Iraq and weapons of mass destruction
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Iraq and weapons of mass destruction concerns the Iraqi government's use, possession, and alleged intention of acquiring more types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) during the reign of Saddam Hussein.
International responsibility
Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction program was actively assisted by a wide variety of firms and governments. Below is listed what each nation directly contributed to the development of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons in the late 1970s and 1980s. Note that national government and private firms are not always distinguished. (Sources: [1], [2], [3], [4], [5])
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Germany
By far Germany had the largest role in Iraq’s WMD program. As part of Project 922, German firms such as Karl Kobe helped build Iraqi Chemical weapons facilities such as laboratories, bunkers, an administrative building, and first production buildings in the early 1980s under the cover of a pesticide plant. Other German firms sent 1,027 tons of precursors of Mustard, Sarin, Tabun, and Tear gasses in all. This work allowed Iraq to produce 150 tons of mustard agent and 60 tons of Tabun in 1983 and 1984 respectively, continuing throughout the decade. About 52% of Iraq’s international chemical weapon equipment was of German origin. Chemical weapons were used extensively against Iran by Iraq.
Five other German firms supplied equipment to manfacture botulin toxin and mycotoxin for germ warfare.
In 1988 German engineers presented centrifuge data that would help Iraq expand its nuclear weapons program. Laboratory equipment and other crucial information was provided, involving many German engineers.
France
France built Iraq’s Nuclear Osirak reactor in the late 1970s, but it was destroyed by Israeli jets in 1981. Later, a French company built a turnkey factory which helped make nuclear fuel.
France also provided glass-lined reactors, tanks, vessels, and columns used for the production of chemical weapons. Around 21% of Iraq’s international chemical weapon equipment was French. Strains of dual use biological material helped advance Iraq’s biological warfare program.
Switzerland
Swiss companies attempted to aid in Iraq’s nuclear weapons development in the form of specialized presses, milling machines, grinding machines, electrical discharge machines, and equipment for processing uranium to nuclear weapon grade.
Italy
Italy gave Iraq plutonium extraction facilities that advanced Iraq’s nuclear weapon program. 75,000 shells and rockets designed for chemical weapon use came from Italy. Between 1979 and 1982 Italy gave depleted, natural, and low-enriched uranium.
Brazil
Brazil secretly aided the Iraqi nuclear weapon program. Supplied natural uranium dioxide between 1981 and 1982 without notifying the IAEA. About 100 tons of Mustard gas came from Brazil.
United States
The U.S. exported $500 million of dual use exports to Iraq that were approved by the Commerce department. Among them were advanced computers, some of which were used in Iraq’s nuclear program, and strains of anthrax and botulinum which helped Iraq’s biological warfare capabilities in the late 1980s.
Despite being a minority supplier to Iraq, the U.S. often is the target for most of the blame.
United Kingdom
The U.K. sent advanced tools and computers to Iraq, some of which were used in Iraq’s nuclear program.
Austria
An Austrian company gave Iraq calutrons for enriching uranium. The nation also provided heat exchangers, tanks, condensers, and columns for the Iraqi chemical weapons infrastructure, 16% of the international sales.
Singapore
Singapore gave 4,515 tons of precursors for VX, sarin, tabun, and mustard gasses to Iraq.
Netherlands
The Dutch gave 4,261 tons of precursors for sarin, tabun, mustard, and tear gasses to Iraq.
Egypt
Egypt gave 2,400 tons of tabun and sarin precursors to Iraq and 28,500 tons of weapons designed for carrying chemical munitions.
India
India gave 2,343 tons of precursors to VX, tabun, Sarin, and mustard gasses.
Luxembourg
Luxembourg gave Iraq 650 tons of mustard gas precursors.
Spain
Spain gave Iraq 57,500 munitions designed for carrying chemical weapons. In addition, they provided reactors, condensers, columns and tanks for Iraq’s chemical warfare program, 4.4% of the international sales.
China
China provided 45,000 munitions designed for chemical warfare.
Portugal
Portugal provided yellowcake between 1980 and 1982.
Niger
Niger also provided yellowcake in 1981.
Documented uses of WMD
The first documented use of WMD's in Iraq was in the early 1920s. The British government ordered chemical bombardment of "recalcitrant" Shia villages. This took place before the 1925 Geneva Protocol, banning chemical and biological weapons.
In 1980 the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency filed a report asserting that Iraq had been actively acquiring chemical weapons capacities for several years. [Subsequent events proved that this estimate was very likely correct.]
The first reported use of chemical weapons by Iraqi forces was in November 1980, two months into the onset of the Iran-Iraq War when Tehran radio reported a poison gas attack on Susangerd. Scores of similar attacks were recorded by the United Nations across the following year. Iran soon also developed and deployed a mustard gas capacity. Beginning in1984 the Iraqis made effective use of poison gas against the Iranian human wave attacks.
Major WMD usage in Saddam-era:
Most of these occurred during the Iran-Iraq War, but WMDs were used at least once to crush the popular uprisings of 1991. While chemical weapons were used extensively, there is no proof that Iraq ever employed biological weapons in combat.
| Location | WMD used | Date | Casualties |
|---|---|---|---|
| Haij Umran | Mustard | August 1983 | fewer than 100 Iranian/Kurdish |
| Panjwin | Mustard | October-November 1983 | 3,000 Iranian/Kurdish |
| Majnoon Island | Mustard | February-March 1984 | 2,500 Iranians |
| al-Basrah | Tabun | March 1984 | 50-100 Iranians |
| Hawizah Marsh | Mustard & Tabun | March 1985 | 3,000 Iranians |
| al-Faw | Mustard & Tabun | February 1986 | 8,000 to 10,000 Iranians |
| Um ar-Rasas | Mustard | December 1986 | 1,000s Iranians |
| al-Basrah | Mustard & Tabun | April 1987 | 5,000 Iranians |
| Sumar/Mehran | Mustard & nerve agent | October 1987 | 3,000 Iranians |
| Halabjah | Mustard & nerve agent | March 1988 | 1,000s Kurdish/Iranian |
| al-Faw | Mustard & nerve agent | April 1988 | 1,000s Iranians |
| Fish Lake | Mustard & nerve agent | May 1988 | 100s or 1,000s Iranians |
| Majnoon Islands | Mustard & nerve agent | June 1988 | 100s or 1,000s Iranians |
| South-central border | Mustard & nerve agent | July 1988 | 100s or 1,000s Iranians |
| an-Najaf - Karbala area | Nerve agent & CS | March 1991 | Shi’a casualties not known |
(Source: [6])
The Washington Post reported that in 1984 the CIA secretly started feeding intelligence to the Iraqi army. This included assistance in targeting chemical weapons strikes. The same year it was confirmed beyond doubt by European doctors and U.N. expert missions that Iraq was employing chemical weapons against the Iranians.
With more than 100,000 Iranian soldiers as victims of Saddam Hussein's Chemical and Biological weapons during the eight-year war with Iraq, Iran today is the world's top afflicted country by Weapons of Mass Destruction, only after Japan.
The official estimate does not include the civilian population contaminated in bordering towns or the children and relatives of veterans, many of whom have developed blood, lung and skin complications, according to the Organization for Veterans.
Nerve gas agents killed about 20,000 Iranian soldiers immediately, according to official reports. Of the 90,000 survivors, some 5,000 seek medical treatment regularly and about 1,000 are still hospitalized with severe, chronic conditions. Many others were hit by Mustard gas.
Despite the removal of Saddam and his regime by American forces, there is deep resentment and anger in Iran that it was Western companies (West Germany, France) that helped Iraq develop its chemical weapons arsenal in the first place and that the world did nothing to punish Iraq for its use of chemical weapons throughout the war.
