,陈毅)
Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平,邓小平)
He Long (賀龍,贺龙)
Lin Biao (林彪)
Liu Bocheng (劉伯承,刘伯承)
Liu Shaoqi (劉少奇,刘少奇)
Luo Ronghuan (羅榮桓,罗荣桓)
Mao Zedong (毛澤東,毛泽东)
Nie Rongzhen (聶榮臻,聂荣臻)
Peng Dehuai (彭德懷,彭德怀)
Su Yu (粟裕)
Xu Xiangqian (徐向前)
Ye Jianying (葉劍英,叶剑英)
Zhang Aiping (张爱萍)
Zhou Enlai (周恩來,周恩来)
Zhu De (朱德)

Japan

Anami Korechika (阿南惟幾)
Abe Nobuyuki (阿部信行)
Doihara Kenji (土肥原賢二)
Fumimaro Konoe (Kyūjitai:近衞文麿,Shinjitai:近衛文麿)
Kanji Ishiwara (石原莞爾)
Koiso Kuniaki (小磯國昭,小磯国昭)
Hata Shunroku (畑俊六)
Honma Masaharu (本間雅晴)
Isogai Rensuke (磯谷廉介)
Itagaki Seishiro (板垣征四郎)
Matsui Iwane (松井石根)
Mutaguchi Renya (牟田口廉也）
Nakajima Kesago (中島今朝吾)
Nagumo Chuichi (南雲忠一)
Nishio Toshizo (西尾壽造,西尾寿造)
Nomura Kichisaburo (野村吉三郎)
Okamura Yasuji (岡村寧次)
Umezu Yoshijiro (梅津美治郎)
Sakai Takashi (酒井隆)
Sugiyama Hajime (杉山元)
Suzuki Kantaro (鈴木貫太郎)
Terauchi Hisaichi (寺内壽一,寺内寿一)
Tojo Hideki (東條英機,東条英機)
Yamaguchi Tamon (山口多聞)
Yamamoto Isoroku (山本五十六)
Yamashita Tomoyuki (山下奉文)
Kingoro Hashimoto (橋本欣五郎)

Others

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Military engagements

Aerial Engagements of the Second Sino-Japanese War

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Campaigns

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Battles

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Battles in Burmese Campaign

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Attacks on civilians

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Footnotes

Template:Note Chang and Ming, July 12, 2005, pg. 8; and Chang and Halliday, pg. 233, 246, 286-287
Template:Note Chang and Ming, July 12, 2005
Template:Note Chang and Halliday, pg. 231
Template:Note Chang and Halliday, pg. 232

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