Further reading on surviving veterans of these weapons:
Halabja poison gas attack
Template:Main On 23 March, 1988 western media sources reported from Halabja in Iraqi Kurdistan, that several days before Iraq had launched a large scale chemical assault on the town. Later estimates were that 4000 people had been killed.
The Halabja poison gas attack caused an international outcry against the Iraqis. Later that year the U.S. Senate unanimously passed the "Prevention of Genocide Act", cutting off all U.S. assistance to Iraq and stopping U.S. imports of Iraqi oil. The Reagan administration opposed the bill, calling it premature, and eventually prevented it from taking effect, partly due to a mistaken DIA assessment which blamed Iran for the attack.
The Iraqis blamed the Halabja attack on Iranian forces. This was still the position of Saddam Hussein in his December 2003 captivity. ("Bearing", 2003) Some evidence appears to support this theory. A report at the time by the United States Defense Intelligence Agency asserted that evidence of blood agent use was found in bodies of dead Kurds. At the time of the attack Iran was reportedly using the blood agent cyanide whereas Iraq was employing mustard gas. (Pelletiere, 2003) Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Physicians for Human Rights disagree with this, since the symptoms they found all corresponded to both mustard and sarin gas, and there was little evidence to suggest cyanide poisoning.
The 1991 Gulf War
On 2 August 1991 Iraq invaded Kuwait. The invasion was widely condemned and overnight the policy of the United States against the government of Saddam Hussein seemed to change, as it was feared Saddam intended to dominate other oil-rich nations in the region such as Saudi Arabia. As fresh horror stories from the occupation of Kuwait, some of which later proved false, came into the spotlight, older atrocities, such as the gassing of Halabja, were also given attention. As the vilification of Saddam Hussein proceeded, his arsenal of non-conventional weapons also began gaining attention.
An international coalition of nations, led by the United States, liberated Kuwait in 1991 and drove the Iraqi army back to the outskirts of southern Iraqi cities. Many expected the Iraqis to use non-conventional weapons but none were deployed.
U.N. ceasefire resolutions
In the ceasefire terms Iraq was forbidden from developing, possessing or using chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Other items proscribed by the treaty included missiles with a range of more than 150 kilometres. The relevant Security Council resolutions are number 686 and 687:
686 (2 March 1991): Iraq-Kuwait Affirms the "independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq" and sets out terms for a cease-fire. The use of force to remain valid to uphold these conditions.
687 (3 April 1991): Iraq-Kuwait Declares effective a formal cease-fire (upon Iraqi acceptance), establishes the UN Special Commission on weapons (UNSCOM), extends sanctions, and required Iraq to accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision of its chemical and biological weapons and missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers and their associated programs, stocks, components, research, and facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was to verify the destruction of Iraq's nuclear program.
UNSCOM inspections 1991-1998
The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) was headed by Rolf Ekéus and later Richard Butler. Between 1991 and 1995, UN inspectors uncovered a massive program to develop biological and nuclear weapons and a large amount of equipment was confiscated and destroyed. The al-Hakam germ warfare center, headed by the British-educated Iraqi biologist Dr. Rihab Rashid Taha, was blown up by UNSCOM in 1996. According to a 1999 report from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, the normally mild-mannered Taha exploded into violent rages whenever UNSCOM questioned her about al-Hakam, shouting, screaming and, on one occasion, smashing a chair, while insisting that al-Hakam was a chicken-feed plant. [7]
"There were a few things that were peculiar about this animal-feed production plant," Charles Duelfer, UNSCOM's deputy executive chairman, later told reporters, "beginning with the extensive air defenses surrounding it."
In 1995, UNSCOM's principle weapons inspector, Dr. Rod Barton from Australia, showed Taha documents obtained by UNSCOM that showed the Iraqi government had just purchased 10 tons of growth medium from a British company called Oxoid. Growth medium is a mixture of sugars, proteins and minerals that provides nutrients for microorganisms to growth. It can be used in hospitals and microbiology/molecular biology research laboratories, in hospitals swabs from patients are placed in dishes containing growth medium for diagnostic purposes. Iraq's hospital consumption of growth medium was just 200 kg a year; yet in 1988, Iraq imported 39 tons of it.
Shown this evidence by UNSCOM, Taha admitted to the inspectors that she had grown 19,000 litres of botulism toxin; [8] 8,000 litres of anthrax; 2,000 litres of aflatoxins, which can cause liver failure; Clostridium perfringens, a bacterium that can cause gas gangrene; and ricin, a castor-bean derivative which can kill by impeding circulation. She also admitted conducting research into cholera, salmonella, foot and mouth disease, and camel pox, a disease that uses the same growth techniques as smallpox, but which is safer for researchers to work with. It was because of the discovery of Taha's work with camel pox that the U.S. and British intelligence services feared Saddam Hussein may have been planning to weaponize the smallpox virus. Iraq had a smallpox outbreak in the 70s and UNSCOM scientists believed the government would have retained contaminated material.
Some experts also believe that, as of 1991, Iraq was within one to three years of developing nuclear weapons. However, others say that Iraq's nuclear weapons program suffered a serious setback in 1981 when the reactor used to generate source material for its bomb was bombed by Israel. [9] The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists concurs with this view: there were far too many technological challenges unsolved, they say. [10]
In the fall of 1998 Saddam allowed U.N. inspectors to return to Iraq, but only after intense U.S. pressure. Iraq charged that the commission was a cover for US espionage and refused UNSCOM access to certain sites like Baath Party headquarters [11]. Although Ekéus has said that he resisted attempts at such espionage, many allegations have since been made against the agency commission under Butler [12], charges which Butler has denied.
After Butler issued a report which heavily criticized Iraqi cooperation with the U.N. weapon inspectors, the U.S. and U.K. launched Operation Desert Fox in retaliation. Amidst controversy, Butler withdrew the UNSCOM team for safety reasons ahead of US bombing.
In August 1998, Ritter resigned his position as UN weapons inspector and sharply criticized the Clinton administration and the U.N. Security Council for not being vigorous enough about insisting that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction be destroyed. Ritter also accused U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan of assisting Iraqi efforts at impeding UNSCOM's work. "Iraq is not disarming," Ritter said on August 27, 1998, and in a second statement, "Iraq retains the capability to launch a chemical strike."
Scott Ritter later accused some UNSCOM personnel of spying. [13]. According to Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting a left-wing media watch organization, some major newspapers presented such accusations as having a factual basis, but later recounted them as simply accusations by Hussein's regime. [14]
On August 31, 1998, Ritter said: "Iraq still has proscribed weapons capability. There needs to be a careful distinction here. Iraq today is challenging the special commission to come up with a weapon and say where is the weapon in Iraq, and yet part of their efforts to conceal their capabilities, I believe, have been to disassemble weapons into various components and to hide these components throughout Iraq. I think the danger right now is that without effective inspections, without effective monitoring, Iraq can in a very short period of time measure the months, reconstitute chemical biological weapons, long-range ballistic missiles to deliver these weapons, and even certain aspects of their nuclear weaponization program."[15]
Scott Ritter's "turnaround"
In June, 1999, Ritter responded to an interviewer saying: "When you ask the question, 'Does Iraq possess militarily viable biological or chemical weapons?' the answer is no! It is a resounding NO. Can Iraq produce today chemical weapons on a meaningful scale? No! Can Iraq produce biological weapons on a meaningful scale? No! Ballistic missiles? No! It is 'no' across the board. So from a qualitative standpoint, Iraq has been disarmed. Iraq today possesses no meaningful weapons of mass destruction capability." [16]
In 2002, Ritter stated that, as of 1998, 90–95% of Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities, and long-range ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons, had been verified as destroyed. Technical 100% verification was not possible, said Ritter, not because Iraq still had any hidden weapons, but because Iraq had preemptively destroyed some stockpiles and claimed they had never existed. Many people were surprised by Ritter's "bizarre turnaround" in his view of Iraq during a period when no inspections were made.[17] In 2000, Ritter produced a film that portrayed Iraq as fully disarmed. The film was funded by an Iraqi-American businessman who had received Oil-for-Food coupons from Saddam Hussein that he sold for $400,000.[18] [19]
During the 2002–2003 build-up to war Ritter criticized the Bush administration and maintained that it had provided no credible evidence that Iraq had reconstituted a significant WMD capability. In an interview with Time in September 2002 (Calabresi, 2002) he stated:
We have tremendous capabilities to detect any effort by Iraq to obtain prohibited capability. The fact that no one has shown that he has acquired that capability doesn't necessarily translate into incompetence on the part of the intelligence community. It may mean that he hasn't done anything.
In the same interview Ritter had this to say on accusations of UNSCOM being used for illegitimate spying on Iraq:
It's ironic that everyone has focused on the struggle of the inspectors vs. Iraq. Not too many people speak of the struggle between the weapons inspectors and the U.S. to beat back the forces of U.S. intelligence which were seeking to infiltrate the weapons inspectors program and use the unique access the inspectors enjoyed in Iraq for purposes other than disarmament. Iraq has a clear case that under this past inspection regime unfortunately it was misused for purposes other than set out by the Security Council resolution.
Ritter was widely denounced in the United States for his supposed "defection" and "lack of patriotism".
Also in the interview, Ritter countered that he had given 12 years of service to his country as a Marine and that he was willing to put his record of service up against anyone.
Between the Inspections: 1998-2002
There were no weapon inspections in Iraq for nearly four years after the U.N. departed from Iraq in 1998, and Iraq asserted that they would never be invited back. In addition, Saddam issued a secret order that Iraq did not have to abide by any U.N. Resolution since in his view the U.S. had broken international law. [20]
In 2001 Saddam stated that "we are not at all seeking to build up weapons or look for the most harmful weapons . . . however, we will never hesitate to possess the weapons to defend Iraq and the Arab nation". [21]
A controversy in 2002 was whether or not Iraq used the absence of inspectors to develop weapons of mass destruction in violation of UN resolutions. Another controversial point came from estimating the time it would take Iraq to produce nuclear weapons from raw materials.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies in Britain published (Chipman, 2002) in September 2002 a review of Iraq's current military capability, and concluded that Iraq could assemble nuclear weapons within months if fissile material from foreign sources were obtained. However, it concluded that without such foreign sources, it would take years at a bare minimum. In addition to the numbers being viewed as overly optimistic by many critics (such as the Federation of American Scientists and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists), the claim that Iraq could built a bomb if only it had enriched nuclear material has been compared to the concept of being able to build a bomb if only one had a few sticks of dynamite.
Iraq insisted it no longer had any weapons of mass destruction.
UNMOVIC search 2003
In late 2002 Saddam Hussein, in a letter to Hans Blix, invited UN weapons inspectors back into the country. Subsequently the Security Council issued resolution 1441 authorizing new inspections in Iraq.
The carefully-worded U.N. resolution put the burden on Iraq, not U.N. inspectors, to prove that they no longer had weapons of mass destruction. The US claimed that Iraq's weapons report which was filed with the U.N. leaves weapons and materials unaccounted for; the Iraqis claimed that it was destroyed, something that had been confirmed years earlier by Iraq's highest profile defector, Hussein Kamel. According to reports from the previous U.N. inspection agency, UNSCOM, Iraq produced 600 metric tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas, VX and sarin, and nearly 25,000 rockets and 15,000 artillery shells, with chemical agents, that are still unaccounted for. In fact, in 1995, Iraq told the United Nations that it had produced at least 30,000 liters of biological agents, including anthrax and other toxins it could put on missiles, but that all of it had been destroyed.
In January 2003, United Nations weapons inspectors reported that they had found no indication that Iraq had a currently active program to make nuclear weapons, and that there was no credible evidence that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons.
Some former UNSCOM inspectors disagree about whether the United States could know for certain whether or not Iraq had renewed production of weapons of mass destruction. Robert Gallucci said, "If Iraq had [uranium or plutonium], a fair assessment would be they could fabricate a nuclear weapon, and there's no reason for us to assume we'd find out if they had." Similarly, former inspector Jonathan Tucker said, "Nobody really knows what Iraq has. You really can't tell from a satellite image what's going on inside a factory."
However, Hans Blix said in late January 2003 that Iraq had "not genuinely accepted U.N. resolutions demanding that it disarm." [22] [23]. He claimed there were some materials which had not been accounted for. Since sites had been found which evidenced the destruction of chemical weaponry, UNSCOM was actively working with Iraq on methods to ascertain for certain whether the amounts destroyed matched up with the amounts that Iraq had produced.
In the last quarterly report submitted by UNMOVIC before the invasion of Iraq (Blix, February 2003) the following statements are found:
"All inspections were performed without notice, and access was in virtually all cases provided promptly. In no case have the inspectors seen convincing evidence that the Iraqi side knew in advance of their impending arrival."
"More than 200 chemical and more than 100 biological samples have collected at different sites. ... The results to date have been consistent with Iraq's declarations."
"UNMOVIC has identified and started the destruction of approximately 50 litres of mustard declared by Iraq... This process will continue. A laboratory quantity of (1 litre) of thiodiglycol, a mustard precursor, ... has also been destroyed."
"Based on information supplied by Iraq, UNMOVIC concluded that variants of the Al Samoud 2 missile were marginally capable of exceeding ranges more than 150 kilometres in violation of UNSC resolutions. As a result, Iraq began destroying its Al Samoud 2 missiles as per UNMOVIC's orders." [24], [25]
"UNMOVIC has reported that, in general, Iraq has been helpful on "process", meaning, first of all, that Iraq has from the outset satisfied the demand for prompt access to any site, whether or not it had been previously declared or inspected. ... While such cooperation should be a matter of course, it must be recalled that UNSCOM frequently met with a different Iraqi attitude."
"During the period of time covered by the present report, Iraq could have made greater efforts to find any remaining proscribed items or provide credible evidence showing the absence of such items."
In the next quarterly report (Blix, May 2003), after the war, the total amount of proscribed items destroyed by UNMOVIC in Iraq can be gathered. Those include:
- 50 deployed Al Samoud 2 missiles
- Various equipment, including vehicles, engines and warheads, related to the AS2 missiles
- 2 large propellant casting chambers
- 14 155 mm shells filled with mustard gas, the mustard gas totalling approximately 49 litres and still at high purity
- Approximately 500 ml of thiodiglycol
- Some 122 mm chemical warheads
- Some chemical equipment
- 224.6 kg of expired growth media
Scott Ritter, a former marine officer who spent seven years hunting and destroying Saddam's arsenal, stated (after his dramatic "turnaround") that WMDs Saddam had in his possession all those years ago has long since turned to harmless substances. Sarin and tabun have a shelf life of five years, VX lasts a bit longer (but not much longer), and finally botulinum toxin and liquid anthrax last about three years. All the all the chemical and biological weapons within Saddam's possessions have since turned into harmless, useless goo. [26]
On March 7, 2003, Hans Blix's last report to the UN security Council prior to the US led invasion of Iraq, described Iraq as actively and proactively cooperating with UNMOVIC, though not necessarily in all areas of relevance, and that it was within months of resolving key remaining disarmament tasks.[27]
Justification of Iraq war
The specious appearance of compliance with inspections stipulated under UN Resolution and the threat of operational, banned WMD in the hands of Saddam Hussein was given as the chief of several reasons for the decision of the United States to invade Iraq and topple his government in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The same justification was used by the government of the United Kingdom. However, on October 6, 2004, the head of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), Charles Duelfer, announced to the United States Senate Armed Services Committee that the group found no evidence that Iraq under Saddam Hussein had produced and stockpiled any weapons of mass destruction since 1991, when UN sanctions were imposed.
The report found that "The ISG has not found evidence that Saddam possessed WMD stocks in 2003, but [there is] the possibility that some weapons existed in Iraq, although not of a militarily significant capability." It also concluded that there was a possible intent to restart all banned weapons programs as soon as multilateral sanctions against it had been dropped, with Hussein pursuing WMD proliferation in the future : "There is an extensive, yet fragmentary and circumstantial, body of evidence suggesting that Saddam pursued a strategy to maintain a capability to return to WMD after sanctions were lifted..." [28]. No senior Iraqi official interviewed by the ISG believed that Saddam had forsaken WMD forever.
Iraq acceded to the Geneva Protocol on September 8, 1931, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on October 29, 1969, signed the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972, but did not ratify until June 11, 1991. Iraq has not signed to the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Under the 1991 Gulf War ceasefire terms Iraq was forbidden from developing, possessing or using chemical, biological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Other items proscribed by the treaty included missiles with a range of more than 150 kilometres. The UN established a commission, UNSCOM, to verify Iraq's adherence to the treaty. At the time adherence was established economic sanctions against Iraq were to be lifted. Iraq's adherence to the treaty was, however, never established to the satisfaction of the United Nations Security Council and the sanctions were not lifted until after the 2003 war.
UNSCOM encountered various difficulties and a lack of cooperation by the Iraqi government. In 1998, UNSCOM was withdrawn at the request of the United States before Operation Desert Fox. Despite this, UNSCOM's own estimate was that 90-95% of Iraqi WMD's had been successfully destroyed before its 1998 withdrawal. After that Iraq remained without any outside weapons inspectors for five years. During this time speculations arose that Iraq had actively resumed its WMD programmes. In particular, various figures in the George W. Bush administration as well as Congress went so far as to express concern about nuclear weapons:
- "Well, I think I’ve just given it, Tim, in terms of the combination of his development and use of chemical weapons, his development of biological weapons, his pursuit of nuclear weapons." —Dick Cheney, Vice President, Meet The Press, March 16, 2003
- "According to the CIA's report, all U.S. intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons. There is little question that Saddam Hussein wants to develop nuclear weapons." Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.) - Congressional Record, October 9, 2002
Intelligence shortly before the 2003 invasion of Iraq was heavily used as support arguments in favor of military intervention with the October 2002 C.I.A. report on Iraqi WMD's considered to be the most reliable one available at that time.[29]
At the beginning of 2003, the United States and the United Kingdom administrations both claimed that there was absolutely no doubt that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and was developing more. Nevertheless proof of these assertions could not be found.
There is dispute about whether Iraq still had WMD programs after 1998 and whether its cooperation with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) was complete. UN Chief Weapons Inspector said in January 2003 that Iraq has, "...not genuinely accepted U.N. resolutions demanding that it disarm." On 7 March, in an address to the Security Council, Hans Blix, the head of UNMOVIC, appeared to take a more positive view describing current Iraqi level of cooperation as "active or even proactive". Attributing increased Iraqi initiative to "outside pressure" he stated his estimate that it would take several months for all outstanding WMD issues to be resolved. United States officials treated Blix's report dismissively.
Even in lieu of actual WMD programs, legal justification for the campaign was claimed due to the alleged lack of cooperation with UN inspectors by Iraq. The stated intention of the U.S. plan to invade Iraq was to eliminate Iraq's ability to threaten its neighbors or its own people with weapons of mass destruction.
In an interview on FOX News Sunday on February 1, 2004, David Kay, former head of Iraq Survey Group looking for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq said: "We know there were terrorist groups in state [Iraq] still seeking WMD capability. Iraq, although I found no weapons, had tremendous capabilities in this area. A marketplace phenomenon was about to occur, if it did not occur; sellers meeting buyers. And I think that would have been dangerous if the war had not intervened." [30] However, despite Kay's opinion there has been no evidence produced indicating any collaboration between the government of Iraq and alleged terrorist groups.
The 2003 war
Prelude
Prior to the invasion, the United States said that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, and that it must either give them all up or undergo a regime change. However, immediately prior to the invasion, the United States made a further demand that Saddam Hussein step down from power and vacate Iraq. Still later, the United States announced that even if Saddam Hussein abdicated and his government was changed, it would send in forces to verify disarmament and oversee the transition to a new government. Iraq variously claimed that it never had any WMD, or that it had gotten rid of them all (and asserted that it was thus in compliance with United States and United Nation demands).
Some said before the invasion that if Iraq were to prove credibly that it no longer had such capability, by allowing unfettered access to inspectors and permitting the destruction of WMD stocks and production facilities as they were found, the primary claimed justification for the proposed US invasion would vanish.
At the United Nations Security Council French and Russian Foreign Ministers Dominique de Villepin and Igor Ivanov garnered an unusual applause inside the chamber with their speeches against the war and for a continuation of the weapons inspections.
Oddly enough in January 2006, the New York Times revealed the existence of a memo stating that the suggestion of uranium being sold (one of the major claims) was "unlikely" because of a host of economic, diplomatic and logistical obstacles. The memo, dated March 4, 2002, was distributed at senior levels by the office of former Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and by the Defense Intelligence Agency.[31]
In another leaked memo by BBC and The Guardian, George Bush told Tony Blair on 31 January 2003 that a war would proceed whether or not WMDs would be found or a second UN resolution would be passed.
For more details: Iraq disarmament crisis, The UN Security Council and the Iraq war
The fall of Iraq
As of April 16, 2003, Iraq's Baath government had fallen to the invasion, all major cities have been captured, and no weapons of mass destruction had been reported found. As of April 24, 2003, the United States had started backing off[32] on the search for weapons of mass destruction. UNMOVIC chief inspector Hans Blix has called for UN inspections to resume.[33]
Aftermath of the 2003 war
Pentagon field report
On May 27, 2003, a secret Defense Intelligence Agency fact-finding mission in Iraq reported unanimously to the White House that two trailers captured in Iraq by Kurdish troops "had nothing to do with biological weapons." The trailers had been a key part of the argument for the 2003 invasion; Secretary of State Colin Powell had told the United Nations Security Council, "We have firsthand descriptions of biological weapons factories on wheels and on rails. We know what the fermenters look like. We know what the tanks, pumps, compressors and other parts look like." The Pentagon team had been sent to investigate the trailers after the invasion. The team of experts unanimously found "no connection to anything biological"; one of the experts told reporters that they privately called the trailers "the biggest sand toilets in the world." The report was classified, and the next day, the CIA publicly released the assessment of its Washington analysts that the trailers were "mobile biological weapons production." The White House continued to refer to the trailers as mobile biological laboratories throughout the year, and the Pentagon field report remained classified. It is still classified, but a Washington Post report of 12 April 2006 disclosed some of the details of the report.[34]
BBC report "sexed up" in Iraqi Dossier
On May 29, 2003, Andrew Gilligan appears on the BBC's Today program early in the morning. Among the contentions he makes in his report are that the government "ordered (the September Dossier, a British Government dossier on WMD) to be sexed up, to be made more exciting, and ordered more facts to be…discovered." The broadcast is not repeated.[35]
Wolfowitz makes a controversial statement
On May 30, 2003, Paul Wolfowitz stated in an interview with Vanity Fair magazine that the issue of weapons of mass destruction was the point of greatest agreement among Bush's team among the reasons to remove Saddam Hussein from power. In Vanity Fair, he said, "The truth is that for reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S. government bureaucracy, we settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on, which was weapons of mass destruction as the core reason..." The remainder of the quote, which was not included in the article, is as follows, according to a Pentagon transcript: "...but, there have always been three fundamental concerns. One is weapons of mass destruction, the second is support for terrorism, the third is the criminal treatment of the Iraqi people. Actually I guess you could say there's a fourth overriding one which is the connection between the first two." [36] The same day, General James Conway, senior Marine commander in Iraq, expressed similar thoughts in a satellite interview with reporters at the Pentagon.
The New York Times, Ahmad Chalabi and WMD
In the build up to the 2003 war the New York Times published a number of stories claiming to prove that Iraq possessed WMD. One story in particular, written by Judith Miller helped persuade the American public that Iraq had WMD: in September 2002 she wrote about an intercepted shipment of aluminum tubes which the NYT said were to be used to develop nuclear material. It is now clear that they could not be used for that purpose.
The story was followed up with television appearances by Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice all pointing to the story as part of the basis for taking military action against Iraq.
Miller's sources were introduced to her by Ahmed Chalabi, an Iraqi exile favourable to a US invasion of Iraq. Miller is also listed as a speaker for The Middle East Forum, an organization which openly declared support for an invasion.
In May 2004 the New York Times published an editorial which stated that its journalism in the build up to war had sometimes been lax. It appears that in the cases where Iraqi exiles were used for the stories about WMD were either ignorant as to the real status of Iraq's WMD or lied to journalists to achieve their own ends.
Looting of nuclear facilities
Various nuclear facilities, including the Baghdad Nuclear Research Facility and Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, were found looted in the month following the invasion. (Gellman, 3 May 2003) On June 20, 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency reported that tons of uranium, as well as other radioactive materials such as thorium, had been recovered, and that the vast majority had remained on site. There were several reports of radiation sickness in the area. By June 7, 2003, many American and British media sources [37] [38] began questioning the credibility of the Bush administration, and John Dean even brought up the possibility of impeachment [39] for "lying to Congress and the American people", although this idea has largely fallen by the wayside since some members of Congress had access to much of the same information as the White House. It has been suggested that the documents and suspected weapons sites were looted and burned in Iraq by looters in the final days of the war. [40]
Nuclear scientist buried components
After he was captured by U.S. forces in Baghdad in 2003, Dr. Mahdi Obeidi, who ran Saddam's nuclear centrifuge program until 1997, handed over blueprints for a nuclear centrifuge along with some actual centrifuge components, stored at his home — buried in the front yard — awaiting orders from Baghdad to proceed. He said, "I had to maintain the program to the bitter end." In his book, "The Bomb in My Garden," the Iraqi physicist explains that his nuclear stash was the key that could have unlocked and restarted Saddam's bombmaking program.
Iraq Survey Group
On 30 May 2003, The U.S. Department of Defense briefed the media that it was ready to formally begin the work of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), a fact finding mission from the coalition of the Iraq occupation into the WMD programs developed by Iraq, taking over from the British-American 75th Exploitation Task Force.
U.S. Senate Committee on Intelligence Review
On 4 June 2003, U.S. Senator Pat Roberts announced that the U.S. Select Committee on Intelligence that he chaired would "as a part of its ongoing oversight of the intelligence community...conduct a Review of intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction."
On 9 July 2004, the Committee released the Senate Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq.
Blair maintains that Iraq had WMD's
On July 17, 2003, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair said in an address to the US congress, that history would forgive the United States and United Kingdom, even if they were wrong about weapons of mass destruction. He still maintained that "with every fiber of instinct and conviction" Iraq did have weapons of mass destruction.
The ISG Interim Report
On October 3, 2003, the world digests David Kay's Iraq Survey Group report that finds no stockpiles of WMD in Iraq, although it states the government intended to develop more weapons with additional capabilities. Weapons inspectors in Iraq do find some "biological laboratories" and a collection of "reference strains", including a strain of botulinum bacteria, "ought to have been declared to the UN." Kay testifies that Iraq had not fully complied with UN inspections. In some cases, equipment and materials subject to UN monitoring had been kept hidden from UN inspectors. "So there was a WMD program. It was going ahead. It was rudimentary in many areas," Kay would say in a later interview.[41] In other cases, Iraq had simply lied to the UN in its weapons programs. [42] The US-sponsored search for WMD had at this point cost $300 million and was projected to cost around $600 million more.
According to Kay, Iraq worked on WMDs right under the noses of UNMOVIC. Kay said that Iraq had tried to weaponize ricin "right up until" Operation Iraqi Freedom. [43] [44]
In David Kay's statement on the interim report of the ISG (Kay, 2003) the following paragraphs are found:
"We have not yet found stocks of weapons, but we are not yet at the point where we can say definitively either that such weapon stocks do not exist or that they existed before the war and our only task is to find where they have gone. We are actively engaged in searching for such weapons based on information being supplied to us by Iraqis."
"With regard to delivery systems, the ISG team has discovered sufficient evidence to date to conclude that the Iraqi regime was committed to delivery system improvements that would have, if OIF had not occurred, dramatically breached UN restrictions placed on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War."
"ISG has gathered testimony from missile designers at Al Kindi State Company that Iraq has reinitiated work on converting SA-2 Surface-to-Air Missiles into ballistic missiles with a range goal of about 250km. Engineering work was reportedly underway in early 2003, despite the presence of UNMOVIC. This program was not declared to the UN."
"ISG has developed multiple sources of testimony, which is corroborated in part by a captured document, that Iraq undertook a program aimed at increasing the HY-2's range and permitting its use as a land-attack missile. These efforts extended the HY-2's range from its original 100km to 150-180km. Ten modified missiles were delivered to the military prior to OIF and two of these were fired from Umm Qasr during OIF -- one was shot down and one hit Kuwait."
"Weapons of mass desctruction-related program activities"
Another notable statement is the following:
"We have discovered dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002."
The phrase of 'WMD-related program activities' was later used in George Bush's state of the union speech. Bush's critics, often not realizing the origin of the statement, derided Bush for unclear wording and trying to "lower the bar" on confirming his pre-war WMD-claims.
Demetrius Perricos, then head of UNMOVIC, stated that the Kay report contained little information not already known by UNMOVIC. (Pincus, 2003) Many organizations, such as the journal Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, have claimed that Kay's report is a "worst case analysis" [45]
On 29 October U.S. intelligence spokesmen claimed that Iraqi WMDs and programs had been comprehensively hidden before or immediately after the fall of Bagdhad, with some elements of the programs being shipped out of the country.
Saddam captured: Insists "no WMDs"
On 14 December Saddam Hussein was captured by U.S. forces. Time Online Edition reports that in his first interrogation he was asked whether Iraq had any WMDs. According to an official, his reply was: "'No, of course not, the U.S. dreamed them up itself to have a reason to go to war with us.' The interrogator continued along this line, said the official, asking: 'if you had no weapons of mass destruction then why not let the U.N. inspectors into your facilities?' Saddam’s reply: 'We didn’t want them to go into the presidential areas and intrude on our privacy.'” (Bennett, 2003) Later interviews with Saddam's military leaders indicated that Saddam didn't want it demonstrated through inspections that he didn't possess WMDs in certain places in order to pose a threat against those who might attempt a coup.
Butler Inquiry
On 3 February 2004, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw announced an independent inquiry, to be chaired by Lord Butler of Brockwell, to examine the reliability of British intelligence relating to alleged weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. ("Iraq", 2004)
The Butler Review was published 14 July 2004.
One notable excerpt:
"We conclude that, on the basis of the intelligence assessments at the time, covering both Niger and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the statements on Iraqi attempts to buy uranium from Africa in the Government's dossier, and by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, were well-founded. By extension, we conclude also that the statement in President Bush's State of the Union Address of 28 January 2003 that 'The British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa' was well-founded." [46]
Iraq Intelligence Commission
On 6 February 2004, U.S. President George W. Bush named an Iraq Intelligence Commission, chaired by Charles Robb and Laurence Silberman, to investigate United States intelligence, specifically regarding the 2003 invasion of Iraq and Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
Post-war interviews with Iraqi WMD searchers
On 8 February 2004, Dr Hans Blix, in an interview on BBC TV, accused the US and British governments of dramatising the threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, in order to strengthen the case for the 2003 war against the government of Saddam Hussein. Quote:
"It was to do with information management. The intention was to dramatise it." [47]
Bill Tierney, former UNSCOM inspector and Arabic linguist said: "On nukes, some analysts wait until there is unambiguous proof before stating a country has nuclear weapons. This may work in a courtroom, but intelligence is a different subject altogether. I believe it is more prudent to determine what is axiomatic given a nation’s capabilities and intentions. There was no question that Iraq had triggering mechanisms for a nuke, the question was whether they had enriched enough uranium. Given Iraq’s intensive efforts to build a nuke prior to the Gulf War, their efforts to hide uranium enrichment material from inspectors, the fact that Israel had a nuke but no Arab state could claim the same, my first-hand knowledge of the limits of UNSCOM and IAEA capabilities, and Iraqi efforts to buy yellowcake uranium abroad (Joe Wilson tea parties notwithstanding), I believe the TWELVE years between 1991 and 2003 was more than enough time to produce sufficient weapons grade uranium to produce a nuclear weapon. Maybe I have more respect for the Iraqis’ capabilities than some." [48]
In an interview with BBC in June 2004 David Kay, former head of the Iraq Survey Group, made the following comment:
- "Anyone out there holding — as I gather Prime Minister Blair has recently said — the prospect that, in fact, the Iraq Survey Group is going to unmask actual weapons of mass destruction, [is] really delusional."
In a January 26, 2004 interview with Tom Brokaw of NBC news, Mr. Kay described Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs as being in a "rudimentary" stage. He also stated that "What we did find, and as others are investigating it, we found a lot of terrorist groups and individuals that passed through Iraq."[49] In responding to a question by Mr. Brokaw as to whether Iraq was a "gathering threat" as President Bush had asserted before the invasion, Mr. Kay answered:
- Tom, an imminent threat is a political judgment. It’s not a technical judgment. I think Baghdad was actually becoming more dangerous in the last two years than even we realized. Saddam was not controlling the society any longer. In the marketplace of terrorism and of WMD, Iraq well could have been that supplier if the war had not intervened.
Speaking on FOX News Sunday, David Kay said "We know there were terrorist groups in state [Iraq] still seeking WMD capability. Iraq, although I found no weapons, had tremendous capabilities in this area. A marketplace phenomenon was about to occur, if it did not occur; sellers meeting buyers. And I think that would have been dangerous if the war had not intervened." [50]
No concrete evidence has been produced indicating any collaboration by the government of Iraq with alleged terrorist groups, or indicating what terrorist groups would have taken part in the alleged "marketplace phenomenon".
Former senior Iraqi General states: WMD was moved to Syria
Former senior Iraqi general, Georges Sada, has reported that in late 2002, Saddam ordered that all the stockpiles of WMD were to be moved to Syria. On January 25, 2006 on Hannity & Colmes on Fox News, the former number 2 officer in the Iraqi Air Force stated:
Well, I want to make it clear, very clear to everybody in the world that we had the weapon of mass destruction in Iraq, and the regime used them against our Iraqi people. It was used against Kurds in the north, against Arabs — marsh Arabs in the south...
He went on to say that those weapons still existed in 2002:
Well, up to the year 2002, 2002, in summer, they were in Iraq. And after that, when Saddam realized that the inspectors are coming on the first of November and the Americans are coming, so he took the advantage of a natural disaster happened in Syria, a dam was broken. So he — he announced to the world that he is going to make an air bridge...
And then described what became of those weapons:
They were moved by air and by ground, 56 sorties by jumbo, 747, and 27 were moved, after they were converted to cargo aircraft, they were moved to Syria.[51], [52]
A similar claim was made by Lieutenant General Moshe Yaalon, a former Israeli officer who served as chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces from July 2002 to June 2005. According to the New York Sun, General Yaalon told the paper in December 2005 that "[Saddam] transferred the chemical agents from Iraq to Syria."[53] In April 2004, he was quoted as saying that "perhaps they transferred them to another country, such as Syria." The Fall 2005 Middle East Quarterly reported that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon stated in a December 23, 2002 appearance on Israeli TV that "Chemical and biological weapons which Saddam is endeavoring to conceal have been moved from Iraq to Syria."[54]
These allegations were considered in the Iraq Survey Group Duelfer report addenda. The report stated:
- ISG formed a working group to investigate the possibility of the evacuation of WMD-related material from Iraq prior to the 2003 war. This group spent several months examining documents, interviewing former Iraqi officials, examining previous intelligence reports, and conducting some site investigations. The declining security situation limited and finally halted this investigation. The results remain inconclusive, but further investigation may be undertaken when circumstances on the ground improve.
The report did conclude, however, that "Based on the evidence available at present, ISG judged that it was unlikely that an official transfer of WMD material from Iraq to Syria took place. However, ISG was unable to rule out unofficial movement of limited WMD-related materials." [55]
In testimony before a Senate panel in October 2004, Charles Duelfer stated "What I can tell you is that I believe we know a lot of materials left Iraq and went to Syria. There was certainly a lot of traffic across the border points...But whether in fact in any of these trucks there was WMD-related materials, I cannot say." In media interviews before the addenda was published, intelligence and congressional officials went further, saying they had not seen any information indicating that WMD or significant amounts of components and equipment were transferred from Iraq to neighboring Syria or elsewhere. [56]
General Sada also claims some of the chemical weapons moved to Syria were later seized when an chemical attack by al-Qaeda against Amman, Jordan was foiled. [57] Some 20 tons of chemical weapons were moved by the attackers from Syria to Jordan in preparation for the attack. The attack was planned and funded by Musab al-Zarqawi. [58]
Reports of chemical weapons finds since 2003
Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, several reported finds of chemical weapons were announced. During the invasion itself, there were half a dozen incidents in which the US military announced that it had found chemical weapons. All of these claims were based on field reports, and were later retracted. After the war, many cases — most notably on April 7, 2003 when several large drums tested positive — continued to be reported in the same way.
Image:10 jan 2004 EOD mortar rounds iraq.jpg Another such post-war case occurred on January 9, 2004, when Icelandic munitions experts and Danish military engineers discovered 36 120-mm mortar rounds containing liquid buried in Southern Iraq. While initial tests suggested that the rounds contained a blister agent, a chemical weapon banned by the Geneva Convention, [59] subsequent analysis by American and Danish experts showed that no chemical agent was present. [60] It appears that the rounds have been buried, and most probably forgotten, since the Iran-Iraq war. Some of the munitions were in an advanced state of decay and most of the weaponry would likely have been unusable.
The reason for the high false positive rates is that field tests using the ICAM (Improved Chemical Agent Monitor) are very inaccurate, and even the more time consuming field tests have shown themselves to be poor at determining whether something is a chemical weapon. According to Donald Rumsfeld, ""Almost all first reports we get turn out to be wrong," he said. "We don't do first reports and we don't speculate." [61]. Many chemicals used in explosives, such as phosphorus, show up as blister agents. Other chemicals, such as pesticides (especially organophosphates such as malathion), routinely show up as nerve agents. Chemically, they are quite similar — the main difference is that some organophosphates kill only insects, and are consequently used as insecticides.
On April 27 2004 FOX News reported that operatives confessed to planning a chemical attack against Jordan under the orders of Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Jordanian officials said the plotters entered Jordan from Syria with trucks filled with 20 tons of toxic chemicals. The attack planned to kill some 80,000 civilians.[62]
On May 2 2004 a shell containing mustard gas, was found in the middle of street west of Baghdad. The Iraq Survey Group investigation reported that it had been previously "stored improperly", and thus the gas was "ineffective" as a useful chemical agent. Officials from the Defense Department commented that they were not certain if use was to be made of the device as a bomb.[63]
On May 15 2004 a 155 mm artillery shell was used as an improvised bomb. The shell exploded and two U.S. soldiers were treated for minor exposure to a nerve agent (nausea and dilated pupils).[64] [65] On May 18 it was reported by U.S. Department of Defense intelligence officials that tests showed the two-chambered shell contained the chemical agent sarin, the shell being "likely" to have contained three to four liters of the substance (in the form of its two unmixed precursor chemicals prior to the aforementioned explosion that had not effectively mixed them). [66]. Former U.S. weapons inspector David Kay told the Associated Press that "he doubted the shell or the nerve agent came from a hidden stockpile, although he didn't rule out that possibility." Kay also considered it possible that the shell was "an old relic overlooked when Saddam said he had destroyed such weapons in the mid-1990s."[67] It is likely that the insurgents who planted the bomb did not know it contained sarin, according to Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, and another U.S. official confirmed that the shell did not have the markings of a chemical agent.[68]
In a July 2 2004 article published by The Associated Press and reported by Fox News that more WMD not destroyed by the Iraqi Regime were discovered in South Central Iraq by Polish Allies. Sarin Gas warheads dating back to the last Iran-Iraq war were trying to be purchased by terrorists for $5000 a warhead. The Polish troops secured munitions on June 23, 2004. [69] After being tested, it turned out that the warheads did not in fact contain sarin gas. The Coalition Press Information Center in Baghdad announced that the munitions "were all empty and tested negative for any type of chemicals."[70]
The US abandoned its search for WMDs in Iraq on January 12 2005.
On August 14, 2005, The Washington Post published an article reporting a raid on a suspected chemical weapons facility in Iraq where (according to the US military) chemical weapons had been uncovered and were now in the process of being classified. The Post reported that "the suspected lab was new, dating from some time after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. The Bush administration cited evidence that Saddam Hussein's government was manufacturing weapons of mass destruction as the main justification for the invasion. No such weapons or factories were found."[71]
"No one was more surprised than I that we didn't find (WMD's)." General Tommy Franks December 2nd 2005 [72]
On February 11, 2006, Congressman Pete Hoekstra appeared on MSNBC to discuss the "Saddam Tapes." Reports claim Saddam discusses WMD and links to terrorists on these tapes. Hoekstra called for the U.S. government to put the remaining 35,000 boxes of documents on the internet so Arabic speakers around the world can help translate the documents. [73] The U.S. government is in the process of releasing these documents. The documents are known as Operation Iraqi Freedom documents.
On February 12, 2006, former Pentagon investigator Dave Gaubatz appeared on Fox News Channel and claimed he and fellow military investigators identified four underground bunkers with five foot thick concrete walls in southern Iraq believed to hold WMD. Iraqi informants brought these sites to the attention of Gaubatz and his colleagues. Gaubatz claims that, for various reasons, these sites have never been inspected by the Iraq Survey Group or the CIA. Gaubatz is making a plea the sites be inspected at this time because of the recent release of the Saddam Tapes. [74]
On February 17-20, 2006, the Intelligence Summit aired 12 hours of translated Saddam Tapes at a conference outside of Washington, D.C. In one of the taped conversations an aide to Saddam Hussein asked "Where was the nuclear material transported to?" He answers his own question: "A number of them were transported out of Iraq." [75] The Washington Times editorialized on another moment caught on tape that revealed "Saddam was actively working on a plan to enrich uranium using a technique known as plasma separation. This is particularly worrisome because of the date of the conversation: It took place in 2000, nearly five years after Iraq's nuclear programs were thought to have stopped." The Washington Times also noted that former Pentagon official John Shaw spoke at the conference about the role of Russian "spetsnaz," or special forces troops in the movement of WMD out of Iraq and into Syria and Lebanon. [76]
The U.S. Iraq Survey Group Final Report
Template:Main On September 30, 2004, the U.S. Iraq Survey Group Final Report concluded that, "ISG has not found evidence that Saddam Husayn (sic) possessed WMD stocks in 2003, but the available evidence from its investigation—including detainee interviews and document exploitation—leaves open the possibility that some weapons existed in Iraq although not of a militarily significant capability." [77] Among the key findings of the final ISG report were:
- Evidence of the maturity and significance of the pre-1991 Iraqi Nuclear Program but found that Iraq’s ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program progressively decayed after that date;
- Concealment of nuclear program in its entirety, as with Iraq’s BW program. Aggressive UN inspections after Desert Storm forced Saddam to admit the existence of the program and destroy or surrender components of the program;
- After Desert Storm, Iraq concealed key elements of its program and preserved what it could of the professional capabilities of its nuclear scientific community;
- Saddam’s ambitions in the nuclear area were secondary to his prime objective of ending UN sanctions; and
- A limited number of post-1995 activities would have aided the reconstitution of the nuclear weapons program once sanctions were lifted.
The ISG did not, though, uncover indications that Iraq had resumed fissile material or nuclear weapon research and development activities since 1991. [78]
In a speech before the World Affairs Council of Charlotte, NC, on April 7, 2006, President Bush stated that he "fully understood that the intelligence was wrong, and [he was] just as disappointed as everybody else" when U.S. troops failed to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.[79] Despite the intelligence lapse, the President stood by his decision to invade Iraq by stating:
- But what wasn't wrong was Saddam Hussein had invaded a country, he had used weapons of mass destruction, he had the capability of making weapons of mass destruction, he was firing at our pilots. He was a state sponsor of terror. Removing Saddam Hussein was the right thing for world peace and the security of our country.
Statements
- "In Iraq, a dictator is building and hiding weapons that could enable him to dominate the Middle East and intimidate the civilized world -- and we will not allow it." - President George W. Bush addressing the AEI, Washington Hilton Hotel, February 26, 2003 [80]
- "According to the CIA's report, all U.S. intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons. There is little question that Saddam Hussein wants to develop nuclear weapons." Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.) - Congressional Record, October 9, 2002
- "In the four years since the inspectors, intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons stock, his missile delivery capability, and his nuclear program. ... It is clear, however, that if left unchecked, Saddam Hussein will continue to increase his capability to wage biological and chemical warfare and will keep trying to develop nuclear weapons. If we were to attack Iraq now, alone or with few allies, it would set a precedent that could come back to haunt us. In recent days, Russia has talked of an invasion of Georgia to attack Chechen rebels. India has mentioned the possibility of a pre-emptive strike on Pakistan. And what if China were to perceive a threat from Taiwan? So Mr. President, for all its appeal, a unilateral attack, while it cannot be ruled out, on the present facts is not a good option." - Senator Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.) - Congressional Record, October 10, 2002
- "[It] is Hussein's vigorous pursuit of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, and his present and potential future support for terrorist acts and organizations, that make him a terrible danger to the people to the United States." - Senator Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.), Congressional Record, October 10, 2002
- "We must eliminate that [potential nuclear] threat now before it is too late. But that isn't just a future threat. Saddam's existing biological and chemical weapons capabilities pose real threats to America today, tomorrow. ... [He] is working to develop delivery systems like missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles that could bring these deadly weapons against U.S. forces and U.S. facilities in the Middle East. He could make these weapons available to many terrorist groups, third parties, which have contact with his government. Those groups, in turn, could bring those weapons into the United States and unleash a devastating attack against our citizens. I fear that greatly." Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-W.Va.) - Congressional Record, October 10, 2002
- "We have known for many years that Saddam Hussein is seeking and developing weapons of mass destruction. But information from the intelligence community over the past six months does not point to Iraq as an imminent threat to the United States or a major proliferator of weapons of mass destruction." - Senator Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.), Remarks at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, October 27, 2002
- "There is no question that Iraq possesses biological and chemical weapons and that he seeks to acquire additional weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. That is not in debate. I also agree with President Bush that Saddam Hussein is a threat to peace and must be disarmed, to quote President Bush directly." Senator Chris Dodd (D-Conn.) - Congressional Record , October 8, 2002
- "In the next century, the community of nations may see more and more of the very kind of threat Iraq poses now - a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction, ready to use them or provide them to terrorists, drug traffickers, or organized criminals who travel the world among us unnoticed. If we fail to respond today, Saddam, and all those who would follow in his footsteps, will be emboldened tomorrow by the knowledge that they can act with impunity, even in the face of a clear message from the United Nations Security Council, and clear evidence of a weapons of mass destruction program." President Bill Clinton - Remarks at the Pentagon , February 17, 1998
- "[L]et's imagine the future. What if he fails to comply and we fail to act, or we take some ambiguous third route, which gives him yet more opportunities to develop this program of weapons of mass destruction and continue to press for the release of the sanctions and continue to ignore the solemn commitments that he made? Well, he will conclude that the international community has lost its will. He will then conclude that he can go right on and do more to rebuild an arsenal of devastating destruction. And some day, some way, I guarantee you he'll use the arsenal. And I think every one of you who has really worked on this for any length of time, believes that, too." President Bill Clinton - Remarks at the Pentagon, February 17, 1998
- "Other countries possess weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. With Saddam, there is one big difference: He has used them, not once, but repeatedly. Unleashing chemical weapons against Iranian troops during a decade-long war. Not only against soldiers, but against civilians, firing Scud missiles at the citizens of Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Iran. And not only against a foreign enemy, but even against his own people, gassing Kurdish civilians in Northern Iraq. The international community had little doubt then, and I have no doubt today, that left unchecked, Saddam Hussein will use these terrible weapons again." -President Bill Clinton - Remarks at the White House , December 16, 1998
- "[I]f you allow someone like Saddam Hussein to get nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, biological weapons, how many people is he going to kill with such weapons? He's already demonstrated a willingness to use these weapons; he poison gassed his own people. He used poison gas and other weapons of mass destruction against his neighbors. This man has no compunctions about killing lots and lots of people." Vice President Al Gore - Larry King Live, December 16, 1998
- "Remember, Peter, this is a man who has used poison gas on his own people and on his neighbors repeatedly. He's trying to get ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons. He could be a mass murderer of the first order of magnitude. We are not going to allow that to happen." Vice President Al Gore - ABC News’ "Special Report,” December 16, 1998
- "We know that [Saddam] has stored away secret supplies of biological weapons and chemical weapons throughout his Country. We have no evidence, however, that he has shared any of those weapons with terrorist groups. Moreover, if we quickly succeed in a war against the weakened and depleted fourth rate military of Iraq and then quickly abandon that nation as President Bush has abandoned Afghanistan after quickly defeating a fifth rate military there, the resulting chaos could easily pose a far greater danger to the United States than we presently face from Saddam." - Vice President Al Gore, Remarks to the Commonwealth Club of California, San Francisco, Calif., September 23, 2002
- "Countering terror is one aspect of our struggle to maintain international security and peace. Limiting the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction is a second. Saddam Hussein's Iraq encompasses both of these challenges.” Secretary Of State Madelyn Albright - Remarks at the American Legion Convention, New Orleans, La., August 9, 1998
- "Iraq is a long way from [America], but what happens there matters a great deal here. For the risk that the leaders of a rogue state will use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons against us or our allies is the greatest security threat we face. And it is a threat against which we must and will stand firm. In discussing Iraq, we begin by knowing that Saddam Hussein, unlike any other leader, has used weapons of mass destruction even against his own people." Secretary Of State Madelyn Albright - CNN "Showdown With Iraq: International Town Meeting," February 18, 1998
- "No one was more surprised than I that we didn't find (WMD's)." General Tommy Franks December 2nd 2005.[81]
- "It is true that much of the intelligence turned out to be wrong." George W. Bush December 14 2005 [82]
See also
- Military preparations for 2003 invasion of Iraq
- Post-invasion Iraq, 2003-2005
- Operation Rockingham
- Office of Special Plans
- September Dossier
- Dodgy Dossier
- Rihab Taha
- Aluminum tubes
- Yellowcake forgery
External links
- Read Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports regarding Iraq
- LookSmart - Iraq WMD Controversy directory category
- Saddam Hussein and WMD Hussein, The UN, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
- On tape, Hussein talks of WMDs by David Ensor, Octavia Nasr, Justine Redman and David de Sola, CNN, February 19, 2006
References
- 1. Report concludes no WMD in Iraq. (7 October 2004). bbc.co.uk.
- 2. Central Intelligence Agency (October 2002). Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs reprinted at www.cia.gov.
- 3. Wallace, Chris (February 1, 2004). Transcript: David Kay on Fox News Sunday. Foxnews.com.
- 4. Arnoldy, Ben and Hauck, Dave (November 6, 2002). The inspections maze. csmonitor.com.
- 5. Corbin, Jane (9 February 2003). Iraqi bio-scientist breaks silence. Transcript of Panorama reprinted at bbc.co.uk.
- 6. Neff, Donald (June 1995). Israel bombs Iraq's Osirak Nuclear Research Facility. Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, p. 81 reprinted at wrmea.com.
- 7. Albright, David and Hibbs, Mark (March 1991). Iraq and the bomb: Were they even close? Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 16–25 reprinted at Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists [website].
- 8. Baghdad prevents inspections at Baath party headquarters. (11 December 1998). ArabicNews.com.
- 9. Hedges, Stephen J. (7 January 1999). UN denies spying for U.S. agencies Chicago Tribune, news section, p. 3 reprinted at ProQuest Archiver. [$4 charge to view full article]
- 10. Middle East Unscom 'infiltrated by spies'. (March 23, 1999). bbc.co.uk.
- 11. Associated Press (1 October 2002). Iraq got seeds for bioweapons from U.S. baltimoresun.com.
- 12. Ritter, Scott (August 31, 1998). Scott Ritter Interview with Elizabeth Farnsworth. NewsHour with Jim Lehrer reprinted at Free Republic.
- 13. Stern, Seth (March 20, 2003). Timeline: the road to war in Iraq. Christian Science Monitor reprinted at GlobalSecurity.org.
- 14. Ritter, Scott (June 24, 1999). Interview with Scott Ritter former UNSCOM chief weapons inspector Interview with Fellowship of Reconciliation. Reprinted at www.firethistime.org.
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